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Summary 
 
This thesis offers the first detailed assessment of the legislative and regulatory differences 
that have developed between Wales and England, in the social housing context, since the 
establishment of the National Assembly for Wales in 1999. The development of policy and 
legislative variation between the nations of the UK remains an underexplored aspect of 
devolution in the UK. This thesis aims to help fill this gap within the existing legal, socio-legal 
and policy literature on devolution and divergence. In undertaking this exploration, the thesis 
also seeks to make a contribution to the literature on housing law and policy.  
In exploring patterns of divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and 
England, the thesis sets out to address four key issues. First, the thesis seeks to 
identify the timing of divergence between Wales and England. Secondly, it explores 
the legislative provisions in place today, and assesses the existence and extent of 
differences between both nations. Thirdly, the thesis considers the impact of 
legislative and regulatory differences in practice. Fourthly, it examines the factors that 
have impacted upon the divergence process.  
 
The thesis uses a mixed methods approach in analysing the issues above. These methods 
include semi-structured interviews, doctrinal analysis, textual analysis, content analysis and 
an exploration of archival material. Deploying this range of methods means that the thesis 
makes a broader contribution to the literature on devolution and social housing. Amongst the 
key findings of the thesis is the identification, for the first of the point at which powers over 
housing were first devolved to Wales, and a development in our understanding of the 
complicated way in which divergence develops. The thesis concludes by reflecting on how 
these, and other findings, impact upon our understanding of devolution in Wales, and by 
discussing the implications for contemporary devolution and housing debates.  
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1. Introduction1 
 
That devolution should generate substantive differences in public policy across 
the component parts of the United Kingdom may seem obvious, since that is 
precisely what it is meant to do. Yet in the protracted debates over more than 
thirty years relatively little systematic attention has been given to this or to its 
implications.2 
Much has changed in the world of Welsh devolution since Michael Keating wrote his 
introduction to Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences within the UK in 2002.3 Over 
the past decade and a half the powers of the National Assembly have increased markedly, 
from limited executive powers, to more significant primary law-making powers. In the 17 
years since its establishment, the Assembly has operated under three different models of 
devolution, with further change to come.4 From 2018 the National Assembly will, for the first 
time, be granted powers over taxation.5 Furthermore, following the enactment of the Wales 
Act 2017, the model of devolution that is in place in Wales will be changed again, with the 
Assembly operating under the reserved powers model of devolution.6 With such continuous 
change it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the academic study of devolution in Wales 
has focused either on developing an understanding of the devolution settlement, or on 
exploring the implications of future constitutional change. With the challenges presented by 
the Wales Act 2017 and Brexit looming ever larger on the horizon, questions around the 
devolution settlement in Wales have grown to become more pressing.7 Whilst the 
significance of the existing literature should not be underestimated, this constitutional 
pressure has meant that some key aspects of devolution have been somewhat overlooked. 
                                                          
1 A reflexive writing approach has been adopted for this chapter. As is argued by Peter Kaufman, writing and 
thinking are 'inextricably linked'. By adopting a reflexive approach to the introduction, this chapter is able to 
set out some of thinking that has underpinned this research project and explain why the thesis has developed 
as it has. Peter Kaufman, 'Scribo Ergo Cogito: Reflexivity through Writing' 41(1) Teaching Sociology 71 
2 Michael Keating ʻDevolution and public policy in the United Kingdom: divergence or convergence?ʼ in John 
Adams and Peter Robinson (eds) Devolution in Practice, public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2002) 3 
ch1 
3 ibid 
4 The first Welsh devolution settlement was the Government of Wales Act 1998. The second Welsh devolution 
settlement was the Government of Wales Act 2006, Part 3, Schedule 5. The third devolution settlement was 
the Government of Wales Act 2006, Part 5, Schedule 7.  
5 As a result of powers devolved under the Wales Act 2014, Part 2. 
6 Wales Act 2017, s 3 
7 New work has already been published concerning this constitutional change including two reports published 
by the Wales Governance Centre and the Constitution Unit. Wales Governance Centre and the Constitution 
Unit, Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015, (Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University, 
February 2016); and Wales Governance Centre and the Constitution Unit, Delivering a Reserved Powers Model 
of Devolution for Wales, (Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University, September 2015) 
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One such area is the development of policy and legislative divergence, as noted by Pete 
Alcock writing in 2012;  
relatively little analysis has taken place of the impact of this devolution on policy 
development in the new century, especially on a comparative basis across the 
four countries.8 
My thesis has set out to examine this underexplored aspect of devolution. The decision to 
examine the development of divergence between Wales and England was not made solely 
on the basis that this is a phenomenon that has been neglected within the existing literature 
on devolution. The limited, yet important work that has already been published on 
divergence suggests that a study of the process could lead us to develop a better 
understanding of how devolution works in practice, and that it could further our knowledge of 
how policy and legislation is developed within a devolved UK. This thesis therefore sets out 
to examine the development of divergence between Wales and England within this broader 
context.  
The literature published on divergence to date has some key characteristics. First, it has 
sought to address three principle questions: the extent to which policy differs between the 
nations of the UK;9 whether the differences that have developed between the nations on 
paper are reflected in practice;10 and what factors have contributed to the divergence 
process.11 Second, the literature has been primarily developed within the social sciences, 
with very little work being published by legal academics on the divergence process.12 Finally, 
the literature on divergence has primarily focused on two policy areas; health and 
education.13 The thesis attempts to address some of the major weaknesses within this 
literature. The approach used in this thesis aims to take law and legal perspectives seriously. 
Given its subject matter which addresses both constitutional and policy arrangements, the 
thesis operates at the boundaries of law and other disciplines - history, politics and policy 
analysis.  Rather than presenting a black-letter or doctrinal analysis, it is in the broad socio-
                                                          
8 Pete Alcock, ʻNew Policy Spaces: The Impact of Devolution on Third Sector Policy in the UKʼ [2012] 46 (2) Soc 
Policy Admin 219, 220    
9 For example, Pauline Jas and Chris Skelcher ʻDifferent Regulatory Regimes in Different Parts of the UK? A 
Comparison of Narrative and Practice in Relation to Poor Performance in Local Governmentʼ 40(1) [2013] Local 
Government Studies 468 
10 For example, Stephen Peckham, Nicholas Mays, David Hughes, Marie Sanderson, Pauline Allen, Lindsay 
Prior, Vikki Entwistle, Andrew Thompson and Huw Davies ʻDevolution and Patient Choice: Policy Rhetoric 
versus Experience in Practiceʼ 46(2) [2012] Soc Policy Admin 199 
11 For example, Scott Greer ʻThe politics of health-policy divergenceʼ in John Adam and Katie Schmuecker 
Devolution in Practice 2006, Public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2005) ch7 
12 Exceptions include Alan Trench who has edited some books in the area, for example; Alan Trench (ed) The 
State of the Nations 2008 (Imprint Academic 2008) 
13 See 1.2 for a discussion on the literature on divergence.   
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legal tradition. It also sets out to add to the body of work on devolution and policy 
divergence, moving beyond the areas of health and education, on which most attention has 
been focused. To achieve this goal this thesis explores the development of legal divergence 
in relation to housing, one of the policy areas that has attracted limited academic scrutiny.14 
Social housing regulation is the particular focus for this thesis.15 Given this focus, the thesis 
also seeks to make a contribution to the literature on housing law and policy.16   
To explore the development of divergence in this previously overlooked policy area, the 
thesis is divided into three parts. Part 1, explores the historical development of divergence 
between Wales and England in the social housing context. In this Part, the thesis, for the first 
time, identifies when housing functions were initially devolved to Wales,17 and charts its 
historical development. Part 2, provides a snapshot of the extent of the differences that exist 
between social housing regulation in Wales and England in the present day. This Part 
demonstrates how, to appreciate the extent of the differences that have developed, it is 
necessary to explore both the legislation, and the regulatory documents that have originated 
at Westminster and Cardiff Bay. Part 3 turns to an exploration of the factors that have 
contributed to the development of these differences. It considers the complicated nature of 
the divergence process and highlights how the process is not liner in nature. Chapter 9, the 
thesis’s conclusion, provides an opportunity to reflect on the findings of these three sections. 
In addition to this, the conclusion considers some of the broader constitutional implications of 
the thesis’s findings, questioning how they impact upon our understanding of devolution in 
Wales.   
My introduction is divided into six sections. Section 1.1 sets out to define some of the key 
concepts that appear in this thesis, setting out what they will mean within the context of my 
thesis. Section 1.2 moves on to discuss the existing literature on devolution and divergence 
in general. It sets out what the literature can teach us about the divergence process, and 
notes the aspects of the field that are in greatest need of further, original research. Having 
done so, section 1.3 moves on to explore the literature on housing, devolution and 
divergence. This section demonstrates the clear need for academic research to be 
undertaken into the development of divergence within the housing context, and highlights 
                                                          
14 The reasons for this are set out in 1.3  
15 ibid 
16 David Cowan argues that separation of housing law and housing policy into separate disciplines is a 'false 
division'. Cowan argues that 'One simply cannot understand, let alone appreciate, the one without the other.' 
This thesis therefore seeks to make a contribution to the discipline of housing law and policy, as advocated by 
Cowan. David Cowan, Housing Law and Policy (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
17 See Chapter 3 in particular. 
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the original contribution this thesis makes to the literature.18 Section 1.4 explores the 
research questions that have formed the basis for my thesis, namely: 
(i) To what extent has social housing regulation in Wales and England diverged?  
(ii) What factors have contributed to the development of divergence and 
convergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
(iii) What is the point of divergence between Wales and England? 
(iv) Why were powers over housing first devolved to Wales and how did the 
devolution settlement develop over time? 
The section discusses some of the challenges that were faced during this research project, 
setting out how these influenced the research questions that were adopted. Section 1.5 sets 
out the structure of the thesis. This section sets out the way that the thesis answers its 
research questions, noting some of the key themes that reappear throughout. These include 
the fact that divergence can develop because of the actions of both the UK and Welsh 
Government, that divergence can develop on a number of levels, and the fact that a number 
of factors have an impact on the divergence process, meaning that law can converge as well 
as diverge. The research methods adopted by this thesis will then be discussed in Chapter 
2. Finally, section 1.6 provides a summary of the work contained within this introduction.  
1.1 Key terms and concepts   
‘Regulation’, ‘social housing’, ‘divergence’ and ‘convergence’ are four key terms that 
underpin the conceptual work undertaken within this thesis. It is therefore important to 
consider what is meant by each term. The purpose of this section is not to contribute to any 
debate around what is meant by each term, but, rather to set out how they are used within 
the context of this thesis.  
‘Regulation’ is a term that appears consistently throughout this thesis. It has been described 
as ‘a phenomenon that is notoriously difficult to define with clarity and precision, as its 
meaning and the scope of its inquiry are unsettled and contested’.19 There are numerous 
reasons why regulation has proven to be such a difficult concept to define. Regulation has 
been described as a concept that does not travel well with ‘no parallel word or even concept’ 
appearing in some non-English-speaking countries.20 Commentators on various parts of the 
                                                          
18 The focus of 1.3 will be on the extent of the literature that has developed on housing and divergence. A 
summary of the broader literature that has developed on social housing governance, operation and 
development can be found in 2.1. 
19 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation, text and materials (first 
published 2007, Cambridge University Press 2007) 3  
20 Julia Black ‘Critical Reflections on Regulation’ (2002) 27 Austl. J. Leg. Phil. 1 
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political spectrum use the term in very distinctive ways.21 It is a concept that has drawn the 
attention of academics working within a range of academic disciplines and traditions, 
including socio-legal studies,22 politics23 and economics.24  
Some analyst define regulation broadly, others, in a more narrow manner. Relatively narrow 
definitions focus on ‘deliberate attempts by the state to influence socially valuable behaviour 
which may have adverse side-effects by establishing, monitoring and enforcing legal rules’,25 
whilst broader definitions encompass ‘all forms of social control, whether intentional or not, 
and whether imposed by the state or other social institutions.’26 As there’s such varied 
literatures addressing regulation it is difficult to identify themes common to all, but, in 
general, the study of regulation has broadened over time to consider a wider range of actors, 
and institutions.  
There has been a widespread presumption that the role of the state has changed since the 
late 1970s. Many scholars of regulation have argued that European states tended to move 
away from Keynesian economics and the idea of the welfare state.27 Services that had once 
been in the hands of the public sector were increasingly being provided by private 
businesses, with the state regulating their activities.28 These scholars described the 
replacement of the welfare state by the regulatory state.29 Such a state was concerned with 
‘steering the flow of events, as opposed to providing and distributing’.30 Subsequently the 
regulatory state concept was challenged and regulatory capitalism proposed as a better 
descriptor.31    
                                                          
21 For example, on the left see Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, (first published 2002, Cambridge 
University Press 2002); and on the right, George J. Stigler, ‘The Theory of Economic Regulation’ (1971) 2 The 
Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 3 
22 Black (n20) 
23 Mick Moran ‘Review Article: Understanding the Regulatory State’ (2002) 32 British Journal of Political 
Science 391  
24 Stigler (n21) 
25 Morgan and Yeung (n19) 
26 ibid 
27 Amongst the academics that discuss this phenomenon are Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe 
(Routledge 1996) 55; John Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism, How it works, ideas from making it work better, 
(Edward Elgar Publishing 2008); Anthony I. Ogus, Regulation, Legal Form and Economic Theory (Clarendon Law 
Series, OUP 1994); David Levi-Faur, ‘The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism’ (2005) ANNALS AAPSS 598; 
Colin Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’ (2000) 27 JLS 38  
28 ibid 
29 ibid; others have used the term ‘hollow state’ H. Brtinton Milward and Keith G. Provan ‘Governing the 
Hollow State’ (2000) 10 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 359 
30 John Braithwaite Neoliberalism or Regulatory Capitalism (Regulatory Institutions Network Research School 
of Social Sciences Australian National University Canberra 2005) 1 
31 For example, Braithwaite (n27) 
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Regulatory capitalism draws on the idea that it is not just the state that regulates the 
activities of private businesses.32 As non-state regulation has grown in prominence, theorist 
of regulatory capitalism have argued that the regulatory state no longer provides a useful 
label.33 It is argued that the label does not fully reflect these new activities and relationships, 
beyond the direct control of the state.34 This shift has prompted new ideas for the study of 
regulation.     
For example, the concepts of decentred regulation35 and regulatory space have become 
increasingly influential amongst scholars of regulation.36 These two concepts are closely 
related. The concept of decentred regulation suggest that command and control, undertaken 
by the state, through the use of legal rules does not reflect accurately the way that regulation 
is undertaken, nor does it explain regulatory failure.37 The role of other actors and 
techniques that go beyond command and control, should also be considered as aspects of 
regulation.38 The notion of regulatory space reinforces the view that regulatory activity may 
be undertaken by a variety of actors and interest groups, including both state and non-state 
organizations.39 Theorists of regulatory space suggest that we should consider not only the 
activities of the non-state actors but also the role of culture in the regulatory process.40 Some 
analysts argue it is culture that created a ‘degree of cohesion’ that allowed for the creation of 
space within which legal regulation could be undertaken.41 They tend to suggest that 
understanding the cultural dynamic is crucial to expanding our understanding of regulation.42  
                                                          
32 ibid 
33 ibid 
34 ibid 
35 Black (n20) 
36 Bettina Lange ‘Regulatory Spaces and Interactions: An Introduction’ (2003) 12(4) SLS 411; and Leigh Hancher 
and Michael Moran ‘Organising Regulatory Space’ in Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran Capitalism, Culture and 
Economic Regulation (Oxford Clarendon Press 1989) 
37 Black (n20) 
38 ibid 
39 Lange (n36) 414, Hancher and Moran (n36) 
40 Lange (n36) 414 
41 ibid 
42 ibid Others, have argued that the regulatory space concept should be expanded further with ‘regulatory 
territory’ being a better label for the concept. Morag McDermont ‘Territorializing Regulation: A Case Study of 
"Social Housing" in England’ (2007) Law and Social Inquiry 373. McDermont argues that a regulatory space 
cannot ‘just be seen for what it is now’ but consideration should also be given to its historical development.  
Furthermore, McDermont argues that the term ‘territory’ is more reflective of the way that regulatory actors 
interact, with each side battling to define their territory and what is under their control. 
12 
 
Some academics have criticised the narrow focus of the literature on a few regulatory 
techniques and particular government and market approaches to regulation. 43 Their 
literature suggests the need to examine other regulatory techniques and architectures.44  
In this thesis I have viewed social housing regulation through the lens of activities 
undertaken by the state, or bodies acting on behalf of the state. In using this perspective, I 
aim to bring the subject of devolution into sharper focus. Clearly, as the wider literatures on 
regulation suggests, there is a sense that regulation is an emergent product of the 
interaction between different state institutions, and non-state actors, operating at different 
levels. There are different ways to approach a regulatory study in this field, the emphasis 
here on state activities reflects the focus of the thesis on devolution. In line with the broader 
approach to regulation discussed above, however, the thesis also takes other actors into 
account in relation to the state’s attempts to regulate social housing, such as lenders.    
A second key term that is used throughout this thesis is ‘social housing’. In their introduction 
to Regulating Social Housing, Governing Decline David Cowan and Morag McDermont 
discuss, in detail, the difficulty of providing a definition for this term.45 They consider three 
characteristics that have been used to make a distinction in typology between social 
housing, and private rental and owner occupation homes.46 The characteristics are: (1) that 
social housing is provided to those in need; (2) that social is provided on grounds that are 
not primarily driven by profit; and (3) that social housing providers are regulated by the 
state.47  Cowan and McDermont argue that these characteristics do not make an useful 
distinction between these types of housing.48 Given these difficulties, they argue that the 
term social housing reflects the ‘mentalities of Government’.49 
Analysing legislation can help to reveal government mentalities around social housing. The 
ways in which the term social housing is used in legislation could define, or at least set some 
                                                          
43 For example; Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, ‘Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for 
Environmental Protection’ (1999) Law and Policy 49; and Peter Grabosky, ‘Beyond Responsive Regulation: The 
expanding role of non-state actors in the regulatory process’ (2012) Regulation and Governance 114; Charles F 
Sabel, Johnathan Zeitlin ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
EU’ (2008) ELJ 271; Joanne Scott, David M Trubek ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in 
the European Union’ (2002) ELJ 1; and Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Lisa Nabatchi, Rosemary O’Leary ‘The New 
Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and Citizen Participation in the Work of Government’ 
(2005) PAR 547 
44 ibid  
45  David Cowan and Morag McDermont, Regulating Social Housing: Governing Decline (Cavendish Publishing 
2006) 3 
46 ibid 
47 ibid 
48 ibid 6 For example, Cowan and McDermont cite controls exercised by government over the private rental 
sector as one problem with this definition. 
49 ibid 7 
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parameters around the definitions of social as a concept in law. In Wales, there is no 
definition of social housing in legislation. Yet ‘social housing’ in Wales is given meaning 
indirectly: Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) are permitted by legislation to undertake 
certain activities – the provision of homes at low cost rents, on a not for profit basis – which 
we can assume is what the Welsh Government considers to be activities relating to ‘social 
housing’.50 In England, a definition of ‘social housing’ can be found in legislation. This 
definition is broader than the definition provided in Wales and includes the provision of 
homes for ‘low cost home ownership accommodation’,51 by both profit making and non-profit 
making organisations.52 
The difference in approach between the governments is interesting. The legislation in Wales 
matches the three characteristics of social housing discussed above closely. In England the 
government seems to have moved beyond this position, with profit making bodies being 
considered as providers as social housing, and organisations being permitted to construct 
homes for those who are not in need. These variations suggest that there is a difference in 
mentality between the Welsh and UK Government on what constitutes social housing. The 
thesis will seek to explore this issue further, questioning why these differences have 
developed.53  
‘Divergence’ and ‘convergence’ are both terms that are used regularly in comparative work 
undertaken on policy and legislative development within the devolved UK.54 No single 
definition of either term has emerged a definitive in the existing literature and it is sometimes 
unclear how they differ from other terms such as difference and variation.55 Nevertheless, 
both terms appear to have been used consistently to refer to processes in the literature.56 
Divergence is used to describe the process of the law and policy becoming more different, 
whilst convergence the law and policy becoming more similar.57 The fact that both terms 
refer to processes has important implications for this thesis. Each government can enact 
legislation which is different, but which does not lead to the development of divergence. For 
                                                          
50 Housing Act 1996 s 2 
51 Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, s 80  
52 ibid 
53 Particular focus is given to this in section 7.1 which discusses the role of politics and ideology on the 
development of divergence.  
54 A full discussion can be found in 1.2 below. 
55 ibid. For example, the Devolution in Practice series, does not contain a definitions section, and neither are 
the meanings of the terms discussed in any of its chapters. John Adams and Peter Robinson (eds) Devolution in 
Practice, public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2002); John Adams and Katie Schmuecker (eds) 
Devolution in Practice, public policy differences within the UK 2006 (ippr 2005); Guy Lodge and Katie 
Schmuecker (eds) Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010). 
56 ibid 
57 ibid 
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example, if the law in both nations was already different prior to the enactment of new 
legislation, divergence would only develop if the new legislative provisions led to the law 
becoming more different than was previously the case. To understand the development of 
legislative and policy divergence and convergence, it is therefore important to consider the 
way that law and policy have developed over time.  
1.2 The literature on divergence 
An underlying assumption found in some of the academic work on devolution is that the 
development of policy variation is a purpose of devolution.58 The establishment of the 
National Assembly for Wales, the reconvening of the Scottish Parliament and the reopening 
of the Northern Irish Assembly under a ʻpermissiveʼ devolution settlement, created the space 
within which policy variation could develop.59 With Northern Ireland’s unique political make 
up,60 and the popular perception of Wales and Scotland being to the left of England,61 it is 
clear how political devolution could lead to the development of divergence. The fact that 
political devolution created the environment within which these political differences could 
lead to the development of policy variation across the UK does not mean that the 
development of such variation was a purpose of devolution. Charlie Jeffrey argues: 
it will be a sign of maturity of devolved politics when divergence is not regarded 
as a necessarily good thing in itself, and there is no political advantage to be 
gained from either introducing new policy initiatives or decrying various initiatives 
simply because they appear to be similar to the situation in Whitehall.62  
Furthermore, empirical research undertaken since 1999 suggests that the perceived political 
differences between the nations of the UK may not be as prevalent as first anticipated. The 
work of leading analysists such as Charlie Jeffrey,63  Guy Lodge,64 Katie Schmuecker,65 and 
John Curtice,66 published in 2006 and 2010 respectively, highlights that the citizens of all 
four nations of the UK broadly share the same opinion on a number of key issues. Not only 
does the data gathered show that UK citizens broadly share the same opinion on policy 
                                                          
58 Keating (n2) 
59 John Adam and Katie Schmuecker ʻIntroduction and overviewʼ in John Adam and Katie Schmuecker 
Devolution in Practice 2006, Public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2005) 3 ch1 
60 ibid 
61 ibid 
62 Charlie Jeffery ʻDevolution and divergence: public attitudes and instructional logics in John Adam and Katie 
Schmueker Devolution in Practice 2006, Public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2005) 48, 49 ch2 
63 ibid; and Charlie Jeffrey, Guy Lodge and Katie Schmuecker, ʻThe devolution paradoxʼ in Guy Lodge and Katie 
Schmuecker (eds) Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010) ch2 
64 ibid 
65 ibid 
66 John Curtice, ʻPolicy divergence: recognising difference or generating resentmentʻ in Guy Lodge and Katie 
Schmuecker (eds) Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010) ch3 
15 
 
matters, it also suggests that the people of the UK wish to see a degree of policy uniformity 
across all four nations.67 This phenomenon has been labelled the devolution paradox, with 
the populations of the devolved nations supporting the transfer of powers to the devolved 
institutions on the one hand, whilst being reluctant to see policy and legislative variation 
develop on the other.68 An example of where the devolution paradox is said to have led to 
the development of convergence can be found in relation to health policy in Wales, with the 
Welsh Government adopting a policy that was more line with England with regard to NHS 
waiting times following public pressure.69 
Whilst the development of policy and legislative variation may not be the purpose of 
devolution, clear evidence has emerged over the previous decade and a half that shows that 
such variation has emerged. The first decade of the twenty-first century saw the publication 
of a number of books that, to varying degrees, charted the development of divergence. 
These included The State of the Nations series,70 The impact of devolution on social policy,71 
and perhaps most significantly, the Devolution in Practice series.72 The Devolution in 
Practice series comprised three books, published in 2002, 2005 and 2010.73 The leading 
experts on devolution and social policy contributed chapters to the books, exploring the 
extent by which policy had diverged. The instances of divergence charted by the contributors 
to these books were diverse and reflected the varying extent by which dissimilarities had 
developed at different points during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Whilst public 
policy, housing and the economy were three devolved areas that drew consistent academic 
interest throughout the books,74 the two areas that attract the greatest scrutiny were health, 
and education and early childhood policy.75 This would suggest that these were the areas 
that saw the greatest degree of divergence develop during the early years of the devolved 
administrations, or that it was within these areas that the differences that had developed was 
of most interest to academic researchers.  
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Whilst the National Assembly’s first decade of operation saw a number of books published 
that provided a snapshot of the extent by which policy variation had developed in a number 
of different devolved areas, these become less prevalent at the turn of the decade. The last 
book in the Devolution in Practice series was published in 2010, whilst the last in the State of 
the Nations series was published in 2008. The instances of divergence set out within the 
books may, therefore, no longer be correct. There appear to be two reasons for the fact that 
there was a reduction in the number of books published that examined policy variation. First, 
some have suggested that funding has become less easily accessible for those developing 
books on devolution.76 Secondly, it has become increasingly difficult to provide an overview 
of the differences that have developed between the nations of the UK across a broad 
number of policy areas in one resource. By 2010 the publishers of Devolution in Practice had 
chosen to omit explicit discussion of education and transport policy from their latest edition of 
the book despite the fact that both policy areas had been ʻimportant themesʼ in the 
conferences that had preceded the book’s publication.77 With the devolved administrations 
having been developing policy and legislation for a further seven years, and the legislative 
powers of the National Assembly for Wales increasing in 2011, the difficulties faced by the 
editors of Devolution in Practice in 2010 in attempting to cover a number of devolved areas 
would appear to be even greater for any editor or author attempting the same task today.  
 
Whilst the body of work that explores the development of divergence across a number of 
devolved areas may have reduced in recent years, a number of academic journal articles 
have been published that have examined the development of divergence in individual policy 
areas. This work has been incredibly diverse. Articles that, to one extent or another, explore 
the extent by which divergence has developed have been published in journals ranging from 
the Journal of Education Policy,78 to Local Government Studies,79 and from Social Policy and 
Administration,80 to Planning, Practice and Research.81 Even though the articles published 
within these and other journals explore very different policy areas, they do share certain 
characteristics. The articles have been published, almost exclusively, within social science 
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journals.82 This means that the body of work that explores the legal significance of 
divergence remains underdeveloped. Another common characteristic is that most of these 
articles do not only focus on one particular policy area, they only explore the extent by which 
divergence has developed with regard to certain policies within that area, for example, 
access to higher education,83 or patient choice within the NHS.84 Whilst this permits the 
authors of these articles to explore the extent by which divergence has developed in these 
particular areas in more depth, it does mean that there are very significant gaps in our 
understanding of where dissimilarities have developed. This, combined with the fact that the 
instances of divergence noted in the existing literature may have already, or may soon 
become dated, means that we should view the published academic work on divergence as 
providing us with guidance as to within which of the devolved areas variation has developed, 
not as a completely accurate resource on the extent of the differences in place today.  
 
Despite the fact that there is clear evidence of policy differences appearing between the 
nations of the UK, the body of work that has developed on divergence does suggest that the 
impact of these differences may be less significant in practice. Perhaps the policy area that 
has attracted the greatest academic study with regards to the impact of divergence in 
practice is health policy. A number of academics draw attention to the fact that promoting 
ʻpatient choiceʼ has been one of the primary health policies of successive Westminster 
Governments since the New Labour era.85 This approach has been in stark contrast to the 
policies that the devolved Governments have adopted, with the devolved administrations 
rejecting the use of the market and competition in providing patient choice, in particular.86 In 
practice, it would seem that there is far less variation between the levels of choice available 
to patients in all four devolved nations.87 Instances of this phenomenon have also been 
found in education policy,88 and within policy on the third sector,89 amongst others. 
The academic literature on the impact of divergence in practice, whilst important, is lacking 
in two regards. First, given that there is not yet a comprehensive body of work on the extent 
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by which divergence has developed on paper between the nations of the UK, it is also not 
possible to complete a comprehensive comparison between divergence in theory and 
practice. Second, much of the literature that explores the extent by which divergence has 
developed in practice does so within the context of comparing government rhetoric with 
policy in practice.90 There would appear to be very little work that examines the impact of 
legislative variation in practice. The Governments in Cardiff Bay and Westminster may have 
in some instances enacted legislation that contain differing provisions but which lead to 
minimal divergence in practice. This is a phenomenon in need of further examination if the 
literature on divergence is to be developed.  
The final aspect of divergence that the existing body of literature explores is the factors that 
contribute to, or constrain its development.  Whilst no consistent terminology has been 
adopted in reference to these factors in the literature on divergence, there do seem to be 
some factors that appear prominently. These factors include the role of ʻpolicy and politicsʼ, 
the nature of the devolution settlement, the existence of structural differences between 
Wales and England, and pressures exerted by the ʻmarketʼ. Understanding how these 
factors impact upon each other allows us to deepen our awareness of the way that 
divergence develops and shapes our understanding of the way that devolution works within 
the UK.  
Despite the empirical research undertaken towards the end of the last decade that 
suggested that the people of the UK were far closer politically than had been the popular 
perception,91 and the academic work undertaken on the devolution paradox,92 it is argued by 
some, that the different political environment within the nations of the UK has contributed to 
the development of divergence, even in the period prior to 2007, when Labour was the party 
of Government in Wales, Scotland and at Westminster.93 It is suggested that the fact that the 
Labour Party in Wales and Scotland were challenged by Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party respectively, pulled the political centre of gravity in the devolved nations to the 
left.94 By contrast the major opposition for Labour at Westminster came from the 
Conservative party, which pulled the debate to the political right, leading to differing policy 
being pursed within different parts of the UK.95 In addition to these party political differences, 
there were also ideological differences within the Labour party at this time. These ideological 
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tensions are perhaps best illustrated by Rhodri Morgan’s famous 'clear red water' speech, in 
which he emphasised the importance social universalism to his Welsh Government in an 
attempt to draw a contrast with the approach taken by New Labour at Westminster.96 With 
each of the UK’s nations having been governed by different political parties since 2010, the 
UK’s political environment would appear to be more conducive to the development of 
divergence. 
A second factor that appears within the literature on the factors that impact on the 
divergence process is the character of the devolution settlement. There appear to be three 
relevant elements here. These can be summarised as; the impact of overlap between the 
powers of the UK and the devolved governments,97 government expenditure,98 and the 
control of supranational organisations.99 The first two elements are closely connected. Whilst 
housing, health and social welfare are policy areas that have been devolved to the National 
Assembly and the Scottish Parliament, a united social security system remains in place 
across Wales, Scotland and England. It is argued that the decisions made by the UK 
Government over social security can have ʻmajor implicationsʼ for devolved areas, leading to 
the different governments of the UK adopting similar policies.100 Not only are the decisions of 
the UK Government said to impact on the devolved nations in those policy areas where a 
degree of overlap exists, but it is argued by some, that the block grant system of distributing 
finance to the devolved nations can place political and practical pressure on the devolved 
governments to adopt similar policies to the ones being pursued by the Westminster 
Government.101 The final element within this factor is the transfer of power to supranational 
organisations. It is suggested that this transfer of power places limitations on the powers of 
the devolved administrations to develop divergent policy and encourages collaboration 
between the nations of the UK.102  
The roots of the third factor noted as potential driver of divergence within the academic 
literature is to be found in each of the UK’s nations. It is suggested that the structural 
differences between the nations of the UK has an impact on the policy developed within 
each nation. These structural differences include differences in topography, demographic 
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and economic conditions. The literature notes, for example, that the size and scale of the 
policy communities in the devolved nations, differs greatly to that of the community that has 
established itself at Westminster over many decades.103 It is argued that this allows and 
encourages the devolved administrations to develop differing approaches to policy making, 
with the devolved Governments developing a more collaborative approach than their 
counterparts at Westminster.104  
The final factor to appear prominently within the literature on divergence is the role of ʻthe 
marketʼ. This is predominantly discussed within the context of the desire of UK politicians to 
maintain a common market across the UK. An example of where the pressure exerted by 
ʻthe marketʼ has impacted on devolved policy can be found with regard to higher education. 
David Raffe argues that the desire of the Welsh Government to ensure that Welsh students 
were not treated unfavourably when applying for a space at a University in England had an 
impact on their proposals to reform secondary education qualifications.105 He argues that it 
was these concerns that meant that the Welsh Baccalaureate was developed in line with the 
regime in place in England, limiting the extent by which differences developed between 
Wales and England.106 It would appear that this is a factor that could figure more prominently 
in a post Brexit UK.107 
The academic research that has been undertaken to examine the factors that encourage the 
development of divergence and convergence suggests that this is a complicated process, a 
theme that reapers throughout this thesis. There appears to a number of reasons why further 
research is required to develop our understanding of it. First, the passage of time may mean 
that the impact of a number of the factors uncovered by previous academic has changed in 
recent years. For instance, any academic research published before 2015 would not have 
been able to explore the potential implications of a majority Conservative Government in 
Westminster on divergence. It is therefore necessary to regularly review the factors that 
contribute to the development of divergence so as to ensure that our understanding of the 
process is accurate. Second, given the significant gaps that appear in the body of work that 
examines divergence more generally, there are number of policy areas within which very 
little analysis has been undertaken as to the factors that impact on the development of 
divergence. Given that the factors that impact on development of divergence may differ in 
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each of these areas, this means that there is a lack of understanding of the way that 
divergence develops. Further research within these devolved areas may discover that there 
are other factors that impact upon the development of divergence that have not been 
unearthed to date. One policy area that could benefit from such further research is housing. 
On the one hand, housing as a policy area has not been adequately covered in the literature 
that has developed on divergence, on the other, the development of legislative and policy 
divergence between the nations of the UK has not been adequately discussed within the 
literature published on housing law and policy. This thesis aims to address this weakness.  
1.3 The literature on housing and divergence 
As demonstrated by Section 1.2 there is a clear need for further research to be undertaken 
into the divergence process, to further our understanding of the process itself, and our 
understanding of the way that law and policy are developed within the devolved UK. This 
section will set out why the thesis has chosen to focus on the development of divergence in 
social housing regulation between Wales and England. This section will focus closely on the 
literature that has been developed with regards to housing and divergence. A broader 
discussion on the literature that has developed on social housing regulation, governance 
and operation is set out in Chapter 2.  
As discussed, housing is a policy area that has not been sufficiently explored in the literature 
on divergence, whilst the divergence process has not been adequately examined in the 
literature on housing law and policy. This is not to say that the development of divergence in 
the housing context has been completely ignored. In her editorial for the Journal of Housing 
Law in 2014, Caroline Hunter states ʻsince devolution, housing law in both Scotland and 
Wales has increasingly diverged from that in Englandʼ.108 Hunter identifies two aspects of 
housing law which she argues has seen the development of particularly significant 
divergence; homelessness law and private sector regulation.109 Hunter’s editorial was not 
the first time homelessness had been identified as an aspect of housing policy within which 
divergence had developed.110 Almost a decade earlier, Robert Smith, a social scientist at 
Cardiff University had identified homelessness and social housing as two policy areas within 
which differences had developed.111 Whilst this academic work provides a useful starting 
point for the study of divergence in housing law and policy between the nations of the UK, 
                                                          
108 Hunter (n82)  
109 ibid 
110 Robert Smith ʻDevolution and divergence in social-housing policy in Britainʼ in John Adams and Katie 
Schmuecker (eds) Devolution in Practice 2006, Public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2005) ch8 
111 ibid. In addition to Smith, Derek Birrell and Steve Wilcox had also identified social housing as an aspect of 
housing policy within which divergence had developed. Birrell (n71); and Steve Wilcox, ʻDevolution and 
housingʼ in Guy Lodge and Katie Schmuecker Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010) ch11 
22 
 
this work has, at times, lacked detail,112 or has become dated.113 It would seem clear that 
housing is a policy area within which further research is needed if we are to develop our 
understanding of divergence. It was for this reason that this thesis chose to focus on this 
policy area.  
Although the body of academic work that explores the development of divergence within the 
housing context is limited, a number of leading housing policy and law academics have 
published work that explores the policy and legislative initiatives of both the Westminster and 
the devolved Governments over the previous twenty years. Much of this work has not been 
comparative in nature, with the exception of some work that has set out how the other 
nations of the UK and nations further afield could learn from particular policy initiatives.114 
This does not reduce the significance of this work. It plays a vital role in developing our 
understanding of both housing policy and legislation in each of the UK’s nations whilst also 
providing an indication as to within which areas divergence has developed.  
Social housing regulation is one aspect of housing law and policy that has attracted some 
academic comment over this period. 2006 saw the publication of David Cowan and Morag 
McDermont’s Regulating Social Housing: Governing Decline.115 The book provides a 
comprehensive exploration of the factors that had contributed to the development of social 
housing and the role of regulation within the social housing sector. Whilst exploring the 
development of the social housing sector and regulation across the UK as a whole, the book 
does not specifically explore the impact of devolution on this process. Robert Smith’s 
chapter in Devolution in Practice 2006 does note that responsibility for the regulation of local 
authority and housing association homes had been devolved to Wales and Scotland but 
provides little comment beyond this observation.116 The implications of the devolution of 
                                                          
112 The work of Hunter (n82); and Birrell (n71); in particular, only provide a very brief summary of the areas 
within which differences have developed. 
113 For example, in his work Steve Wilcox discusses the policy variations that had developed with regard to the 
right to buy. In the years since the publication of his work, the right to buy has been abolished in Scotland. In 
Wales, the Welsh Government has the power to suspend the right to buy in individual local authorities and is 
bringing forward legislation to abolish the right to buy in its entirety. In England on the other hand, the right to 
buy has been extended to the properties of housing associations. Wilcox (n111);  
Aspects of Robert Smith’s work have also become dated. At the time of his chapter’s publication, only 
Bridgend County Borough Council had transferred their social housing stock to stock transfer housing 
associations. By 2016, 11 out of 22 Local Authorities had done so. This means that his observation that fewer 
Local Authorities in Wales had transferred their social housing stock to the third sector than was the case in 
England is of less significance. Smith (n111) 
114 For example, Peter Mackie ʻHomelessness Prevention and the Welsh Legal Duty: Lessons for International 
Policiesʼ 30(1) [2015] Hosing Studies 40   
115 Cowan and McDermont n(45) 
116 Smith (n111) 126 
23 
 
social housing regulation would become increasingly clear in the months and years following 
the publication of these two books. 
In December 2006 Professor Martin Cave was commissioned to review the way that social 
housing regulation was undertaken in England.117 Over the following five years three further 
reviews were undertaken into social housing regulation across the UK; a Scottish 
Government Review in Scotland,118 the Essex Review in Wales,119 and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government Review in England.120 These Reviews resulted in the 
Governments of Wales and Scotland, and the Westminster Government in England enacting 
new legislation and making regulatory changes, leading to the possibility that the way that 
regulation is undertaken in each of the three nations is now different.121 Whilst there has 
been very limited study of the impact of these changes on the development of regulatory 
variation, there has been academic work undertaken to explore the importance of these 
legislative and regulatory changes within each of the three nations.  
Some of this work has been rather descriptive in nature. For example, a piece published in 
the Journal of Planning & Environment Law in 2009 provides legislative comment on the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the legislation enacted in England in the wake of the 
Cave Review.122 The piece merely sets out the steps that had led to the enactment of the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, and provides an overview of the Act’s provisions and 
content.123 Others provide some analysis on the likely impact of these changes as they were 
developing at the time. Simon Hoffman’s article in the Journal of Housing Law in 2010 
explores the potential impact of transferring legislative competence over housing to the 
National Assembly for Wales on social housing regulation, particularly in light of the 
recommendations of the Essex Review, made just a few months earlier.124 There are others, 
however, who provide a more critical analysis of the content of the Reviews and the 
legislative and regulatory proposals that followed in their wake. David Cowan’s article in the 
Journal of Housing Law in 2008 delivers a particularly robust critique of the approach of the 
                                                          
117 The Cave Review Of Social Housing Regulation, Every Tenant Matters: A Review of Social Housing 
Regulation (June 2007) 
118 Scottish Government, Firm Foundations: the future of housing in Scotland (October 2007) 
119 Affordable Housing Task and Finish Group, Report to the Deputy Minister for Housing (June 2008) 
120 Department for Communities and Local Government, Review of Social Housing Regulation, (October 2010) 
121 The legislation included the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the Housing (Scotland) Act 2010, the 
Localism Act 2011 and the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011. 
122 ʻLegislative Comment. The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008ʼ [2009] J.P.L. 46 
123 An example of another descriptive piece is Andrew Dymond and Christopher Handy ʻRegulation of social 
landlords – the new regimeʻ 15(4) [2012] J.H.L 77  
124 Simon Hoffman ʻLegislative competence in housing for Wales: an assessment of likely impactsʼ 13(3) [2010] 
J.H.L. 41 
24 
 
Labour Government at Westminster to housing policy, questioning the significance of its 
legislative proposals and the approach taken to Cave Review.125 
The broader body of academic work that has developed on social housing regulation, 
governance and operation, whilst not directly exploring the divergence process, does 
suggest that it is an aspect of housing policy within which differences have developed. This 
literature will be explored in more detail in 2.1. The literature does not only suggest that the 
way that regulation is undertaken across the UK differs in the present day, it also suggests 
that this divergence may have deeper historical roots. This literature is at times 
inconsistent,126 with some suggesting that housing powers were first devolved to Wales prior 
to the 1950s.127 Despite this disagreement within the literature Alan Murie’s extensive guide 
to the history of social housing regulation in the UK makes it clear that there were 
differences between the way that social housing regulation was undertaken in the nations of 
the UK before the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales and the Scottish 
Parliament.128 It would appear that exploring the development of divergence within social 
housing regulation does not only provide us with an opportunity to further our understanding 
of the phenomenon in the present day, but also gives us an opportunity to develop our grasp 
of how divergence and devolution developed over time. Such an exploration provides us with 
an opportunity to deepen our understanding of the divergence process, allowing us to 
examine it during a period prior to political devolution.   
1.4 Research questions 
Having explored the literature on divergence and explored its development within the 
housing context, the chapter now turns to look at the research questions adopted by my 
thesis. The literature review set out that the body of academic work concerning divergence 
has attempted to address three questions: (1) to what extent has policy and legislative 
variation developed between the nations of the UK? (2) Is the impact of divergence on paper 
being felt in practice? (3) What factors impact upon the divergence process? Given the 
weakness identified within the literature review in relation to each of these three questions, 
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there is a pressing need for further research to be undertaken to address all of them. This 
thesis will only focus on two of these broader question: the extent by which variation has 
developed, and the factors that have an impact upon the divergence process. The reasons 
for this will be set out below.  
1.4.1 To what extent has policy and legislative variation developed between the 
nations of the UK? 
It would appear imperative that any research project that explores the divergence process 
within the devolved UK considers the extent by which policy and legislative variation has 
developed. It would be impossible to examine the impact of divergence in practice, and the 
factors that have influenced the divergence process if there was no understanding of the 
extent by which the law and policy were different. To gain a clear understanding of the 
differences that now exist between the nations of the UK, the literature on divergence 
suggests that it is necessary to focus on one policy area in depth. The growth in the body of 
law, and the increasing number of policy initiatives emanating from both the devolved 
administrations and the UK Government has made it increasingly difficult for researchers to 
explore the extent of the differences that exist between the nations of the UK in both breadth 
and depth.129 Given the need to develop the body of literature on divergence across almost 
all devolved areas, this thesis could have explored the process within many different fields. 
Education and health policy are the two devolved areas that have attracted the greatest 
academic interest within the divergence context to date.130 As discussed above, however, 
housing, in particular social housing regulation, is an area within which divergence has been 
under-researched. It was decided that this thesis would seek to contribute to this 
underdeveloped area of study. 
Having decided to focus on the development of divergence within social housing regulation, 
there was a further consideration to keep in mind when drafting the research questions for 
the thesis; what would be its territorial extent? Would the thesis attempt to explore the 
divergence process across all the nations of the UK or focus on two? The decision was 
made to focus on Wales and England. It was decided that exploring the extent by which 
differences had developed in social housing regulation across all four nations of the UK 
would potentially mean that the thesis lacked the ability to explore the divergence process in 
sufficient depth. Given that my thesis was being undertaken at Cardiff University, and was 
funded by an Arts and Humanities Council Comparative Doctoral Award with support 
provided by Blake Morgan Solicitors, conducting a comparison between Wales and England 
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was the obvious choice. The University’s location, close to the National Assembly and the 
Welsh Government’s offices, and Blake Morgan’s position as one of the largest law firms in 
Wales provided unique opportunities to engage with stake-holders and policy makers to 
develop an understanding of the way that regulation was undertaken in Wales, both formally 
and informally. The fact that regulation in England is the responsibility of the Westminster 
Government on the other hand means that the decisions taken on social housing regulation 
on the eastern side of Offa’s Dyke do continue to have some impact in Wales.131 This, 
coupled with the closer administrative ties that exist between Wales and England, led to the 
decision to explore the extent by which social housing regulation had diverged between 
these two nations. Three research questions were developed in this context: 
• To what extent has social housing regulation in Wales and England diverged?  
• What is the point of divergence between Wales and England? 
• Why were powers over housing first devolved to Wales and how did the 
devolution settlement develop over time? 
1.4.2 What factors impact upon the divergence process? 
Having developed two research questions about the extent of the differences that have 
developed between Wales and England, the next consideration for this research project was 
whether the thesis would merely provide a detailed account of the extent by which 
divergence had developed, or would it also explore the extent by which divergence had 
developed in practice, or consider some of the factors that had, had an impact on its 
development?  The first of these approaches was quickly dismissed. As noted in the 
literature review, the academic work that only explores the extent by which variation 
develops can quickly become dated. Whilst this work can provide a useful resource for those 
who wish to explore the extent that divergence has developed at a given point in time, and 
can assist legal historians who wish to chart the development of divergence, it was felt that 
limiting the thesis to only charting the divergence that had developed with regard to social 
housing regulation would not assist us in developing our understanding of the process and 
devolution more generally. It was therefore decided that the thesis should, in addition to 
exploring the extent by which variation had developed between Wales and England, 
consider the impact of divergence in practice, or it should explore the factors that impacted 
upon the divergence process. Such an exploration would also help further our understanding 
of either the way that legislation and policy apply in practice, or our understanding of how 
legislation and policy are developed, within the devolved UK.     
                                                          
131 See discussions on welfare spending and the Barnett formula in section 1.1 above.  
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It became clear while undertaking this research project that it would not be possible to 
examine both the impact of divergence in practice and the factors that drive the process in 
depth. A decision was therefore made to focus exclusively on the factors that impact upon 
the divergence process. This decision was reached on two primary grounds. First, difficulties 
were encountered when approaching registered providers in England for research 
interviews.132 Such interviews would have permitted the project to consider the experiences 
of Welsh and English housing associations of regulation in practice. Second and perhaps 
most importantly, in November 2015 the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published a 
decision that was to have a significant impact upon social housing regulation.     
In November 2015, the ONS decided that, given the extent of the control exercised by the 
UK Government over registered providers of social housing in England through regulation, 
they should be reclassified as part of the public sector.133 The decision had enormous 
implications. The debt of English registered providers, some £60 billion was transferred, from 
the private sector onto the public balance sheet.134 In response, the UK Government 
enacted legislation to deregulate the social housing sector in England, in an attempt to 
reverse the ONS’ decision.135 Shortly after the ONS reached its decision in England, it 
became apparent that a similar decision would be reached if the ONS were to review the 
classification of Welsh RSLs.136 In the spring of 2016 the ONS announced that they would 
take such a review and by September 2016 they made public their decision to reclassify 
Welsh RSLs.137 It appears almost certain that the Welsh Government will follow the lead of 
its counterparts in Westminster, changing the way that regulation is undertaken in Wales in a 
bid to reverse the ONS’s decision.138 Given that the literature currently in place on the factors 
that drive divergence does not seem to have considered the impact of international 
                                                          
132 This is discussed in greater detail in 2.2.3. 
133 Office for National Statistics ʻClassification announcement: “Private registered providers” of social housing 
in Englandʼ (30 October 2015). 
134 Housing association change adds £59 billion to UK debt (Business Reporter, 20 November 2015) 
http://business-reporter.co.uk/2015/11/20/housing-association-change-adds-59-billion-to-uk-debt/ accessed 
15 June 2016 
135 The Housing and Planning Act 2016 
136 Steffan Evans ʻAdding £2.3bn of debt to the accounts – social housing deregulation as an early test for the 
minority Welsh Governmentʼ (LSE British Politics and Policy Blog, 10 May 2016) < 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/adding-2-3bn-of-debt-to-the-national-accounts-social-housing-
deregulation-as-an-early-test-for-the-minority-welsh-government/> accessed 23 July 2016 
137 Office for National Statistics ʻEconomic statistics sector classification - classification update and forward 
work plan: Mar 2016ʼ (29 March 2016); and Office for National Statistics ʻStatistical classification of registered 
providers of social housing in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: September 2016ʼ (29 September 2016) 
138 A Welsh Government spokesperson said: ʻWe are exploring a legislative solution to the issue of 
reclassification, and housing associations can be confident that it will be resolvedʼ  Heather Spurr 
ʻGovernments pledge to reverse ONS reclassificationʼ (Inside Housing, 30 September 2016) < 
http://www.insidehousing.co.uk/governments-pledge-to-reverse-ons-reclassification/7017032.article> 
accessed 2 November 2011.  
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accountancy standards on the process, it was felt that moving the focus of the thesis to 
examining the factors that have impacted upon the divergence process, provided an 
opportunity to further our understanding of it, making a valuable contribution to the literature 
on the divergence process within the devolved UK.  
The fact that the existing literature on the factors that impact upon the divergence process 
did not explore the role of the ONS highlighted a further need to focus on this research 
question. No academic work had been undertaken, prior to this thesis, which had explored 
the factors that contribute to the development of divergence in social housing regulation.139 
Given that it appeared likely that a study of social housing regulation would unearth evidence 
that a previously unidentified factor impacted upon the way divergence developed between 
Wales and England, this led to the question of whether the factors that had already been 
identified within the literature on divergence, had the same impact upon the divergence 
process in the social housing context? It became clear that exploring the factors that had 
contributed to the development of policy and legislative variation in social housing regulation 
could strengthen our understanding of the divergence process as a whole, and the way that 
policy and legislation is developed in Wales and England. The thesis has therefore set out to 
address the following question: 
• What factors have impacted upon the development of divergence and convergence 
in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
There was one further reason why this research question was addressed. Understanding the 
divergence process is key, if our understanding of the devolution settlement, in particular, 
our understanding of the way that the Westminster parliament and the devolved 
administrations operate, is to be improved. An examination of the factors that have an 
impact on the divergence process allows us to develop our knowledge of the way that policy 
spill overs impacts upon the work of both the Welsh and UK Governments. It also provides 
us with an opportunity to develop our awareness of the way that Welsh law develops, 
leading to questions that could have an impact on the ongoing debate concerning the 
creation of a distinct Welsh legal jurisdiction, and the debate concerning the codification of 
Welsh law. My thesis will review some of these broader constitutional questions as it 
progresses and will reflect on how the thesis’ findings impacts upon our understanding of 
Wales’s devolution settlement in its conclusion.  
                                                          
139 There has been some work, however, within the literature on Housing Law and Policy that has explored the 
development of social hosing regulation. See section 1.2  
29 
 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
Having set out the research questions that my thesis will address in section 1.4, this section 
turns to consider how these questions will be addressed, and will note some of the key 
themes that reappear throughout the thesis. The thesis can be divided in three. Part One, 
comprising Chapters 3 to 5, will explore the historic development of housing devolution in 
Wales, searching for the point of divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and 
England. Part Two, comprising only Chapter 6, explores the extent by which social housing 
regulation differs in Wales and England today. Part Three, comprising Chapters 7 and 8, 
explores the factors that have contributed to both the development of divergence and 
convergence, examining how these factors work with and against each other. The 
Conclusion in Chapter 9 looks back over the findings of the thesis, highlighting the areas 
within which future research is required. 
1.5.1 Chapter 2 Sector and Methods  
Before seeking to address the thesis’ three research questions, Chapter 2 sets out to place 
the thesis in its broader context and to consider the research methods it has utilized. The 
purpose of this section is to highlight the context within which the legislative and regulatory 
divergence, discussed within the remainder of the thesis, developed. This chapter will focus 
specifically on developments over recent years within the social housing, and the impact 
they may have had on the nature of the social housing sectors in Wales and England. The 
chapter will then move on to consider the methods employed within the thesis, noting their 
limits and possibilities.  
1.5.2 Part 1: The historic development of divergence in social housing regulation  
Part 1 of the thesis explores the historic development of patterns of divergence and 
differences in social housing regulation across Wales and England. This analysis makes an 
original contribution to our knowledge and understanding of divergence and devolution. It 
highlights how, even in an era of limited devolution, differences were beginning to emerge 
between social housing policy in Wales and England, suggesting that divergence precedes 
political devolution. Furthermore, Part 1 will argue that devolution within housing did not 
develop as a result of a ‘processes of thinking’ but was rather the consequence of a series of 
politically expedient, ad-hoc decisions.  
With the existing literature on social housing and Wales suggesting that divergence 
precedes political devolution, it is clear that, in order to understand present day divergence, 
it is necessary to uncover its historical roots. Part 1 does so with the aim of addressing three 
research questions in particular:  
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• What is the point of divergence between social housing regulation in Wales and 
England?? 
• What factors have impacted upon the development of divergence and convergence 
in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
• Why were powers over housing first devolved to Wales and how did the devolution 
settlement develop over time? 
As noted in 1.3 there is no consensus within the academic literature on housing and 
devolution over when housing functions were first devolved to Wales.140 Indeed, with the 
exception of Malcom J Fisk’s chapter in Housing in Wales, The Policy Agenda in an Era of 
Devolution there has been very limited study of the history of housing in Wales, with a 
particular gap in the literature on the role that housing has played in the development of 
devolution.141 By drawing on this previously unexamined archival material I have been able 
to establish, for the first time, that housing policy in Wales diverged from the English position 
as early as 1 May 1940.  
On 1 May 1940, limited administrative housing functions were devolved to the Welsh Board 
of Health.142 This was the first time that housing in Wales was to be administered separately 
to housing in England. The significance of this decision and the process that led to it, is 
discussed in Chapter 3.143 Having established 1 May 1940 as the initial point of divergence 
between Wales and England, the remainder of Part 1 charts the development of housing 
devolution in Wales, and examines the extent by which divergence grew over the following 
decades. The remainder of Chapter 3, and Chapters 4 and 5 discuss a number of important 
steps along the devolution and divergence journey. These include the establishment of a 
separate Welsh Office within the Ministry of Housing and Local Government,144 the 
establishment of the post of Secretary of State for Wales145 and the establishment of Tai 
Cymru as an independent Welsh regulator of housing associations.146  
The historic study of the development of housing devolution and divergence concludes at the 
turn of the first decade of the 21st century. Chapter 5 explores the way that both the 
divergence processes and devolution developed during the early years of the National 
                                                          
140 Murie (n126); Fisk (n126); and Evans (n126) 
141 Fisk (n136) 
142 Circular 2005, sent by the Ministry of Health to the County and County Borough, Town, Urban District and 
Rural District Council in Wales and Monmouthshire, 26 April 1940 National Archives File HLG 158/ 3 
143 In particular, in section 2.3 
144 See section 2.4 
145 See section 3.1 
146 See section 3.3 
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Assembly and provides a link between the historical aspect of the thesis and a more 
contemporary study of divergence. 
1.5.3 Part 2: Divergence today 
Part 2 sees the focus of the thesis turn to the contemporary period. Chapter 6 sets out to 
provide a snapshot of the extent by which divergence has developed between Wales and 
England on 31 January 2017.147 In doing so Part 2 addresses the thesis’s first research 
question: 
• To what extent has social housing regulation in Wales and England diverged?  
In order to explore the extent of the divergence that has developed between Wales and 
England, Chapter 6 focuses on three key areas of regulation; registration,148 tenant 
protection,149 and the regulatory controls cited by the ONS in their reclassification 
decisions.150 This approach was adopted so that the extent by which divergence has 
developed can be examined in detail in these three areas, as opposed to providing a brief 
overview of regulation more generally. In doing so the thesis is able to explore the extent by 
which divergence has developed between both primary and secondary legislation, and 
between the regulatory frameworks that are in place in both nations.  
1.5.4 Part 3: What causes divergence? 
The final part of this thesis explores the factors that have contributed to the divergence 
process. This work can be found spread over two chapters. Chapter 7, discusses the role of 
political and constitutional factors; specifically the impact of the devolution settlement and 
policy and politics on divergence. Chapter 8 meanwhile considers the impact that issues 
within the social housing sector have had on divergence, namely; accountancy techniques 
and the ONS, private finance and the structural differences that exist between Wales and 
England. The research undertaken for the purposes of this thesis suggest that each factor 
does have an impact on the divergence process, contributing to both the development of 
policy and legislative variation and convergence. In undertaking this analysis, Part 3 
addresses the thesis’s third research question: 
• What factors have impacted upon the development of divergence and convergence 
in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
                                                          
147 A discussion as to why the extent of the differences set out in this thesis should only be considered correct 
as of 31 January 2017 is set out in 2.1. 
148 See section 6.1 
149 See section 6.2 
150 See section 6.3 
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1.5.5 Conclusion and broader significance 
The Conclusion will provide the thesis with an opportunity to both reflect on its findings, and 
to consider their broader significance. The Conclusion will focus on the original contributions 
made to the literature on divergence in Part 3 of the thesis, which examines the factors that 
impact upon the divergence process. These findings give us a clearer understanding of the 
way that legislation and policy on social housing regulation is developed in both Cardiff Bay 
and at Westminster.  
To ascertain the broader significance of these findings, the Conclusion will consider, in the 
first instance, the relationship between devolution and divergence. Reflecting on the findings 
of my thesis, it will consider whether the development of a degree of divergence is an 
inevitable consequence of devolution. Having explored this connection, the Conclusion will 
move on to consider some of the broader changes facing the housing sector, a sector, that it 
is argued, is currently in a state of flux. The findings of the thesis give us a better 
understanding of some of the factors that impact upon the work of both legislatures as they 
try and deal with the ʻhousing crisisʼ.  
The chapter will conclude by considering some of the broader constitutional questions that 
arise from this research project. The conclusion will consider questions that have arisen 
about what constitutes ʻWelsh lawʻ, the codification of the ʻWelsh lawʼ and the future of the 
untied legal jurisdiction of England and Wales. The findings of this thesis would seem to 
suggest that the debate, currently ongoing in relation to these big constitutional questions 
would be improved if greater consideration was given to the divergence process. They also 
suggest that if the study of divergence continues to be overlooked, that there is a risk that 
the people of Wales could be at a disadvantage to the people of England.  
1.5.6 Key themes 
Whilst the thesis can be divided into three parts, there are a number of themes that appear 
consistently throughout each of these. These include the fact that divergence can develop 
because of the actions of both the UK and Welsh Government, that divergence can develop 
on a number of levels, and the fact that a number of factors have an impact on the 
divergence process, meaning that law and policy can converge as well as diverge. Each of 
these themes has an impact upon our understanding of the divergence process and the way 
that devolution works in practice. This sub-section will briefly set out their significance.  
Since political devolution became a reality in the UK at the turn of the millennium there has 
been a growing body of academic work that examines the devolution process. Much of this 
academic work has focused on the new devolved institutions in Belfast, Cardiff and 
Edinburgh. The establishment of new legislatures in those three nations has not been the 
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only impact that devolution has had on the UK. Devolution has meant that a new body of law 
and policy has developed, legislation which is enacted and policy that is implemented, by the 
UK Government, but which only applies in England. Until the introduction of English Votes 
for English Laws in 2015, no formal mechanism had existed within the Westminster 
Parliament that recognised its dual role as a legislature for the United Kingdom as a whole 
and as the de facto legislature for England. Perhaps as a consequence of this a-symmetrical 
devolution settlement, an erroneous presumption has been evident in some of the discourse 
surrounding devolution and divergence, namely, that the development of divergence is a 
consequence of the actions of the devolved legislatures.151 Whilst this may be true in a 
number of instances, a theme that keeps reappearing throughout this thesis is the fact that 
divergence can develop as a result of the actions of both the devolved and UK 
Governments. If we are to fully understand the impact of devolution on policy development 
and legislation in the UK then it is important that this is considered in all future discussions 
on divergence. 
A second important theme that reappears throughout this thesis is that divergence and 
convergence can develop at a number of levels - and the levels to not necessarily push in 
the same direction. These levels include primary legislation, secondary legislation and 
regulatory frameworks. The thesis demonstrates how, on occasions, despite the existence of 
similar primary legislation, the Governments in Cardiff and Westminster have developed very 
different approaches to its implementation, for example, developing different approaches to 
regulation and registration.152 On other occasions, the Governments have approached 
issues very similarly, despite the existence of very different legislative provisions.153 This 
phenomenon, and the reasons for it are discussed throughout the thesis. This finding 
furthers our understanding of how policy and legislation is developed and implemented in the 
UK, emphasizing the need to look beyond headline policy announcements and primary 
legislation, to achieve a fuller understanding of law and policy.   
A third theme that reappears consistently throughout the thesis is the fact that a number of 
factors contribute to the divergence process. These factors can lead to the law diverging 
further, or converging, emphasizing the fact that divergence is not a linear process. The 
thesis identifies five factors that have impacted on divergence between Wales and England. 
These include political and ideological differences, technocracy, structural differences, 
                                                          
151 For example, see Lord Crickhowell’s comments during the Wales Bill’s second reading. Lord Crickhowell 
talks of 'diverging Welsh laws' as a result of 'emerging body of law made by the Welsh Government'. He makes 
no reference to diverging English laws. HL Deb, 10 October 2016, vol 774, col 1684. See also the discussion in 
sub-section 9.3 on the Wales Act 2017. 
152 See sub-section 6.1.2 for more information 
153 ibid 
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pressures exerted by the financial sector and the nature of the devolution settlement. In 
exploring this process, the thesis makes a valuable contribution to the literature on policy 
development within the devolved UK, both supporting and challenging some of the published 
literature.  
1.6 Conclusion  
The introduction has clearly identified gaps or weaknesses within the literature on devolution 
in the UK, in particular within literature that has developed on policy and legislative 
divergence. As discussed in Section 1.2, this literature has primarily developed within the 
social sciences and has focused on specific policy areas.154 This focus has meant that the 
development of divergence within other policy areas remains underexplored. There is also a 
clear need for the divergence process to be examined by academics from other disciplines, 
including the law, if the phenomenon is to be accurately understood. My thesis attempts to 
address both these weaknesses, by exploring the development of divergence in social 
housing regulation between Wales and England.155 To plug this gap in the academic 
literature my thesis sets out to address four research questions:   
(v) To what extent has social housing regulation in Wales and England diverged?  
(vi) What factors have contributed to the development of divergence and 
convergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
(vii) What is the point of divergence between Wales and England? 
(viii) Why were powers over housing first devolved to Wales and how did the 
devolution settlement develop over time? 
As set out in 1.5, the thesis will address these three questions in three parts. The first part 
will focus on the historic development of devolution and divergence within the social housing 
context. The second will explore the extent of the differences that are in place between 
Wales and England in the present day. Whilst the third will examine the factors that impact 
upon the divergence process. Through this examination my thesis will not only developed 
the academic understanding of the divergence process but will also make a valuable 
contribution to the broader body of work on Welsh devolution.   
                                                          
154 Namely health and education.  
155 The reasons for this focus are given in Section 1.2      
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2. Sector and methods 
Having set out the general scope of the thesis in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 turns to look at some 
of the broader literature that has developed on social housing, and the methods used in 
addressing the thesis’s research questions. The Chapter is divided into two. Section 2.1 
seeks to provide a synopsis of the extensive literature on social housing governance, 
operation and financing. The purpose of this section is to place the work of this thesis within 
the broader academic literature that has been published on social housing, with particular 
regard to the literature on the operation of housing associations. The chapter also gives an 
overview of the social housing sector in Wales and England. Section 2.2 goes on to consider 
the thesis’s methodology and research methods, setting out both their limits and possibilities.  
2.1 The literature on social housing and housing associations 
As set out in 1.2 and 1.3, housing is a subject area that has been to some extent overlooked 
within the literature that has developed on legislative and policy divergence in the UK, whilst 
divergence is a process that has largely been overlooked in the literature on housing. The 
last decade has seen a significant growth in the literature published on the development of 
the social housing sector generally. This literature has an international dimension with the 
development of the sectors in Australia1 and the Netherlands, attracting significant academic 
comment.2 There has been a great deal of academic commentary on the development of the 
social housing sector in England. Section 2.1.1 will demonstrate how this literature argues 
that, with a reduction in the availability of public funds for the construction of social housing, 
housing associations have turned to the private sector for increasingly innovative forms of 
finance.3 It is argued in the literature, that this pursuit of private finance has seen a number 
of organisations develop an ‘entrepreneurial’4 approach leading to a rise of ‘hybrid’ 
organisations.5 Having considered the literature on England, the chapter will turn to look at 
Wales. The literature that has developed on ‘hybridity’ and ‘entrepreneurialism’ in England is 
                                                          
1 For example; Ilan Wiesel, Gethin Davison, Vivienne Milligan, Peter Phibbs, Bruce Judd and Michael Zanardo, 
‘Developing sustainable affordable housing: a project level analysis’ (2012) Australian Housing and Research 
Institute; and Victor Gruis and Nico Nieboer, ‘Government regulation and market orientation in the 
management of SH assets: Limitations and opportunities for European and Australian landlords’ (2007) 
European Journal of Housing Policy 45 
2 For example; Victor Gruis, ‘Organisational archetypes for Dutch housing associations’ (2008) Environemnt and 
Planning C 26: Politics and Space 1077; and Victor Gruis and Nico Nieboer, ‘Shifting back – Changing 
organisational strategies in Dutch social housing’ (2014)  Journal of Housing and Built Environment 1  
3 For example Connie P.Y. Tang, Michael Oxley and Daniel Mekic, ‘Meeting commercial and social goals: 
institutional investment in the housing association sector’ (2017) Housing Studies 411 
4 For example Nicola Morrison, ‘Selling the family silver? Institutional entrepreneurship and asset disposal in 
the English housing association sector’ (2017) Urban Studies 2856 
5 Nicola Morrison, ‘Institutional logics and organisational hybridity: English housing associations’ diversification 
into the private rented sector’ (2016) Housing Studies 897  
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not present in Wales. 2.1.2 will therefore provide a summary of the social housing sector in 
Wales, as it stands at 6 June 2017, in relation to the published academic work from England 
and beyond.  
2.1.1 The development of the sector in England 
As of 1 August 2016, 1,769 housing associations were registered with the Homes and 
Communities Agency (the social housing regulator in England) as providers of social 
housing in England.6 These organisations varied significantly in size and scale, from the 
G157 to small almshouses.8 In 2015, these organisations provided a total 2,708,611 homes 
across all housing tenures, playing a significant role in housing the nation.9 Chapters 3, 4 
and 5 will chart the development of these organisations over previous decades. This section, 
however, will draw attention to some of the current debates ongoing within the social 
housing sector, as to how the sector is developing and how it may change in future. In doing 
so this section will set the landscape within which any divergence in social housing 
regulation has developed.  
For over a decade, governments across the world have reduced the amount of public money 
spent on social housing.10 This has presented a significant challenge for the sector. On the 
one hand, providers of social housing are expected to continue to meet their ‘social mission’ 
of providing homes for those who can’t afford what is on offer on the open market. On the 
other, the reduction in public funds has put pressure on providers to operate in a more 
commercial manner so that they can attract private finance, or so that they can develop their 
own revenue streams.11 These competing pressures have led to the development of what 
have been dubbed as ‘hybrid’ organisations, organisations that exist in a grey area between 
the state, the market and the community, receiving funds from a range of sources and 
providing a diverse range of services.12 
                                                          
6 Homes and Communities Agency, ʻCurrent Providers of Social Housingʼ, (Gov.uk, 1 August 2016) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/current-registered-providers-of-social-housing accessed 10 
August 2016 
7 A group of London’s 15 largest registered providers. They manage 410,000 homes between them. G15, 
ʻAbout usʼ (G15) http://g15london.org.uk/about-us/ accessed 10 August 2016 
8 Register of providers n(6) 
9 Homes and Communities Agency ʻPrivate Registered Provider Social Housing Stock in Englandʼ (Gov.uk, 29 
September 2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/464349/SDR_2014-
15_full.pdf accessed 10 August 2016 
10 Tang et al n(3)  
11 Ibid and Morrison (n5)  
12 Tang et al n(3) 
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Hybridity is a concept that has been discussed internationally within the literature on social 
housing.13 The literature on hybridity suggests that it is not just the reduction in public funds 
that has led to change within the social housing sector in England. Government policy has 
allowed, and in some cases encouraged, social housing providers to diversify in order to 
fund their social housing services.14 Some organisations have taken full advantage of these 
new opportunities, entering into the private rental market,15 establishing construction 
companies,16 and taking on services previously provided by the state such as extra care 
facilities,17 and work programmes.18 Other organisations, have been more cautious in their 
approach.19 Work published by Professors David Mullins and Hal Pawson in 2010 suggested 
that individual organisations were developing their own distinctive approach to hybridity.20 
They argued that whilst some organisations behaved like agents of the state, others were 
acting as profit driven entities.21 
The concept of ‘institutional entrepreneurialism’ has been used to explain this difference in 
approach between organisations.22 It is argued within the literature that organisations with 
‘prospector traits’23 are more likely to actively seek market opportunities than organisations 
with ‘defender traits’.24 Whilst the ability of social housing providers to innovate is 
constrained by regulation,25 it is argued that their ability to innovate is not limited to those 
areas where the Government has permitted diversification.26 Research undertaken by 
Professor Nicola Morrison highlights how one ‘prospector’ organisation co-sponsored a 
report calling for greater autonomy for social housing providers in England, highlighting how 
such organisations actively seek to change the social housing landscape.27 
                                                          
13 For example Gruis and Nieboer n(1)  
14 Tony Manzi and Nicola Morrison, ‘Risk, commercialism and social purpose: Repositioning the English housing 
association sector’ (2017) Urban Studies 1, 5 
15 Denise Chevin, ‘Social hearted, commercially minded: A report on tomorrow’s housing associations’ (April 
2013, The Smith Institute) 29  
16 ibid 
17 ibid 30 
18 ibid 32 
19 ibid 28 
20 David Mullins and Hal Pawson, ‘Agents of policy or profits in disguise?’ in David Bills (ed) Hybrid 
Organizations and the Third Sector Challenges for Practice, Theory and Policy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 207 
21 ibid 
22 Morrison n(5)  and Victor Gruis, Nico Nieboer and Andrew Thomas, ‘Strategic asset management in the 
social rented sector: Approaches to Dutch and English HAs’ (2004) Urban Studies 1229 
23 ibid 2859 According to Morrison organisations with prospector traits ‘continually redefine products and 
markets’  
24 ibid According to Morrison oorganisations with defender traits ‘direct attention to a clearly defined market 
segment and seek stability through the provision of a reliable product-market domain.’  
25 ibid 2860 
26 Ibid 2868 
27 ibid 
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Diversification and innovation has not been the only consequence of the reduction in public 
funds within the social housing sector. As public money has become harder to come by, 
social housing providers have increasingly turned to the private sector for money. Historically 
housing associations have relied on long term bank loans.28 Following the Financial Crisis, 
however, the cost of such loans has increased.29 Housing associations have therefore 
searched for other sources of finance; institutional investment, in particular the capital bond 
market has become an increasingly important source of long term borrowing for the sector.30 
This has seen housing associations access funds from a new range of organisations, in 
particular pension funds and insurance corporations.31 Access to the capital bond market is 
not just limited to the largest social housing providers in England. Whilst the largest 
organisations are able to issue bonds publicly, smaller organisations have the ability to 
privately place bonds on the market, whilst organisation with under 10,000 units are able to 
club together to issue ‘club bonds’.32  
Whilst securing funds from the bond market is no longer uncommon within the social 
housing sector in England, other sources of finance are still used by only a few 
organisations. Such forms of finance include ‘equity type’ investment,33 where property is 
developed in partnership or through sale and leaseback agreements between social housing 
providers and investors such as pension funds,34 and the derivatives market.35 Such 
arrangements remain uncommon, however, partly because of the preference of the social 
housing regulator for housing associations to seek funds from the bond market,36 and the 
perceived high risk of such sources of finance.37 
Such diversification both in terms of the services offered by social housing providers and in 
terms of their sources of funding has had a significant impact on the sector. Organisations 
have been challenged to balance their social purpose with their new commercial needs. It is 
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argued that some organisations have chosen to overly focus on the commercial dynamic.38 
Others, however, argue that such diversification presents the sector with opportunities.39 
Whilst there may be some debate as to the merits of diversification and hybridisation what 
seems beyond doubt is that the sector has changed the way that it operates because of 
these new challenges and opportunities.  
Many housing associations have restructured over recent years. It is argued that one motive 
for this is has been the desire within some organisations to balance their social and 
commercial aims.40 Another motivation for such restructuring has been the merger of a 
number of housing associations.41 The merger of social housing providers has been a 
prominent feature of the development of the social housing sector over the past two decades 
with their promised efficiency savings proving attractive in an era of limited public funds.42 
Merged organisations have adopted a number of differing structures, ranging from structures 
that allow the merged organisations to preserve a degree of independence, to a fully 
integrated unitary organisation.43 As organisations have become larger, adopted more 
complicated group structures and have become more commercially focused as a result of 
these pressures, another word has increased in prominence within the sector, ‘risk’. 
Social housing providers have long benefitted from borrowing sums from private lenders at 
preferential rates due to the fact that they are viewed as low risk organisations.44 The 
perception of organisations as low risk has stemmed, in part, from the fact that they are 
regulated,45 and the expectation that the state would take steps to protect social housing 
assets.46 Whilst banks have become more cautious in the way that they lend money 
following the 2008 financial crash, the low risk reputation of the sector has attracted 
institutional investors.47 The fact that no social housing providers collapsed during the 
financial crisis is said to be a particular attraction for institutional investors who are eager to 
                                                          
38 Nicola Morrison, ‘Meeting the decent home standard: London housing associations’ asset management 
strategies’ (2013) Urban Studies 2569  
39 Tang et al n(3) 419 Tang For example, a number of social landlords have developed services that assist 
tenants in financial difficulty. The initial motivation for this has been to reduce rent arrears in line with new 
commercial goals, however, this has also got clear social benefits.  
40 Chris Skelcher and Steven Rathgeb Smith, ‘Theorizing hybridity: Institutional logics, complex organizations, 
and actor identities: The case of nonprofits’ (2014) Public Administration 433  
41 David Mullins, ‘Competing Institutional Logics? Local Accountability and Scale and Efficiency in an Expanding 
Non-Profit Housing Sector’ (2006) Public Policy and Administration 6  
42 ibid and Jacob Veenstra, Hendrik M. Koolma, Maarten A. Allers, ‘Scale, mergers and efficiency: the case of 
Dutch housing corporations’ (2017) Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 313  
43 David Mullins, English Housing Mergers and Groups (Third Sector Partnerships for Service Delivery 
Birmingham University, 2010) 
44 Tang et al n(3) 
45 ibid 
46 ibid 
47 ibid 
40 
 
diversify their credit risk.48 There are concerns, however, that the more commercial approach 
adopted by a number of organisations undermines the low risk status of the sector.  
As housing associations provide greater services and products at market rates, social 
housing providers become more vulnerable to changes within the housing market and the 
economy more broadly.49 Housing associations have, historically been counter-cyclical 
organisations, as social housing providers take on more market functions, however, this has 
begun to change, with organisations becoming more pro-cyclical.50 With these changes 
appearing at the same time as public funds have become scarcer for the sector in England, 
and at the same time as the adoption of more complex business models and structures, 
there is concern that housing associations are increasingly being exposed to risk.51  
Private financiers are becoming increasingly aware of the risks of diversifications for the 
sector. Research undertaken Thomas Wainwright and Graham Manville found that social 
housing providers had been made aware that investors were not keen ‘on complex business 
models, which deviate from social housing due to the higher risk’.52 Other research has 
found that institutional investors are making finance available at different prices dependent 
upon the perception of risk at individual organisation.53 It would appear that the private 
funders are not only becoming aware of the risks of diversification but are increasingly 
playing a regulatory role, informing the sector of what activities and conduct social housing 
providers can undertake whilst continuing to borrow money at cheap rates.54  
It is not just lenders and institutional investors that are now playing a regulatory role within 
the social housing sector. Another source of regulatory control for the social housing sector 
are ratings agencies. Housing Associations with high credit ratings can find investment on 
the open bond market, and are viewed as lower risk options by institutional investors.55 
Housing Associations are therefore heavily incentivised to follow any guidance and 
requirements set out by credit agencies as to how they should run their organisations. As set 
out in 1.2.3 such actions thesis. The thesis will consider, however, how such actions have 
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contributed to the development of divergence and convergence in social housing regulation 
between Wales and England, in Chapter 8. 
2.1.2 The social housing sector in Wales 
As set out above, the extensive literature on the development of the social housing sector in 
England is not matched by a similarly large literature on social housing in Wales.56 This 
section therefore provides a summary of how the social housing sector in Wales stands as of 
6 June 2017, the date of submission for this thesis, referring to the literature that has 
developed in England and globally where appropriate.  
In Wales, 93 housing associations are registered as Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) 
with the Welsh Government.57 These organisations provide 139,104 social rented properties 
with a further 10,000 properties being provided by RSLs at non-social rates.58 As with the 
social hosing sector globally, RSLs in Wales have had to operate within an environment 
where public funds have become harder to come by.59 Despite the reduction in the 
availability of public funds, Welsh Government grant still accounts for over half the funds 
used by Welsh RSLs to construct social housing.60 Whilst the reduction in the availability in 
public funding may not have been as stark in Wales as in England, housing associations on 
the western side of Offa’s Dyke have also diversified in an attempt to make up the shortfall in 
public funds. Amongst the new activities undertaken by Welsh RSLs are the provision of 
student housing,61 the construction of homes for sale at market value,62 and the provision of 
commercial premises.63 
In line with their English counterparts Welsh housing associations have also increasingly 
turned to private finance as they seek to fund the construction of social housing. Unlike 
England, however, individual RSLs in Wales have not, to any great extent, sought access to 
money provided by institutional investors, with banks still being the biggest provider of 
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private finance.64 One potential explanation for this may be the relative small size of housing 
associations in Wales. Of the 34 RSLs in Wales that are developing new property, only two 
own more than 10,000 units.65 Furthermore, the two large organisations, Pobl Group and 
Wales and West have only recently grown past the 10,000 mark, as a result of mergers. 
Pobl Group was established in March 2016 following a merger between Seren Group and 
Grŵp Gwalia, making it the largest RSL in Wales.66 Wales and West on the other hand 
merged with Cymdeithas Tai Cantref in September 2016.67 It remains to be seen whether 
either RSL will turn to institutional investors for funds, given their increased size.  
Despite taking place within six months of each other both mergers developed in different 
ways. The impact of this difference is reflected in the group structures that both 
organisations have adopted. Pobl developed as a result of a commercial decision to merge, 
taken by the boards at Seren Group and Grŵp Gwalia. As a result, Pobl Group have decided 
to adopt a group structure that maintains the identity of the organisations that were in place 
prior to Pobl’s establishment. Wales and West merged with Cantref on the other hand, 
following the latter organisation entering financial difficulty. As a result, Cantref was shut 
down as a separate organisation with its activities and assets moved over to Wales and 
West.   
Diversification appears to have been a factor that contributed to Cantref entering financial 
difficulty. Local press reports suggest that Cantref found it difficult to let student 
accommodation that it had constructed in Aberystwyth and that this had put pressure on its 
finances.68 Given the Cantref experience and the increased diversification seen within the 
social housing sector in Wales, it appears likely that, as in England, lenders are increasingly 
undertaking a regulatory role within the social housing sector in Wales.69 The impact of this 
on state’s regulatory activities will be examined, in detail in section 8.2.1. 
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Shortly prior to the submission of this thesis the Welsh Government issued a new regulatory 
framework for RSLs in Wales.70 As set out in 1.5.3 the extent of the divergence charted in 
this thesis should be considered correct as of 31 December 2016. The content of the new 
regulatory framework adopted in Wales will therefore not be considered in detail in this 
thesis. A summary of the new regulatory approach will be provided in 9.2, however, and a 
discussion of the factors that contributed to the development of this new framework will be 
provided in 8.1.  
2.2 Methods and methodology  
Having provided a brief synopsis of the literature that has developed on social housing 
governance and operation, and a summary of the social housing sector in Wales, the focus 
of this chapter now turns to the methods adopted when undertaking the research that 
underpins this thesis. As set out in 1.1, rather than presenting a black-letter or doctrinal 
analysis of the law, this thesis developed within the broad socio-legal tradition. As such, a 
number of research methods were utilized over the course of this research project. These 
methods and the reasons why they were adopted will be discussed in three sub-sections. 
2.2.1 will discuss the archival research undertaken for the purposes of this thesis, 2.2.2, will 
discuss the methods that were used when examining text, whilst 2.2.3, will discuss the 
interviews that were undertaken during this research project. In setting out how and why 
these research methods were adopted and utilized, these sub-sections will set both their 
limitations and strengths in relation to the thesis. 
2.2.1 Archival Research  
As discussed in 1.5.2, there is no consensus within the literature on the history of Welsh 
devolution and the history of social housing in Wales as to when housing functions were first 
devolved to Wales. Given that the existing literature does suggest that divergence precedes 
political devolution, however, it is clear that to understand present day divergence, it is 
necessary to uncover its historical roots. Part 1 of the thesis sets out to do so and seeks to 
address two of the thesis’ research questions:  
• What is the point of divergence between social housing regulation in Wales and 
England?? 
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• What factors have impacted upon the development of divergence and convergence 
in social housing regulation between Wales and England? 
• Why were powers over housing first devolved to Wales and how did the devolution 
settlement develop over time? 
The motivation for the historical analysis pursued in Part 1 is not primarily with history for its 
own sake. The analysis is also concerned with the ways in which this hitherto unknown 
history has shaped and continues to influence contemporary developments. The approach 
taken here shares some characteristics with other analysis of housing law and policy and of 
devolution. David Cowan and Morag McDermont's Regulating Social Housing: Governing 
Decline sets out 'not to provide a history as historians might view it, but in Foucauldian style 
we seek to develop a history of the present of social housing'.71 In moving towards 
genealogy from his earlier 'archeological' approach, Foucault drew increased attention to a 
diagnosis of the current situation as the starting point for a genealogical analysis of how we 
came to be here. Analysis of the past of this kind unsettles conventional understandings of 
the present day. 
In his legal analysis of the first phase of political devolution in Wales, Rawlings also draws 
on history to make sense of the current conjecture. He sets out in Delineating Wales, some 
of the key historical events that preceded the establishment of the National Assembly in 
1999.72 In exploring these events, Rawlings sets out to address two questions:  
Be that as it may: what of the considerations – including the historical – that work 
to influence the design of the new constitutional and legal architecture? How is it 
for example that Wales currently has a framework of government that may safely 
be described as like nothing else on earth?73 
Given the lack of clarity in the literature on devolution and social housing as to when housing 
functions were first devolved to Wales, it became apparent that it would be necessary to turn 
to primary materials to establish the point of divergence between Wales and England, to files 
held at the National Archives at Kew Gardens in particular.  
The lack of clarity in the literature on housing devolution presented a significant challenge for 
the undertaking of archival research on the history of housing and devolution. Whilst the 
literature on devolution suggested that housing functions may have first been devolved to 
Wales at some point during the 1950s or prior to this, this did not provide much information 
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upon which to base a search of the files held at the National Archives. Fortunately, through 
conversations with a colleague who was also undertaking archival research into 
administrative devolution in Wales, I learned of the HLG 158 (EFI) series of files held at the 
National Archives. The HLG 158 series holds records created by the Welsh Office 
component of the Ministry for Housing and Local Government, including documents from the 
period of the Welsh Office’s establishment, and some documents inherited from its 
predecessor, the Welsh Board of Health. The documents held within the series contained a 
rich source of information and included a diverse range of materials including official 
government publications, memos, communication and letters between civil servants and 
ministers, press clippings and extracts from Hansard. Through this information, I could locate 
further files from the period before and after the HLG 158 series. 
In addition to exploring the documents held at the National Archives, I also examined 
documents held at the Guildhall Library in London. The decision to visit the Guildhall Library 
was reached having read Alan Murie’s Moving Homes, The Housing Corporation 1964-
2008.74 In his book Murie refers to the Annual Reports published by the Housing 
Corporation. These references suggested that the Reports may have been able to provide 
valuable information as to the nature and the extent of divergence that had developed 
between Wales and England over the lifespan of the Corporation. Whilst Murie’s book was of 
assistance in identifying a valuable primary resource, I did face a major difficulty in 
assessing these materials. Having initially suspected that the Reports were held at the 
British Library but being unable to find a record of them using the library’s online search 
function I contacted one of the librarians. Through communication with her it became 
apparent that there is not one location that holds a full collection of the Housing 
Corporation’s Reports. Birmingham University Library hold copies of the Reports from 
1964/5 to 1986/7, the Guildhall Library hold copies from 1972/3 to 1991/2, and 1997/8 to 
2007/8, Leeds Library hold copies from 1972/3 to 1987/8, and Trinity College Dublin hold 
copies from 1972/3 to 2001/2. Having initially intended to visit both the Birmingham 
University Library and the Guildhall Library to examine the Corporation’s Reports I 
encountered a further problem. The Library at Birmingham University was closed to visitors 
during the period I had intended to visit. Whilst Alan Murie’s work, the documents held at the 
National Archives and the Guildhall Library all offer an indication as to what information 
these Reports would contain, the fact that I was unable to examine the content of the 
Housing Corporation’s first seven Reports does present an obvious limitation to my 
discussion on the role of the Housing Corporation in the 1960s. Fortunately, I was able to be 
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gain full access to the Corporation’s Reports through most of the 1970s, 1980s and, with 
some exceptions, the 1990s and 2000s. The Reports therefore provided a valuable resource 
for my exploration of the development of divergence in social housing regulation between 
Wales and England.  
2.2.2 Analysing textual sources 
As the historic study of the development of housing devolution and divergence concludes in 
Chapter 5, the focus of the thesis, the resources examined, and the methods adopted 
changes. As set out in 1.5.3, Part 2 of the thesis sets out to provide a snapshot of the extent 
of the divergence that has developed between Wales and England. Part 3, meanwhile sets 
out to explore the factors that have both driven and constrained the development of 
divergence. To explore both the extent of the differences that have developed between 
Wales and England, and the reasons for it, a number of different textual sources were 
examined, including legislation, regulatory frameworks and policy documents. Three different 
research methods were adopted when inspecting these documents; a doctrinal analysis, a 
textual analysis and a content analysis.    
The first of these methods to be adopted was a doctrinal analysis of relevant legislation and 
regulatory frameworks. Whilst this thesis is not doctrinal in nature, and seeks to 
predominately contribute to the socio-legal literature on devolution and housing law and 
policy, this approach was adopted so that the extent by which the law in Wales and England 
varied could be examined in detail and accurately. A difficulty that was encountered when 
utilizing this method concerned amendments made to the regulatory framework and the 
statutory basis for social housing regulation late on during the research period for this thesis. 
The Housing and Planning Act 2016 did not receive royal assent until May 2016.75 This 
meant that the analysis of the law undertaken previously had to be revisited and updated at 
short notice, to ensure that the thesis reflected the changes made to regulation, and to 
certify that the instances of divergence set out in the thesis continued to be accurate. The 
situation in Wales proved to be even more difficult. Whilst the Welsh Government have 
committed to introduce new legislation concerning social housing regulation in Wales, at 
time of submission it was yet to publish any firm details on this.76 The Welsh Government 
has announced, however, proposals to change the regulatory framework in Wales, and the 
way that it assesses compliance with that framework.77 With the housing sector in a state of 
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flux on both sides of the border, the decision was made to ensure that the doctrinal analysis, 
undertaken for the purposes of this thesis was accurate as of 31 December 2016. Further 
research will be required to monitor the impact of the changes facing the sector in future.  
In addition to exploring the legislation and the regulatory frameworks that are in place in 
Wales and England, a textual analysis of other documents was undertaken as part of the 
research that led to the completion of this thesis. This work focused on the reviews that were 
undertaken into social housing regulation in both nations at the turn of the decade.78 The aim 
of this work was to examine whether the instances of divergence that had been identified 
during the doctrinal analysis of the law could also be identified in the policy documents, and 
to explore some of the contextual differences within which these reviews were undertaken. 
The final method used when analysing text as part of this research project was content 
analysis. This method was applied to the reviews into social housing regulation conducted in 
Wales and England from 2007 onwards and to the regulatory frameworks in place in Wales 
and England. These documents were explored using appropriate software to see whether 
there were significant differences between the language used in Wales and England 
regarding regulation.79 The results of this analysis were then used to inform and refine the 
doctrinal and textual analysis of the same documents by providing an indication of the areas 
within which divergence may have developed most or least prominently. One final method 
was adopted as part of this research project, semi structured interviews.   
2.2.3 Interviews  
As set out in 1.4.2 a decision was made at the outset of this research project that the thesis 
should, in addition to exploring the extent by which variation had developed between Wales 
and England, consider the impact of divergence in practice, or it should explore the factors 
that impacted upon the divergence process. Initially the thesis intended to examine both 
questions. As such, a decision was made to adopt an additional research method, semi 
structured interviews. This research method was initially adopted so that a comparative 
study could be undertaken of the experiences of housing associations across Wales and 
England of regulation in practice. This sub-section will set out how the decision to limit the 
thesis’s focus to an examination of the factors that contribute to the development of 
divergence and convergence impacted on how the data gathered through this method was 
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used in the thesis, and how that means that it has been used in a predominantly illustrative 
manner, amplifying arguments.    
As set out above, the initial motivation for conducting semi-structured interviews for the 
purposes of this thesis was to undertake a comparative analysis of the experiences of Welsh 
RSLs and English registered providers, of regulation in practice. This initial intention is 
reflected in the structure that was adopted for the interviews. The interview questions 
adopted can be divided into three sections. The first section of the interview set out to 
explore a participant’s experience of regulation in practice. Participants would be asked 
questions about their relationship with their regulator,80 and about the way they felt that 
regulation impacted upon their day-to-day activities. The second section of the interview 
explored the impact of ʻhousing needʼ on participants. These questions were designed to 
assess whether the pressure that housing associations faced to provide homes impacted 
upon their activities. The final section of the interview explored the impact of ʻfinanceʼ on the 
way that the respective participants operated in practice. Participants were asked questions 
about how their organisations borrowed money, and about the corporate structures of their 
organisations. The interviews closed by asking the participants to reflect on the questions 
that had been asked during the interview, and to consider whether they felt that one factor 
had a greater impact on their ability to operate than any of the others.   
Having designed a schedule of questions the chief executives of Welsh RSLs and English 
providers were approached for interview. Prospective participants were approached via e-
mail and were provided with a participant information sheet setting out the details of the 
project and a participant consent form. Several difficulties were encountered when 
approaching prospective participants. On the one hand, it proved difficult to find housing 
associations between which a comparison could be undertaken. When selecting housing 
associations to undertake a comparative analysis upon it is important to exclude, as much as 
possible, ʻthe differences that are caused through factors related to size and context of an 
organisation.ʼ Given the significant difference in size and scale between the sectors in Wales 
and England, as discussed in 2.1 above  it is very difficult to find a provider of social housing 
in England that is operating under similar market conditions to a Registered Social Landlord 
(RSL) in Wales. Despite these difficulties, attempts were made to identify registered 
providers of social housing in England that had common features with Welsh RSLs. Having 
identified these registered providers a second problem was encountered. It was far more 
difficult to arrange interviews with housing associations that operated on the eastern side of 
the border to discuss their experiences of regulation in practice than it was to make similar 
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arrangements in Wales.  Without such access in England, it would be difficult to undertake 
an accurate comparison of the experiences of housing associations of regulation in practice. 
For this reason, and because of the Office for National Statistics (ONS)’s decision to 
reclassify registered providers in England as part of the public sector in October 2015, the 
decision was made to focus on the factors that have an impact on the divergence process.81   
Whilst it may have been difficult to find chief executives of housing associations in England 
who were willing to be interviewed for the purposes of this thesis, such difficulties were not 
encountered to the same extent in Wales. In total the chief executives of five Welsh RSLs 
agreed to be interviewed. These interviews took place face to face, lasting between 30 
minutes and one hour. Given assurances that their answers would be anonymised and that I 
was intending to interview other RSL chief executives,82 the participants provided very 
honest answers.83 These answers included open criticism of the Welsh Government and 
revelations about sensitive material regarding their organisations.84 Whilst these interviews 
have provided very useful data, it is important to acknowledge some of its limitations. Whilst 
there are 92 RSLs registered with the Welsh Regulator, only five were interviewed for this 
thesis.85 The information gathered from these interviews can therefore only be indicative of 
the views and experiences of RSLs in Wales. The five RSLs do, however, provide a cross 
section of the sector in Wales and include large, national organisations, and small urban, 
and small rural organisations. It should be noted that whilst the chief executives of five 
diverse organisations did agree to take part in the project an equal number did not. These 
Chief Executives did not reject an approach to be interviewed, they merely did not respond 
to the initial approach e-mail and a subsequent follow up message. Whilst it was possible to 
find suitable alternative RSLs to approach to interview, this may indicate that the participants 
who agreed to take part in the project were the most engaged within the sector, or had a 
particular view that they wished to share with me as a researcher. This had to be kept in 
mind when analysing their responses. 
Whilst the interviewees provided very honest and interesting responses to the interview 
questions, the refocusing of the thesis to examine the factors that contribute to the 
                                                          
81 See 1.4.2 for a more detailed discussion.  
82 ʻEliteʻ respondents are said to take a particular interest in knowing who else if being interviewed as part of a 
research project and I also encountered this phenomenon. Karen Duke ʻGetting Beyond the “Official Line”: 
Reflection on Dilemmas of Access, Knowledge and Power in Research Policy Networksʼ 31(1) [2002] Jnl Soc. Pol 
39, 47   
83 There is some evidence that ʻeliteʼ individuals are more prepared to present their own opinion than junior 
staff. Catherine Welch, Rebecca Marschan-Piekakri, Heli Penttinen and Marja Tahvanainen ʻCorporate elites as 
information in qualitative international business researchʼ 11 [2002] International Business Review 611, 616 
84 One participant did ask me to be careful how I used this information to ensure that individuals were not 
identified.   
85 Welsh Government register n(57)  
50 
 
development divergence limits how they can be utilized to address the thesis’s research 
questions. The decision to refocus the thesis meant that data that had already been 
gathered had to be reviewed and reconsidered. It became apparent that some of this data 
was no longer applicable to my new research focus. Whilst some of the data was no longer 
applicable, other aspects did remain relevant and do play a part in the analysis set out in 
Part 3. The part played by this data, however, is mainly illustrative, supporting findings made 
through analysing textual sources.  
In addition to the interviews undertaken with the chief executives of Welsh RSLs, two further 
interviews were undertaken as part of this research project; an interview with an employee of 
ONS and an interview with Kerry Mac Hale, the policy lead for social housing regulation at 
the Westminster Government. These additional interviews were undertaken because of the 
new events that were taking place within the sector, specifically the ONS’s decision to 
reclassify English registered providers of social housing, and subsequently Welsh RSLs as 
part of the public sector. The interview with the ONS employee took place on a face to face 
basis, whilst Kerry Mac Hale was interviewed via telephone. Both interviews presented 
different challenges.  
The decision to approach the ONS for an interview was taken shortly after their decision to 
reclassify English registered providers of social housing as part of the public sector.86 When 
the ONS were first approached for an interview no announcement had been made about 
when a review would be undertaken into the status of Welsh RSLs. A few days before the 
interview the ONS announced that they would undertake a review of the status of Welsh 
RSLs, publishing their announcement during the autumn of 2016.87 There were two primary 
motivations for undertaking this interview; developing a better understanding of the reasons 
that led the ONS to its decision in England, and to get an indication as to whether the ONS 
were likely to reach a similar decision in Wales. I received a very positive response from the 
ONS regarding my request for an interview with the condition that I ensured anonymity for 
the staff member who was willing to answer my questions. As with the interviews undertaken 
with the Chief Executives of Welsh RSLs, the interview was undertaken on a semi-structured 
basis. The interview with the ONS proved more difficult than these previous interviews. The 
participant at the ONS was bound by greater confidentiality requirements than the Chief 
Executives and was unable to provide me with ʻprivileged informationʼ.88 Given the 
employee’s reluctance to share ‘privileged information’ during interview, the data gathered 
                                                          
86 Office for National Statistics ʻClassification announcement: ʻPrivate registered providersʼ of social housing in 
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87 ONS forward work plan (n99) 
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through interview is again used primarily as an illustrate tool within this thesis, contributing 
limited new information.   
The final interview undertaken as part of this project was undertaken with Kerry Mac Hale, 
the policy lead for social housing regulation at the Westminster Government. Initially I had 
approached the then Minister for Housing and Planning at Westminster, Brandon Lewis, for 
an interview following comments he had made at a Communities and Local Government 
Committee meeting in December 2015.89 In the Committee meeting the Minister had said 
that the Government wished to see housing associations returned to the private sector as 
quickly as possible.90 To do this the Minister stated that the Government would insert a 
number of amendments into the Housing and Planning Bill that was proceeding through the 
Houses of Parliament at the time, to deregulate the social housing sector.91 The Minister was 
therefore approached in an attempt to gain further information on these proposals and to 
assess whether these changes had previously been under consideration or whether these 
changes were being introduced solely as a result of the ONS’s work.  
The Minister was approached via e-mail and a formal letter sent to his ministerial address. 
Seven weeks after the e-mail was sent I received a response from the Department for 
Communities and Local Government setting out that whilst the Minister was unable to 
provide me with an interview, the department’s ʻpolicy lead on Regulation of the Social 
Housing sector in Englandʼ, Kerry Mac Hale, was willing to be interviewed via telephone. The 
interview was undertaken on 17 May 2016, only five days after the Housing and Planning 
Act 2016 received royal assent. This provided me with a unique opportunity to interview a 
civil servant that had played a leading role in the development of legislation, immediately 
following its enactment. Whilst this did mean that there were some secondary legislation that 
the Government had not put in place at the time of the interview, the proximity with which the 
interview was undertaken to the events that had led to these regulatory changes meant that 
Mac Hale could provide a detailed account of the reasons behind individual provisions within 
the act, and of the circumstances that had led to the Bill’s enactment. In contrast to the 
interview with the ONS, Mac Hale was happy to provide direct and detailed answers to my 
questions, revealing that the Government ʻwould probably notʼ have deregulated were it not 
for the ONS’s decision.92 In contrast to the other six interviews, the information provided by 
Mac Hale does provide information that is more than purely illustrative and provides a 
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valuable insight into how the ONS’s decision and other pressures has had an impact on how 
divergence develops.  
To fully assess the impact of the ONS’s decision on the development of divergence it would 
have also been desirable to have conducted an interview with Kerry Mac Hale’s equivalent 
at the Welsh Government. The Welsh Government have been significantly slower in making 
legislative proposals to reverse the ONS’s decision than what was seen at Westminster. As 
of 31 December 2016, the Welsh Government were yet to publish any concrete proposals on 
any new legislation that it would bring forward following the ONS’s decision. Informal 
conversations held with members of the social housing sector in Wales and the Welsh 
Government indicate that whilst there will be legislative and regulatory changes made to the 
sector in Wales, it may take two years for any legislation to be enacted. Given that the Welsh 
Government are in the early stages of drafting their legislative response to the ONS’ 
decision, it was decided that any formal interview would be able to provide data of limited 
value. The data gathered from the interview with Kerry Mac Hale would suggest that such an 
interview with the Welsh Government would, at the right point in time, provide very 
interesting information for an academic examining the development of divergence. 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to place this thesis within the broader literature that has developed 
on social housing. As demonstrated in 2.1, the nature of the social hosing sector is changing 
globally, as the sector seeks to grapple with a reduction in the availability of public funds and 
a changing economic landscape. 2.1.2 shows that the sector in Wales has not been immune 
from such changes and pressures, with an increasing number of RSLs diversifying from their 
core purpose. The thesis will consider how some of these factors have contributed to the 
development of divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England. As 
discussed in section 2.2 a number of methods have been adopted to consider how these, 
and other pressures have contributed to both push and to limit the development of 
divergence, allowing us to develop our understanding of the divergence process and 
devolution more broadly.   
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3. Disease and Political Pressure: The Early Years of Housing 
Devolution 
 
Social Housing has been in existence, in one form or another for centuries. From the Alms-
houses of the Middle Ages, to the philanthropists of the Industrial Revolution, to the state 
investment in housing following the First World War, all have played their part in developing 
what we today consider as social housing. This chapter provides a brief guide to this history, 
examining some of the greatest developments that took place during this era in Wales and 
England, focusing on the decision to devolve powers over housing to Wales, for the first time 
on 1 May 1940. Whilst undertaking this exploration, this chapter will consider how these 
developments have shaped the social housing sector in the present day.  
Through this historical examination this chapter makes two primary claims. (1) It argues that 
the decision to devolve housing powers to Wales in May 1940 was not a result of a process 
of thinking, but, was the consequence of a series of ad-hoc, politically expedient decisions. 
(2) The chapter contends, that it was the decision to devolve these powers to Wales that 
created a space within which the housing sector in Wales could be viewed as distinct from 
the sector in England, for the first time. The chapter demonstrates that there is clear 
evidence that divergence developed between the two nations over this period, suggesting 
that the roots of the process precedes political devolution. Through examining the 
development of divergence during this period the chapter will consider which factors 
contributed to, or constrained its development.   
3.1 The historical roots of the social housing movement 
What we refer to today as Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) in Wales, or registered 
providers in England encapsulates a broad range of organisations. Amongst these, the roots 
of one type of organisation stretches deep into history, the Alms-houses. There is some 
evidence to suggest that the first Alms-houses were founded in England in the 11th century.1 
They provided housing healthcare and other associated services for the poor and were 
founded by the wealthy who felt under a Christian duty to support the poorest and the most 
vulnerable in their communities.2 Despite the fact that Alms-houses continue to play an 
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important, if somewhat limited role, in the provision of social housing in Wales and England,3 
it is during the Industrial Revolution that we find the foundations of what we today would 
consider to constitute social housing.  
With the growth of heavy industry in the second half of the nineteenth century the 
populations of Britain’s industrial towns and cities boomed.4 As they struggled to deal with 
the new demands placed upon their infrastructure, a lack of housing quickly became a major 
issue, with many families living in small, over-crowed houses, often in squalor.5 These 
conditions were the perfect breeding ground for disease and revolution.6 By 1852 the 
average life expectancy for a labourer in Merthyr was just 177 and following a cholera 
outbreak in London in 1840, and further typhoid outbreaks, there was growing realisation by 
policy makers that something had to be done to tackle this problem.8 As the century 
progressed governments of different colours introduced legislation to try and improve the 
situation. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the context under which these policies were being 
developed, housing was viewed by government as a public health issue.9 Focus was placed 
on slum clearances, the improvement of drainage and on the quality of housing.10 
Whilst the steps taken by the Government over this period did improve the sanitary 
conditions of Britain’s town and cities, its work was overwhelmingly focused on the removal 
of unfit housing, with little Government involvement in housing development.11 Small steps 
were taken to try and remedy this. The Labouring Classes Dwelling Houses Act 1886 
allowed the Public Works Loan Commissioners to lend money for the construction of 
labourers’ dwellings.12 By 1869 Liverpool became the first city to build council houses,13 and 
the introduction of the Housing of the Working Classes Act 1890 made the process of 
                                                          
3 Of the 92 Registered Social Landlords in Wales, 8 are Alms-houses, whilst of the 1,762 Registered Providers in 
England, 141 are Alms-houses.  
See Welsh Government ʻRegistered Social Landlordsʼ (2 December 2016) http://gov.wales/topics/housing-and-
regeneration/publications/registered-social-landlords-in-wales/?lang=en accessed 9 January 2017; and Homes 
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https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/current-registered-providers-of-social-housing accessed 9 
January 2017. 
4 The population of Glamorgan rose from 398,000 to 1,121,000 between 1871 to 1911 – Malcom J Fisk 
ʻHistorical perspectives on housing developmentsʼ in Robert Smith, Tamsin Stirling and Peter Williams (eds) 
Housing in Wales, The Policy Agenda in an Era of Devolution (Chartered Institute of Housing 2000) 19 ch2 
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housing construction easier for local authorities by increasing access to finance.14 Council 
housing was being developed in London by 1892, and in Manchester by 1896.15 In 1897 
Llandudno became the first Welsh local authority to construct council housing.16 Other local 
authorities, such as Birmingham, did not develop their own construction programmes. The 
Act did not compel authorities to construct council housing, and many only instigated a 
programme of repair and renovation.17 Consequently, local authorities were responsible for 
only 1% of the houses built before the First World War.18 
The conditions that had led to successive governments taking steps to try and improve living 
standards during the industrial revolution also had an impact on the richest in society. 
Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century a broad range of philanthropists 
started investing in housing, with charitable trusts also playing a significant role in housing 
construction.   
These organisations, whilst working towards broadly common goals developed very 
differently. In Regulating Social Housing: Governing Decline David Cowan and Morag 
McDermont highlight the differing approaches that existed with regards to housing 
management.19 They compare those developed by charitable trusts such as the Guinness 
Trust to those developed by philanthropist Octavia Hill who placed a great deal of focus on 
the moral character of those she sought to assist.20 Whilst these organisations may have 
operated in very different ways, in them we can see the forefathers of modern day housing 
associations.  
Philanthropic activity played a less prominent role in Wales over this period. Whilst there 
were some model dwelling developments in both the Ebbw and Rhymney Valleys, these 
were the exception rather than the rule.21 Perhaps surprisingly the owner-occupation sector 
played a prominent role in housing construction in Wales over this period.22 The sector was 
developed with the assistance of building clubs and societies and was particularly prevalent 
in the south Wales Valleys.23 These organisations had similarities with other mutual aid 
groups that had developed within the south Wales coalfield over this period, such as the 
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18 Ministry of Health, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Anti –Tuberculosis Service in Wales and 
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Tredegar Medical Aid Society. The distinct character and culture of industrial south Wales, 
which had led to the development of such organisations, was not as prevalent elsewhere in 
Wales, with private renting still being the predominant form of occupation in both the urban 
and rural areas outside of the valleys.24 Whilst the prominence of private home ownership in 
Wales did mean that were some differences between the Welsh and English housing 
markets on the brink of the First World War, the importance of these differences should not 
be exaggerated. What little state direction that was being applied to the housing sector in 
Wales was either on a British, or an English and Welsh, basis. The laissez faire attitude of 
the Government led to great regional variation in housing provision, but the differences were 
as great between various parts of Wales as they were between Wales and England. The 
south Wales Valleys may have had a higher percentage of owner occupation but given the 
lower rates of owner occupation across the rest of Wales it would appear wrong to describe 
this as a distinctly Welsh approach to housing. Whilst there may not have been a distinctive 
Welsh approach to housing over this period, the higher rate of home ownership in the south 
Wales Valleys demonstrate how local socio-economic factors can impact upon the nature of 
the housing in an area. These local and national structural differences were to continue to 
have an impact over the following decades. impacting upon the development housing policy 
and contributing to the development of both divergence and Welsh devolution.   
3.2 The inter-war period  
As the First World War ended the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George made a promise that 
became a watershed moment for the development of social housing provision across the 
UK. The ʻHomes fit for Heroesʼ campaign made housing ʻthe pivot of post-war social policyʼ 
and led to a fundamental change in how housing was viewed by the state.25 Despite the 
developments over the previous decades, housing was still viewed as a matter for the 
private sector prior to the war.26 Even the philanthropists that had helped develop housing 
during the industrial revolution were hostile towards state involvement in housing provision.27 
This view was to change during the war. The lack of quality, affordable housing that had 
been a problem throughout the industrial revolution became even more apparent with house 
building decreasing and the workforce being concentrated in areas that were manufacturing 
goods for the war effort.28 In August 1917 the Salisbury Committee reported that an 
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estimated 300,000 properties would be needed immediately at the end of the war.29 These 
factors led to reform. 
The Ministry of Health Act 1919 established the Ministry of Health. Under the powers that he 
had acquired under the Act, the Minister for Health, Dr Christopher Addison set about 
introducing legislation to try and tackle the housing crisis. The Housing and Town Planning 
Act 1919, or the Addison Housing Act as it became known, required local authorities to 
assess local housing need, and to carry out a scheme to improve housing availability in their 
areas.30 Over three years, 170,000 homes were built across the UK.31  
State led development was originally viewed as something that would only be necessary in 
the short term. There was an expectation that the private sector would again become 
responsible for housing development across Britain.32 As the decade continued, further 
legislation moved the focus of housing development away from the state, to the private 
sector, but even some of these private developments were dependent on financial support 
from the state.33 Between 1919 and 1934, 2,459,000 homes were built in Wales and 
England.34 Only 31% of these were council homes, but of the remaining 69% constructed by 
the private sector, a quarter was constructed with some financial assistance from the state.35 
Whilst the private sector was still the largest provider of housing in Wales and England, the 
UK developed the largest public rented sector in the western world over this period.36  
Despite the investment in housing in the post war years, housing associations played a 
peripheral role in the development of new homes. This looked as though it would change in 
March 1933 with the establishment of the Moyne Committee. The Committee of nine MPs, 
chaired by Lord Moyne, was established to consider the steps that could be taken to 
maintain working class properties, and to construct new homes for the working classes 
without public charge, through bodies such as public utilities societies.37 The Committee 
published a report which made a number of recommendations that, if accepted, would have 
increased the role of housing associations.38 These recommendations included giving local 
authorities the power to compulsory purchase working class housing in need of renovation 
on behalf of housing associations, and providing housing associations with access to loans 
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for up to 100% of the cost of acquisition and renovation of property.39 Amongst other 
suggestions set out in the Report was the establishment of a Central Public Utilities Council, 
a body that was to have played a very similar role to the one that was later played by the 
Housing Corporation.40 Despite receiving a warm response by many when published, the 
Committee’s recommendation’s soon faced difficulties. Some of the recommendations were 
immediately dismissed,41 but the most significant opposition to the Committee’s proposals 
came from local authorities, who were eager to maintain control and power.42 By joining 
forces with private landlords and some within the civil service, local authorities successfully 
managed to halt the Report’s more radical recommendations, maintaining the status quo and 
limiting the role of housing associations.43 The Housing Act 1935, which was enacted after 
the publication of the Committee’s Report, did provide the Minister with one power that 
would prove to be significant in future. The Minister was given the power to financially 
support a central association, or some other body, established for the purpose of promoting 
and advising housing associations.44 This central association fell short of the Central Public 
Utilities Council recommended by the Commission but did lead to the establishment of the 
National Federation of Housing Societies (NFHS) as a trade body for Housing 
Associations.45 The body and its successors were to play a key role in the development of 
housing associations over the following decades. 
3.3 Administrative devolution 
3.3.1 Tuberculosis 
The fear of disease was one of the major drivers of the changes that took place within the 
housing sector and wider society during the 19th and early 20th century. One disease was 
causing particular concern in Wales, tuberculosis (TB). Between 1911 and 1913 the death 
rate from TB in Wales was 136 people for every 100,000, lower than the death rate in both 
England and Scotland.46 By 1931 - 1933 the death rate in Wales had dropped to 101 for 
every 100,000, but whilst dropping, Wales now had the highest death rate in Great Britain.47  
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In 1910, the King Edward the Seventh Welsh National Memorial Association was founded at 
a National Conference of public bodies in Wales with the aim of providing a monument for 
King Edward VII.48 At the meeting it was agreed that the memorial should take the form a 
national campaign to tackle TB in Wales.49 Following pressure from the Association an 
inquiry was established in 1938 to investigate ʻthe working of the arrangements for the 
prevention, treatment and after care of tuberculosis in Walesʼ.50 The Committee of Inquiry 
into Anti-Tuberculosis Service in Wales and Monmouthshire collected evidence through the 
first half of 1938 and was chaired by the Liberal National MP for Montgomeryshire, Clement 
Davies.51 By December 1938 the Committee had drafted a report containing their findings, 
this was distributed throughout Wales in early 1939.52 
Throughout the course of the inquiry witnesses raised many factors as the potential cause of 
Wales’s TB crisis. Amongst the most prominent of these were poor nutrition, concerns about 
meat and dairy production, and the need to improve education of the disease in schools.53 
Perhaps the most striking theory put forward by witnesses was that the ʻCeltic raceʼ was 
more susceptible and less resilient than the English to diseases. Whilst the Report 
concludes that it was ʻunlikelyʼ that race would be a factor that would explain Wales’ higher 
rate of TB, it did conclude that there was a more ‘fatalistic and pessimistic’ response by 
those in Wales to the disease, which led patients to conceal their symptoms and delay 
treatment.54  
For the purposes of my thesis, one further factor considered by Clement Davies and his 
team is of more interest, the condition of housing in Wales. The Report can be seen as a 
damming criticism of the state of housing provision in Wales. It declared: 
The health of people is to a very large measure, dependent on good, sound, 
sanitary housing conditions, and their happiness upon their health and 
environment.55 
Davies concluded that housing in Wales was not good, sound and sanitary, with the Report 
painting a particularly grim picture of the state of housing in rural areas:  
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The little towns have a very old history, in many instances covering centuries. 
They have been market towns throughout the years and the centres of rural 
areas that surround them. The houses in them are old and often dilapidated. 
Houses have been built down old yards – at one time the curtilages of larger 
house – and in old alleys, and they often consist of converted buildings which 
were erected for other purposes, for example, stabling and outhouses of a larger 
house. Down these yards and narrow alleys, there is little air and no sun. The old 
stone built houses have no damp course. In many of them the roofs and 
windows are still dilapidated. Often the windows will not open, and were not built 
to open. The hearths and grates are broken, and there is a general appearance 
of abject poverty. There are rows of these houses with no separate sanitary 
arrangements. Sometimes there is only one lavatory for the use of the occupants 
of several houses. In some towns, the water supply is far from satisfactory. 
There does not seem to be any standard either of quantity or even of purity.56 
These conditions had a clear impact on Davies and his team as can be seen from the 
following passage: 
We ourselves saw a number of these houses in Anglesey and Caernarvon, and 
they were a most distressing and pitiable sight. Many witnesses described them 
to us, but the description given by the witnesses, vivid as it was, did not convey 
the full picture. They have to be seen to be believed.57 
Considering this, it is perhaps not surprising that the Report made a radical 
recommendation: 
In our opinion nothing is to be done to make these houses habitable or even 
sanitary. The only thing to be done with them is to pull them down and to pull 
them down as soon as possible.58 
The Report was critical of the work of many rural local authorities. It concluded that these 
problems had been known for years and that local authorities had failed to act on reports by 
Medical Officers of Health.59 Indeed in some circumstances Medical Officers of Health felt 
that strings had been pulled to prevent the activation of their reports.60 Davies and his team 
found some merit in these claims:  
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So little attention has been paid by some councils to the recommendations of the 
Medical Officer of Health that, seeing they are so keen on avoiding expenditure 
and keeping down rates, one wonders why they did not suggest long ago to the 
Government and the Legislature that they could do without a Medical Officer of 
Health and thereby save his salary and expenses.61    
Davies’s Report highlighted that these failures weren’t just a contemporary issue but had 
deep historical roots. It noted that ʻin spite of the effort of a few pioneers, the State and Local 
Authorities, with a few notable exceptions, took too little interest in the housing and the 
sanitary conditions of the peopleʼ before World War One.62 The Report demonstrated how 
little an impact 19th century housing legislation had, had in Wales and the extent of the 
housing shortage in the wake of the First World War.63 Whilst showing an increase in house 
building following the Addison Housing Acts, Davies and his team concluded that Wales’s 
housing needs had ʻremained unsatisfiedʼ.64 The Report showed that house building in 
Wales lagged behind England. Under the Addison, Chamberlain and Wheatley Acts 2,050 
houses were erected per 100,000 people in Wales, when looking at England and Wales 
combined on the other hand, the number constructed was 3,020 per 100,000 people.65 The 
inquiry took this analysis further and ranked each local authority in Wales by the number of 
homes that had been constructed, both with and without exchequer assistance.66 The 
difference between the best and worst counties was striking. With exchequer support, Flint 
had constructed 4,550 properties per 100,000 habitants, whilst Merionydd had constructed a 
mere 470 per 100,000 habitants.67 This discrepancy between local authorities was 
highlighted as a major cause of poor quality housing. The worst performing local authorities 
received severe criticism in the Report:  
The failure on the part of Authorities in the lowers half of the table to exercise 
their functions and to take advantage of the grants made by Parliament seems 
more inexcusable when it is realised that the Authorities knew how bad the 
housing conditions were in those areas.68   
Of the eight worst performing authorities, seven were in rural areas.69 The Report 
acknowledged that the relative poverty of these authorities and the difficulties of 
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administrating over large distances did make their task harder, but they concluded that even 
after considering these factors, rural authorities were underperforming.70 One Ministry of 
Health inspector went so far as to suggest that the sympathies of these local authorities 
were on the side of the property owners, not the tenants.71 Davies and his team seem to 
agree with this belief:    
We find that they have insufficient regard for their powers or their duties or the 
advice that was tendered to them by their officers. In fact, they have failed in 
their trusteeship as guardians of the health and welfare of the people who 
elected them.72 
This criticism of rural local authorities continued throughout the rest of the Report. Of the 
performance of Cardiganshire, it stated: 
The District Councils have been dilatory and apathetic. The County Council 
should have exercised a close surveillance over the District Councils. Their 
housing record for the working classes is a poor one.73  
The Report concluded its section on Meirionydd with: 
Their housing performance speaks for itself and further comment is 
superfluous.74 
Whilst the Report said the following on the performance of Pembrokeshire: 
we are of the opinion that the District Councils have failed in their duty to provide 
decent sanitary houses for people.75 
In contrast to those damning remarks, the performance of authorities in urban areas was 
viewed in a more positive light. It was concluded that there were three reasons why 
performance of local authorities in urban areas was better than their rural counterparts. First, 
there was said to be a ʻkeener communal conscienceʼ in industrial areas which made people 
more ready to complain if conditions were bad.76 Secondly, the greater competition for seats 
on councils in industrial areas meant that councillors were more active than councillors in 
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rural areas.77 Thirdly, due to the relatively recent migration to the industrial areas, houses 
were newer and more modern.78 The socio-economic factors that had driven the growth of 
homeownership in industrial south Wales at the turn of the century, would seem to have 
resulted in better quality housing and living conditions. Whilst there were comparatively few 
problems with the housing stock in the south Wales coalfield, the structural issues that had 
contributed to the growth of TB in rural Wales were to have a significant impact on 
devolution and divergence. 
The good performance of urban authorities did little to take attention away from the criticisms 
of the Report. Considering the strong language used and the direct criticisms levelled by the 
Report at individual Welsh local authorities, it is not surprising that it led to significant public 
and political reaction.79 In a meeting of the Honourable Society of Cymmrodorion held on 31 
March 1939, Clement Davies was forced to defend himself against accusations that he had 
written his Report for effect.80  
Whilst local authorities and local councillors faced the brunt of Davies’s criticism, central 
government and the Welsh Board of Health did not emerge unscathed. Witnesses had 
expressed that there should have been closer contact between the: 
Ministry and the Welsh Board of Health on the one hand and the local authorities 
on the other; and that in the past the Ministry and the Board had not exercised, 
their powers of supervision and control sufficiently strongly against the local 
authorities who were backward or neglectful of their duties.81 
The Report, therefore, also provided direct criticism of the UK Government. Given the highly 
critical nature of the Report and the significant public reaction that it generated, it was 
inevitable that the Government would have to react. On 20 March 1939 the Welsh Board of 
Health prepared a brief for the Minister of Health on the content of the Report.82 The briefing 
highlighted that the committee took on a wider remit than was first imagined,83 and made a 
number of critical remarks on the performance of smaller local authorities.84 The briefing also 
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highlighted that whilst a number of local authorities had failed to deliver, the ultimate 
responsibility for housing was located at the Ministry of Health in Whitehall.85 The briefing 
sets out how the system operated: 
It is the duty of each local authority to consider their housing need, including the 
need arising from slum conditions and overcrowding. Their reports, their 
proposals for meeting these needs and all information as to progress made 
carrying out the proposals are sent to the Ministry. Correspondence, consultation 
etc., are conducted direct with the authorities. These are matters of 
administration with which the Welsh Board of Health have so far not been 
directly concerned.86 
The Welsh Board of Health was established by the Ministry of Health Act 1919. Officers 
would be appointed to the Board so as to exercise the powers of the Minister of Health in 
any way that he would deem fit.87 Initially the Minister had decided to transfer very limited 
powers to the Welsh Board of Health.88 By 1931 the Minister had decided to expand these 
powers.89 The Board now carried out the Minister’s general functions relating to supervising 
and co-ordinating public health services in Wales,90 whilst responsibility for supervising and 
co-ordinating housing remained with the Ministry in Whitehall. As such, the Report’s criticism 
of housing in Wales was not only a critique of the performance of Welsh local authorities but 
also a direct judgment on the performance of the Minister in Westminster.  
The Welsh Board of Health’s briefing note not only made it clear that they had no 
responsibility over housing, it also made it clear that they believed that the Minister at 
Westminster was at fault for several the Report’s findings. The briefing stated: ʻthe bad 
health conditions in parts of Wales disclosed in the Report have been known and bought to 
the notice of the Minister on a number of occasions.ʼ91 It is not surprising that taking steps to 
minimise the political fallout of the Report was at the forefront of the Government’s mind. On 
17 March a conference took place so that the department could ʻtake stockʼ of their position 
ahead of a Parliamentary debate that was to be held on 22 March.92 In the conference 
attention was given to what the Minister could expect the opposition to draw attention to and 
                                                          
85 ibid Appendix XI   
86 ibid   
87 Ministry of Health Act 1919, s 5  
88 So limited in fact that the Board could not employ a cleaner without the consent of Whitehall. K O Morgan, 
Rebirth of a Nation: A History of Modern Wales 1880-1980 (1st edn, OUP 1987) 205 
89 D Gareth Evans, A history of Wales 1906-2000, (1st edn, University of Wales Press Cardiff 2000) 104 
90 ibid 
91 Welsh Board of Health Briefing Note (n82) 
92 Notes of Conference held on the Clement Davies Report (Held 17 March 1939) - National Archives File 
MH55/ 1196 
65 
 
how they could counter this.93 The decision was made to focus on the improvement in the 
performance of Carmarthenshire following a visit by an inspector, and the Minister 
announced in the parliamentary debate that he saw such visits as the key to future 
improvement.94 A Housing Inspector was to visit each of the eight worst performing local 
authorities, to inspect the state of their houses and to educate members of staff at the local 
authorities about the financial support that was available to them.95 By May 1939 these 
inspections were underway with letters sent to the relevant local authorities, notifying them of 
upcoming visits from housing inspectors. 96  
In addition to the above, the Minister considered one further proposal to tackle the problems 
highlighted by the Report, transferring functions over housing to the Welsh Board of 
Health.97 The Minister announced to the House of Commons that he would not make any 
drastic changes to how health was administered in Wales without further consideration of the 
content of the Report.98 Within twelve months the Minister had, had time to consider the 
Government’s position. The conclusions he came to were to lead to a decision that would be 
of great significance for housing, devolution and Wales.   
3.3.2 The reaction 
On 8 March 1940 during a parliamentary debate, the Minister of Health, Walter Elliot was 
asked by the MP for Rhondda West, William John, whether he proposed to increase the 
powers of the Welsh Board of Health.99 Elliot’s response was clear:  
It is my intention in future to exercise and perform through the Welsh Board of 
Health all the principle powers and duties of the Minister of Health in relation to 
Wales, subject of course, to central direction of broad policy.100 
Elliot was equally clear in his response when asked a further question by William John, 
asking the Minister which powers would be transferred immediately to the Welsh Board of 
Health: 
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We shall begin, of course, with housing and town and country planning; and 
other duties, I hope, will be transferred at as early a date as is administratively 
possible.101  
On 1 May 1940, less than a month before the Dunkirk evacuations, powers over housing 
were transferred to the Welsh Board of Health.102 Circular 2005 advised local authorities that 
all their correspondence regarding proposals for capital expenditure, dealings in land and 
other matters relating to housing should be directed to the Welsh Board of Health at Cathays 
Park Cardiff, with the exception of Byelaws which were still to be referred to the Ministry of 
Health in Whitehall.103  
This finding demonstrates, for the first time, the clear link between Clement Davies’s Report 
into TB in Wales and the decision to devolve administrative functions relating to housing. It 
suggests that 1 May 1940 should be considered as the point of divergence between Wales 
and England. For the first time, housing was to be administered differently in Wales and 
England. The decision to devolve housing functions to Wales was made, not as a result of a 
process that had considered the potential advantages and disadvantages of their devolution, 
but, rather on grounds of political expediency. Whilst minimising the political fallout from the 
Clement Davies Report may have been the primary driver behind the decision to devolve 
responsibility over housing to the Welsh Board of Health, the decision did lead to the 
possibility that the way in which housing was administered in both nations could differ.  
The devolution of administrative functions relating to housing did not immediately lead to the 
development of a substantial variation between housing policy in Wales and England. The 
Welsh Board of Health had been founded to administer the Minster of Health’s policies in 
Wales, not to develop a separate Welsh health policy. But by separating the administration 
of housing in Wales from England, Whitehall were, for the first time, recognising that Wales 
had separate housing needs. In effect, the Westminster Government were recognising that 
the housing sector in Wales was distinct from the sector in England. Whilst it seems 
probable that many of the issues raised by the Clement Davies Report regarding the 
condition of rural housing also existed in England,104 Wales’s smaller, more rural population 
had made this problem a more pressing, political and social concern. Such a recognition 
would over the coming years, pave the way for greater devolution of administrative and 
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policy functions over housing to Wales and it is for this reason that this thesis argues that 1 
May 1940 should be considered the point of divergence between Wales and England.    
3.4 Growing devolution  
3.4.1 The Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
As with the First World War, house building had ground to a virtual stop during the Second 
World War. In Wales, 72,000 properties were damaged,105 whilst 475,000 properties had 
been destroyed or made permanently uninhabitable across the UK.106 In addition to the 
properties destroyed during the war, a population boom meant that there was a serious 
shortage of housing.107 In the run-up to the 1945 general election, housing had become the 
primary concern for British voters.108  
Under both the Labour and Conservative Governments that followed the war, the state was 
to play a crucial role in meeting this demand for new properties, with housing associations 
continuing to be on the fringes of housing development. By 1957, 2.5 million properties had 
been built across the UK, three quarters of these had been built by local authorities.109 
Housing associations did have access to some of the funds now available to local 
authorities, but they continued to operate under financial restrictions, limiting their ability to 
construct new homes.110 Despite this, housing associations did play a role in meeting 
demand in areas where there had been a shortage of state investment, in particular, housing 
for the elderly and minority communities.111 Whilst this did lead to a growth in the number of 
housing associations, the state continued to predominantly channel its housing investment 
through local authorities.112 The ability of housing associations to have an impact on the 
broader housing shortage remained constrained.  
Housing had historically been viewed as a public health matter but there had been growing 
calls to reunite housing and planning in one department.113 In 1951 housing was moved, 
from the Ministry of Health to merge with the Ministry of Town and Country Planning at the 
newly created Ministry of Local Government and Planning, subsequently renamed the 
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Ministry of Housing and Local Government.114 This decision was to lead to a change in the 
way housing was administered in Wales and England and constituted the next step in the 
development of devolution in Wales.  
The Welsh Board of Health had played a role in the administration of housing in Wales for a 
decade by 1951 but with housing now moving from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, a meeting was held on 6 February 1951 between the 
Minster of Health, the Minister of Local Government, and the Welsh Parliamentary Party to 
discuss the impact of this re-organisation on the Welsh Board of Health.115 The Ministers had 
to re-assure the Welsh Members of Parliament that the decision would not weaken the 
Welsh Board of Health.116 This was to be done by establishing a Welsh Office within the 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government.117 The Members and Officers of the Welsh 
Board of Health who’s work concerned the functions transferred to the Ministry would now 
be answerable to the Minister of Housing and Local Government, but administrative steps 
were taken to ensure that ʻthe same degree of devolution as before the changeʼ was be 
maintained.118 By the end of 1951 all the powers that were transferred to the Welsh Board of 
Health under circular 2005 had been transferred to the Welsh Office of the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government.119 Once more the devolution settlement in Wales did not 
develop as a result of a process of thinking about what would be the best system of 
governance for the nation, but, rather as a consequences of other changes being made 
elsewhere.  
The Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was distinct from the 
remainder of the Ministry in many ways. The Welsh Office was ʻvirtually independentʼ from 
the remainder of the Ministry on all office services, having direct dealings with the Ministry of 
Works and the Stationary Office.120 New accounts were opened in the name of the Welsh 
Office with the Paymaster General121 and a separate Whitley Council was developed for the 
staff of the Welsh Office.122 
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This distinction was clearly felt to be important by the staff at the Welsh Office. In a letter to 
William Thomas, the Undersecretary of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government in 1953, the Establishment Officer at the Welsh Office complained that 
staff at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government treated them on the same footing as 
those working for an English Regional office, on staff matters.123 The letter serves to 
highlight that there were limitations to administrative devolution in 1953, but its existence and 
the response it received does emphasise that the staff at the Welsh Office of the Ministry for 
Housing and Local Government had begun to consider themselves as different to those that 
were working at the Ministry’s regional offices.124 The Establishment Officer argued: ʻThis 
sort of thing never happened in the Welsh Board of Health days and it hardly seems 
consistent now with our position here…ʼ125 In addition to this growing sense of 
distinctiveness felt by staff operating at the Welsh office, there is evidence to suggest that 
those at Westminster were also becoming increasingly conscious of the differences that 
existed between Wales and England. This can be seen in the consultation that took place 
between Whitehall and Cathays Park before making two key appointments.  
The first appointment was that of Blaise Gillie as replacement for William Thomas, the 
Undersecretary of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. Gillie 
was Scottish and the staff at Whitehall were concerned that such an appointment would be 
criticised in Wales on the grounds that he wasn’t a Welshman.126 It appears from the 
documents held at the National Archives that efforts were made to seek a Welsh 
replacement for William Thomas, but that none of suitable experience could be found.127 The 
fact that those at Westminster were concerned about the reaction of Welsh MPs and the 
Welsh public to the appointment does emphasise the fact that the administration of housing 
in Wales was now viewed differently to the administration of housing in England.  
The second appointment further supports this argument. Under section 24 of the Housing 
Act 1935, the Minister of Health established a Central Housing Advisory Committee, to seek 
advice on housing matters.128 Despite the Statutory Rules and Orders of the Committee 
being titled, ʻHousing, Englandʼ129 the committee worked on an England and Wales basis 
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and amongst its first appointees was Megan Lloyd George, the MP for Anglesey.130 She 
continued in her role until 1956.131 As with the appointment of the Under-Secretary at the 
Welsh Office, it was decided by the Ministry that its preference was to find a Welsh 
replacement.132 Such a provision had not been made for any region in England. The Welsh 
Office of the Ministry for Housing and Local Government played a prominent role in assisting 
the Ministry in selecting her replacement. The Welsh Office suggested two names as 
possible candidates to replace Lady Lloyd George with the 72-year-old Sidney Foulkes 
being their clear preference.133 Despite some reservations by the Minister about Mr Foulkes’ 
age,134 the decision was made on 31 December 1956 to follow their recommendation.135 It 
seems that the Welsh Office was becoming increasingly significant as a force in the politics 
of administration. Administrative devolution had created a space where factors such as 
national identity and language could now directly impact on how housing was administered 
in Wales, in a way that had not being possible at the start of the previous decade.  
3.4.2 Further developments 
In a letter to Sir Thomas Sheepshanks, the Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government in 1955, Blaise Gillie drew the Permanent Secretary’s attention to an 
Administrative Panel established by the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire to consider 
the organisation of central government departments in Wales.136 In his letter, Gillie indicated 
to the Permanent Secretary that he did not expect their department to be the central focus of 
the Panel’s work given that the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, and the Welsh 
Board of Health were the two departments that were considered to have made a ʻgenuine 
affairʼ of devolution.137 Gillie did argue, however, that there were areas where greater powers 
could be devolved to the Welsh Office in order to avoid any ʻneedless opposition from 
holding back from devolution where it is not really necessary to do so.ʼ138 
Perhaps the most significant of Blaise Gillie proposals were that powers over byelaws should 
be transferred to the Welsh Office, that the Welsh Office should have its own team of 
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inspectors and that a proportion of the Welsh Office’s staff should be Welsh speaking.139 
Whilst the latter of these three proposals was not directly concerned with expanding the 
devolution settlement, all three proposals show a growing awareness of Wales as a distinct 
entity. By Christmas 1955 the decision had been made to devolve powers over byelaws to 
the Welsh Office with a circular issued in early January 1956.140 By now all the functions of 
the Minister of Housing and Local Government under the Housing Acts had been transferred 
to the Welsh Office, with the exception of New Towns.141 In addition to showing that there 
was a growing awareness of Wales as a distinct entity at Westminster, these changes, once 
again, highlight the impact that political expedience had on the development of housing 
devolution in Wales. Gillie proposed that these powers should be devolved to the Welsh 
Office, not because he thought their devolution would improve the administration of housing 
in Wales, but because he thought that devolving these powers would mean that the Welsh 
Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government was less likely to be criticised by the 
Council for Wales and Monmouthshire. Even prior to political devolution, politics was still a 
factor in making the way that housing policy was administered in Wales distinct from 
England. This political decision would lead to the desired outcome. Overall, the tone of the 
Third Memorandum of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire was positive about the 
operation of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Report 
was satisfied that the Office:  
is not a regional office, but is an out-stationed unit of the Ministry operating with a 
good measure of autonomy in Wales where it applies on which it receives 
guidance from London.142 
The Council was also pleased that further powers had been transferred to the Welsh Office, 
but concluded that the Welsh Office was less autonomous than the Welsh Board of 
Health.143 Attention was drawn in particular to the lack of statutory underpinning for the 
Welsh Office, which, it was argued, would have given the Office a more independent status, 
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and a clearer link to the Minister.144 It was concluded, however, that these differences were 
slight and that overall the operation of the Office was a satisfactory one.145 
Whilst satisfied with the work of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, the Council were not as content with the operation of devolution in other 
departments. This led them to propose that a Secretary of State for Wales should be 
established.146 Since 1951 the Home Secretary had also held the role of Minister for Welsh 
Affairs. In this capacity, the role of the Home Secretary had been to inform himself about 
Welsh life by visiting Wales, and to speak on behalf of Wales in Cabinet meetings.147 Despite 
these changes, administrative powers relating to Welsh Affairs remained with the other 
Ministries at Whitehall.148 Members of Parliament had questioned in 1951 whether the Home 
Secretary could successfully represent Welsh views if he had no responsibility over 
administrative functions concerning Wales.149 The Council for Wales and Monmouthshire 
concluded that he could not, and that a Secretary of State for Wales should be appointed.150 
The limitations on the Home Secretary’s powers and the fact that some departments had not 
fully accepted devolution were not the only factors that had led the Council to this view. The 
Council drew attention to the fact that the Secretary of State for Scotland held all the powers 
of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government.151 They also argued 
that, as many of the issues that concerned the Minister in Wales were ʻmarkedly different to 
those in Englandʼ, Wales needed its own Secretary of State so that Welsh concerns could be 
better represented.152 A year had passed and there had been a change of Prime Minister 
before the Government made a full response to the Memorandum. The decision taken by the 
new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan was to prove to be the next step along the path of 
divergence between housing administration in Wales and England.  
3.4.3 The Prime Minister responds  
In a letter to the Chair of the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire in December 1957, 
Macmillan dismissed the need to establish a Secretary of State for Wales.153 In the letter he 
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set out his belief that the majority of the Welsh population agreed with him that ʻtheir 
interests can best be furthered in association with England and English peopleʼ.154 MacMillan 
also dismissed the comparisons with Scotland, pointing to Scotland’s greater population, and 
its separate legal system.155  
Macmillan does concede the need for some reform. On the formation of his first cabinet in 
January 1957, Macmillan appointed Henry Brooke as the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government and the Minister for Welsh affairs. Macmillan notes in his letter to the Council 
for Wales and Monmouthshire that he believed that the decision to transfer responsibility for 
Welsh Affairs to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, from the Home Office had 
been well accepted in Wales.156 In his letter, the Prime Minister made further alterations to 
Wales’ devolution settlement. Macmillan decided to appoint a Minister of State for Welsh 
Affairs to assist the Minister in his duties regarding Wales.157 The Undersecretary of the 
Welsh Office was also to be renamed as the Welsh Secretary, and an Assistant Secretary 
was appointed to assist the Welsh Office’s work.158 The Prime Minister also set out plans to 
make arrangements for more devolution in other departments such as agriculture and 
education.159 
Housing was now at the vanguard of devolution. Whilst the steps taken by the Prime Minister 
had stopped short of those wanted by the Council for Wales and Monmouthshire and had 
not transferred any further powers over housing to the Welsh Office of the Ministry of 
Housing and Local Government, they had reinforced the independence of the Office. It also 
meant that when future discussions on further devolution would take place, housing was to 
be one of the subject areas that would be at the centre of any change. 
3.5 Conclusion  
The decision to transfer responsibility for Welsh Affairs to the Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government did not resolve all the issues that existed within its Welsh Office prior to 1957. 
Staff dissatisfaction continued into 1958.160 This came to a head with a Welsh Office Whitley 
Council statement on the Autonomy of the Welsh Office on 2 October 1958.161 Interestingly, 
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the Whitley Council’s concerns were limited to staff issues, with a contrast being drawn 
between the lack of autonomy in this regard and the ʻfull degree of responsibility placed upon 
the Welsh Office in its conduct of the business of the Ministry in Wales.ʼ162 
The staff side dispute does serve to highlight the limitations that were in place on the Welsh 
Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Office had not been 
established to pursue distinct Welsh policy approaches, but to administer the UK 
Government’s policy in Wales. This should not lead to us to overlook the significance of the 
changes that had taken place in housing administration in Wales over the previous twenty 
years. The period between 1 May 1940 and December 1957 had been one of great 
development for housing devolution in Wales. By 1957 housing in Wales was administered 
separately to housing in England. This was significant advancement from the period prior to 
1940 when, as demonstrated in sub-sections 2.1 and 2.2, there was very little that was 
distinctively ‘Welsh’ about either the administration or the nature of Welsh housing. Whilst 
the decision to devolve housing functions to Wales may not have been the result of a 
process of thought, it’s impact on the housing sector in Wales appears undeniable.   
 
The findings of this chapter have clearly demonstrated that the decision to devolve powers 
over housing to the Welsh Board of Health created a housing sector in Wales that could be 
viewed as distinct from the one in England, and that these sectors had begun to gradually 
diverge from each other. The chapter has demonstrated how two factors had an impact on 
this process; politics, and structural differences between Wales and England. The impact of 
these two factors and others will be further demonstrated in the remainder of the thesis. 
Whilst the practical impact of these developments had remained limited, with very few 
differences appearing in housing policy and legislation between Wales and England, these 
developments were to be the bedrock upon which later, significant devolution were built 
upon, and from where future divergence grew. Chapter 4 will explore the next stage of this 
process.  
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4. From the Secretary of State to the National Assembly  
 
The development of divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England 
has deep historical roots. So far, the thesis has charted the development of this process for 
the first time. As set out in on 1 May 1940, limited administrative functions relating to housing 
were devolved to the Welsh Board of Health. The Welsh Board of Health’s powers grew 
slightly over the following decade until the 1950s when its housing functions were transferred 
to a newly established Welsh Office at the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The 
Office played an important role in the development of devolution in Wales. The period after 
its establishment saw greater powers over housing devolved to Wales, including the power 
to pass byelaws, and in 1957 the Minister of Housing and Local Government also became 
responsible for Welsh Affairs. During the next three decades, divergence between Wales 
and England, and the powers devolved to Wales increased significantly. This period, 
specifically the years between the establishment of the post of Secretary of State for Wales 
in 1964, and 1996, the year that the last piece of legislation concerning social housing 
regulation that applied to both Wales and England was enacted, is explored in this chapter.  
 
This was a period of great change not just for Welsh devolution but also for the social 
housing movement more generally. As the immediate housing crisis that followed the 
Second World War eased, direct state involvement in housing construction declined. This 
was to lead to a shift in how social housing was developed. It was over this period that 
housing associations began to play an increasingly prominent role in the provision of 
housing. It is no coincidence that it is during this era that we also see the birth of modern 
social housing regulation, with the establishment of the Housing Corporation in 1964. 
Originally established as a funder of housing associations, by the 1970s the Corporation had 
taken on a full regulatory role. These developments in both housing and devolution were to 
become increasingly entangled over the next three decades. The Housing Corporation was 
to act as a driver for convergence within the social housing sector, taking power out of the 
hands of local authorities and providing more centralised direction for the sector. At the 
same time, the Secretary of State for Wales was to limit the impact of this process on Wales, 
thus driving divergence. By 1988 this process was to come to a head with the establishment 
of Tai Cymru as a separate social housing regulator for Wales, a decision that undoubtedly 
increased divergence between Wales and England. This process is examined in detail for 
the first time in this chapter. Through this exploration, this chapter will demonstrate how 
divergence was beginning to develop at several levels, and how a number of different factors 
were having an impact on the process in an era that predates political devolution. This 
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chapter, will demonstrate how the existence of administrative devolution permitted the social 
housing sector in Wales to continue to develop distinctly, and to diverge from the sector in 
England. It will also further emphasise how devolution within the housing context developed 
because of a series of ad-hoc decisions, not through a process of thinking. Developing an 
understanding of this period is key if we are to comprehend the Assembly’s position on its 
inception in 1999 and if we are to fully appreciate the development of divergence in more 
recent times.   
4.1 The 1960s – A new era for devolution and housing 
Two landmark events took place in the 1960s, specifically in 1964, which led to an important 
change in both the administration of social housing in Great Britain, and Wales’s devolution 
settlement. The first of these was the establishment of the Housing Corporation. The 
Corporation was founded to promote and assist the development of housing associations.1 
Over time the Corporation’s role was to evolve and it would eventually become the regulator 
of housing associations across Great Britain. At the same time, the post of the Secretary of 
State for Wales was established, with a seat at the cabinet and its own Welsh Office. As can 
be seen from discussions in Chapter 3, this was a development that had been called for over 
many years. Its establishment in 1964 was a crucial event in the development of Welsh 
devolution. Even though these events took place during the same year, they were largely 
unrelated developments. As both developed over the following thirty years they were to 
become increasingly intertwined. Studying their development will allow us to examine the 
growth in social housing regulation and Wales’s increasingly distinct role within that process. 
This will highlight the extent of the differences that had developed between Wales and 
England by the 1990s.     
4.1.1 The Housing Corporation  
The first indication of the more prominent role that housing associations were to play in the 
1960s came with the enactment of the Housing Act 1961. Under the Act, the Exchequer 
made £25 million available as loans for housing associations.2 This money was to be made 
available on the condition that the houses would be kept available for renting, and that rents 
would be no more than £4 a week excluding rates.3 The £25million was to be shared 
between England and Wales with a separate £3 million being made available in Scotland.4 
The scheme was administered by the National Federation of Housing Societies (NFHS), with 
the Exchequer providing the NFHS with the funds that they would then provide to Housing 
                                                          
1 Housing Act 1964, s 1 
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Associations as loans.5 The scheme was considered to have been a success and by 1963 
proposals were being made to extend it.6 Some concerns remained, that, as a trade 
association, the NFHS lacked independence.7 In part to counter this concern, the decision 
was made in May 1963 to establish the Housing Corporation.8 This plan became a reality 
with the Housing Act 1964. The Corporation was established to:  
promote and assist the development of housing societies, to facilitate the proper 
exercise and performance of the functions of such societies, and to publicise, in 
the case of societies providing houses for their own members no less than in the 
case of those providing houses for letting, the aims and principles of such 
societies.9 
The Corporation was established on 1 September 196410 and had the power to provide 
loans,11 an advisory service12 and land for housing associations.13 Despite having no 
regulatory functions at this time, the Housing Corporation did start to have an effect on the 
nature of housing associations. Early on, the Housing Corporation made moves to 
encourage housing associations to register under the rules of the Registrar of Industrial and 
Provident Societies.14 The Corporation also attempted to encourage private investment.15 
This was done through providing housing associations with second mortgages16 which 
meant that any private investors who provided the first mortgage would still get the primary 
security on the property.17  
Despite this focus on investment and support, the area in which the Housing Corporation 
arguably had its most significant impact was housing administration. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the administration and the development of housing had historically been under 
the control of local authorities. The formation of the Housing Corporation signalled a shift in 
direction, with powers moving to the centre, particularly with regards to funding. Housing 
Associations now had access to state funding without having to deal with local authorities. 
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This process of centralisation would become even more pronounced with the developments 
that were to follow in the 1970s.18  
The establishment of the Housing Corporation would appear to be, a point of convergence in 
the history of housing in Wales and England. Prior to the formation of the Housing 
Corporation, housing associations did not have easy access to central government funding 
and, as such, associations were more reliant on the funds they received from local 
authorities or through philanthropy.19 This had meant that associations developed very 
differently across the country.20 By reducing the powers of local authorities, with regards to 
housing associations, the Government was reducing the scope for the regional variation. 
Over the coming decade operational variation also began to reduce as the Corporation 
encouraged associations to register under the rules of the Registrar of Industrial and 
Provident Societies. The extent of any potential convergence between Wales and England 
was to be limited by a development that followed only a few months later, the establishment 
of the Welsh Office. 
4.1.2 Welsh Office 
Going into the 1964 general election, the Labour party’s manifesto contained a pledge to 
appoint a Secretary of State for Wales.21 Following their victory at the election, James 
Griffiths was appointed to the role on 18 October 1964,22 and on 19 November, the Prime 
Minister made a statement to the House of Commons setting out the Secretary of State’s 
functions. The Prime Minister announced that the Welsh Secretary was to have an office in 
Cardiff that was to be ʻadequately staffedʼ, with a smaller office based in London.23 The 
Secretary of State was to take over virtually all of the Minister of Housing and Local 
Government’s executive responsibilities in Wales, with housing explicitly named as an area 
where executive functions would be transferred. 24  
The fact that housing was transferred to the Welsh Office was a consequence of Wales’s 
devolution settlement prior to the 1964 election. As discussed, devolution had been a reality 
in Wales for many decades, with housing one of its key cornerstones. Prior to the 
appointment of the Secretary of State, housing in Wales had been administered through a 
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separate Welsh Office within the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. The Minister for 
Housing and Local Government had also held the title of Minister for Welsh Affairs and in 
this light, it is unsurprising that powers over housing were transferred to the Secretary of 
State for Wales. A passage from the instructions given to the Parliamentary Counsel in 
preparation for the transfer of these functions, however, gives an indication as to the extent 
the civil servants at Whitehall were willing to see devolution go. The key passage reads: 
The general approach to the splitting up of functions is that the day to day 
administration in Wales and Monmouthshire is handed over to the Secretary of 
State. The making of certain appointments is to be a joint exercise. Certain 
operations, however, such as the making of general regulations and the giving of 
general directions are to be reserved to the Minister with the object of securing 
uniformity of enactments. The giving of directions which only have a local effect 
and the making of local orders is transferred to the Secretary of State and within 
the field of general regulations he is given the any power to make regulations 
which only prescribe forms or the time and manner of doing anything. This is so 
that the regulations for Wales may provide, if it is so desired, forms which use 
the Welsh language.25 
Whitehall imagined that the Welsh Office was to merely be a base through which its policy in 
Wales would be administered, not as a department that would be free to develop its own 
policies and ideas. Divergence was to be kept to a minimum. After a few months of 
consideration, the decision was made as to which functions were to be transferred. These 
were transferred to the Secretary of State for Wales on 1 April 1965 under Statutory 
Instrument 319.26 It is apparent in all the documents that were exchanged between the 
concerned parties at Whitehall, that, the intention was to follow the approach set out in the 
instructions given to the Parliamentary Counsel. This can be seen in a note dated 15 
December 1964. It stated that the Ministerial powers that were spread throughout the 
Housing Acts should all be transferred to the Secretary of State for Wales, as far as they 
applied to Wales and Monmouthshire, with the exception of those that covered general 
regulatory powers.27 Whilst the powers devolved were administrative in nature, they provided 
                                                          
25 Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Transfer of Functions to Secretary of State for Wales - 
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the Secretary of State with significant power. These functions were to have a great impact 
on Welsh social housing over the coming decades. 
Before finalising which functions ought to be transferred to the Welsh Office, discussions 
were held as to how these functions should be transferred. The debate amongst the civil 
servants at Whitehall over this bares a similarity to a more recent devolution debate, the 
debate over whether Wales should move from a conferred to a reserved powers model of 
devolution. This is clear from the following extract: 
The defect in specifying exceptions, rather than the powers actually to be 
transferred in their application to Wales and Monmouthshire, is of course that 
any accidental omission will cause too much power to be transferred rather than 
too little; and that an amending order pulling back power that ought not to have 
been transferred would present obvious difficulty.28   
It has been argued by some that such thinking underpins the UK Government’s approach to 
Wales’s devolution settlement today. It has been suggested that the Government’s primary 
motivation for supporting a move to a reserved powers model of devolution in Wales, was a 
desire to pull back power, accidentally devolved to the National Assembly under the 
Government of Wales Act 2006.29 The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Government of 
Wales Act 2006 is said to have seen greater powers devolved to the National Assembly than 
what the Westminster Government had initially intended, and that the new Wales Act 2017 is 
an attempt reverse this decision.30 The Wales Act 2017 has drawn considerable criticism for 
this reason.31 The difficulties that were faced by the Westminster Government as they 
sought to introduce the reserved powers model of devolution in Wales, would suggest that 
the analysis undertaken at Whitehall in the 1960s, as to the difficulties that accidently 
devolving too much power to Wales would present, was correct.    
There was a crucial difference between debate in 1964 and the more recent discussion over 
which devolution model should be implemented in Wales. Due to the nature of administrative 
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devolution the Secretary of State’s powers were limited to introducing secondary legislation 
and therefore all his powers were set out in primary legislation. As such, the debate at 
Whitehall was over which form of the conferred powers model of devolution should be 
implemented, not over whether the Secretary of State’s powers should be set out under the 
reserved or the conferred model. In their initial conversations, the civil servants considered 
adopting a form that listed the legislation that conferred powers upon the Secretary of State, 
and to then set out which provisions within those were exempt. This was to be done for the 
sake of ʻsimplicityʼ.32 As the extract above suggests, there were some concerns that such a 
system would lead to functions being transferred to the Secretary of State unintentionally. 
So, a second option was considered. Under this model every single provision within an Act 
that was to confer powers onto the Secretary of State was to be listed.33 Ultimately, it seems 
that simplicity was favoured, with the first of the two models adopted.34 This approach 
remains the basis for the conferred powers model of devolution in place in Wales to this day, 
as can be seen from Schedule 7 of the Government of Wales Act 2006.35  
The list of functions transferred to the Secretary of State was a long one. With regard to 
housing alone, the functions that were transferred to the Secretary of State were set out in 
26 separate pieces of legislation.36 This legislation spanned a period of six decades and 
included legislation that was implemented to tackle specific issues such as rural housing,37 
war damage,38 and housing finance.39 Amongst the housing functions now transferred to the 
Secretary of State for Wales was the power to approve Exchequer Subsidies to Housing 
Associations,40 and to approve or decline proposals to establish Local Authority 
Redevelopment Areas.41  
It was the functions exercised by the Secretary of State under the Housing Act 1964 that are 
of most interest to this thesis. These were arguably the most significant functions transferred 
to the Welsh Office in relation to the development of divergence in social housing regulation. 
It was this piece of legislation that founded the Housing Corporation. Under the Act, the 
Secretary of State could issue directions to the Corporation if it only concerned the exercise 
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or performance of its functions in Wales.42 If there was a need to issue more general 
directions, the Secretary of State still retained power and such directions were issued 
jointly.43 A number of other functions were transferred to the Secretary of State. The 
Secretary of State was to be the person that was to grant consent to the Corporation before 
it could undertake a number of its activities.44 The Secretary of State could also provide a 
great deal of financial assistance to the Housing Corporation, local authorities and housing 
associations.45 Perhaps of equal significance was the fact that the Secretary of State also 
had powers over the Corporation’s constitution.46 The powers were to be exercised jointly 
with the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister for Housing and Local 
Government.47 This meant that the Secretary of State had a say over the membership of the 
Corporation, including the appointment and remuneration of the chairman.48 These were 
functions that had not been transferred to the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and 
Local Government upon the inception of the Corporation in 1964. 
As with the developments of the 1940s and 1950s, the establishment of the Secretary of 
State for Wales in 1964, and subsequently the Welsh Office, did not lead to immediate 
changes to the nature of Welsh housing. The distinction between the administration of 
housing in Wales and the administration of housing in England, however, was becoming 
more pronounced. The powers that were transferred to the Welsh Office in March 1965 
would lead, seemingly unintentionally, to a rapid increase in the divergence between housing 
in Wales and in England. This divergence would no longer be limited to housing 
administration but would have a broader impact.   
4.2 The 1970s - Growing regulation and divergence 
As the 60s turned into the 70s the role of the Housing Corporation expanded. By 1972 the 
Corporation’s ability to lend money had increased following the enactment of the Housing 
Finance Act 1972, but it was the enactment of the Housing Act 1974 that was to significantly 
change the role of the Corporation.49 This is a period that has been described as a 
watershed moment for housing associations.50  
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The Housing Act 1974 was enacted 34 years after what this thesis has argued is the point of 
divergence in housing administration between Wales and England. To date, this thesis has 
only briefly discussed social housing regulation. This is a consequence of the limited role 
played by housing associations over the previous decades with the state, through local 
authorities, being at the forefront of housing development across the UK. This had begun to 
change with the enactment of the Housing Act 1964. Housing Associations were now 
starting to play a much more prominent role in the delivery of social housing and had access 
to a much greater amount of public money. The changing nature of the sector was also to 
lead to a change in the Housing Corporation’s role. The Housing Act 1974 set about 
establishing the Housing Corporation as a regulator of housing associations. This could be 
viewed as the birth of social housing regulation in the UK, or as had been argued by some, 
the birth of centralised regulation in the UK in all areas.51 
4.2.1 Growing regulation and centralisation  
The Housing Act 1974 expanded the duties of the Housing Corporation. For example, the 
Corporation was now under a duty to register housing associations and to monitor their 
performance.52 These duties remain in place to this day for the regulators in Wales and 
England.53 In addition to registering and monitoring the performance of registered 
associations, the Act also limited the availability of certain grants and loans to those housing 
associations that had registered.54 These steps increased the power of the Corporation at 
the expense of local authorities.55  
With new powers transferred to the Housing Corporation, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Corporation made completing the registration process one of its top priorities.56 Amongst the 
requirements an association had to satisfy to be registered were that it did not trade for profit 
and that it was established to provide housing for letting.57 By 1976/7, it reported that it had 
nearly completed the task, registering 2,400 associations.58 The focus of the Corporation 
now turned to monitoring associations. Following consultation, the decision was made that 
monitoring could be best achieved by requiring housing associations to complete an annual 
return that contained such information as; the location of their housing stock, total staff 
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numbers and the disclosure of interests.59 In addition to this, the Corporation began a 
programme of ʻmonitoring visitsʼ to housing associations, with the new system in place by 
the publication of the Corporation’s Annual Review in 1977/78.60 The Corporation also had 
the power to appoint individuals to conduct statutory inquiries into the affairs of registered 
associations,61 and to appoint or remove members of an associations committee based on 
the results of such an inquiry.62 
This increase in the Housing Corporation’s responsibilities led to a change in its operation. In 
1974, there was a 40% increase in staffing at the Corporation.63 In addition to this the 
Corporation was split in two, one part dealing with investment, the other with regulation.64 
These two parts would then work together on any application for funding, sharing 
information.65 In addition to these operational changes the Housing Corporation also 
established regional offices. These offices had been established over the previous decade 
and were to consider the proposals of housing associations at a regional level.66 This was a 
move that further reinforced the supremacy of the Corporation, ensuring that it was the 
primary driver of housing association work, even at a local level.67  
All these changes suggest that the convergence in social housing administration that had 
been evident in the 1960s had continued into the 1970s. Indeed, it could be argued that as 
social housing regulation evolved in the 1970s that there was very little variation, if any at all. 
The administrative devolution that had taken place in Wales over the previous three 
decades, however, meant that the impact of the Corporation’s new regulatory powers 
affected Wales in a different manner, and reinforced the differences that had already 
developed between Wales and England.  
4.2.2 Regulation and Wales 
Regional offices were not only opened by the Housing Corporation in England. Two Scottish 
Offices were established, whilst a Welsh regional office was also established in Cardiff under 
the control of the Chief Officer for Wales.68 The Office in Cardiff was originally established as 
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the regional office for Wales and the South West of England,69 but by 1974 the decision had 
been taken to establish a separate Regional Office for the South West in Exeter. The 
Corporation itself suggested in 1979 that there were two reasons for this decision. First that 
it was necessary to ʻto meet the challenge of the 1974 Housing Actʼ and secondly that such 
a move was necessary so that the Corporation could ʻconcentrate in Wales on the 
principality’s particular problemsʼ.70 These suggestions highlight just how important the 
developments of the 1970s were to both social housing and devolution. The fact that the 
Corporation felt that it could not operate effectively under the Housing Act 1974, without 
needing to restructure itself, shows how social housing regulation had changed the sector. 
This argument is supported further by the increase in staff numbers at the Corporation, as 
outlined above. But perhaps of more importance to this thesis is the suggestion, in the 
excerpt above, that the Corporation viewed Wales as increasingly distinct from England.71 
This interpretation can be supported by a number of other developments that took place in 
the mid-1970s. Separate brief reports were prepared on the activities of the Corporation in 
both Wales and Scotland, and these were then discussed with other agenda papers.72 The 
Annual Reports of the Corporation also evolved dramatically to give more focus to Wales 
and Scotland. In 1973, the activities of the Corporation in Wales were discussed in two short 
paragraphs.73 By 1975/6 the activities of the Corporation in Wales had been allocated a 
column,74 by 1977/8 this had grown to a full page,75 and by 1978/9 there were three pages 
dedicated to the work of the Housing Corporation in Wales.76 These developments also 
provide further evidence that suggests that structural differences between Wales and 
England do have an impact on the development of divergence. In noting that Wales had 
'particular problems'77 the Housing Corporation were, in effect acknowledging that Wales’s 
economic, geographical and socio-linguistic condition meant that it had different needs to 
England. With the Housing Corporation deciding to develop a distinctive approach when 
operating in Wales because of these 'problems', it appears beyond doubt that the structural 
difference between nations can contribute to the development of divergence.   
The role played by the Secretary of State for Wales in the operation of the Corporation also 
became increasingly prominent over this period. The Secretary of State was involved in the 
                                                          
69 Housing Corporation, Report 1972/3, Page 6  
70 Housing Corporation, Report 1978/79, Page 13 
71 Murie (n4) 119 and Housing Corporation (n52) Page 11 
72 Murie (n4) 119 
73 Housing Corporation (n69) 
74 Housing Corporation, Report 1975/6 
75 Housing Corporation (n60) 
76 Housing Corporation (n70) 
77 Housing Corporation (n70) 
86 
 
consultation that took place over the format of the Housing Corporation’s Annual Return,78 
and dwelling construction and saving targets were set out along national lines.79 The impact 
of devolution was not just limited to how the Corporation was administered or to how the 
Corporation published its information, but also extended to its financing. As noted, the 
Secretary of State for Wales had the power to provide advances to the Housing Corporation 
under the Housing Act 1964. It is over the course of the 1976/77 and 1977/78 financial years 
that the significance of the devolution of this power becomes apparent.  
During the 1976/77, financial year the Housing Corporation was faced with significant cuts to 
its budget for 1977/78. The first cut was announced in July 1976. The Corporation was 
expected to save £15 million from its budget in England and a further £1 million from its 
budget in Wales.80 By December 1976 the Corporation was faced with an even greater cut. 
The Government announced that the Corporation’s budget would be cut by £57million the 
following year, a cut so severe that it would have led to the freezing of all remaining new 
work for the 1976/77 year and a reduction by 50% in the work planned for 1977/78.81 
Importantly, this was only a cut in the Corporation’s budget in England and no cut was 
announced for the budgets of the Corporation in Scotland or Wales.82 Cleary, the differences 
between the administration of social housing in Wales and England was beginning to have a 
real impact in practice.  
Not only was Wales spared the worst of the cuts to the Corporation’s expenditure, but it 
received further financial and non-financial support throughout the decade. In the 1976/77, 
financial year the Welsh Office had worked with the Corporation to scrutinise the standards 
and costs of acquisition and improvement units,83 whilst in 1979/80, having spent its initial 
budget, the Corporation received a further £500,000 from the Secretary of State for Wales.84 
The provision of social housing in Wales and the work of housing associations were clearly 
becoming increasingly distinct from England. Furthermore, whilst the divergence in housing 
administration between Wales and England had historically had very little impact on the 
nature of Welsh housing and broader civil society, the 1970s was the decade that saw a 
change in this regard.  
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In 1976, the National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA) established a Welsh 
Housing Association Committee (WHAC).85 The WHAC was described by the Corporation as 
the Welsh arm of the NFHA and the Corporation welcomed what it dubbed as a ʻcorporate 
voiceʼ for the Welsh social housing movement.86 This was not the only development that 
showed a growing awareness that Wales and England now operated differently when it 
came to social housing. In March 1976, the Welsh Consumer Council published a survey of 
the allocation policies for Council Housing in Wales, whilst the TUC published Housing in 
Wales a document that looked at the condition of Welsh housing.87 
Despite this growing divergence between the administration of housing in Wales and in 
England, it is important to distinguish between this and the extent by which divergence was 
developing with regard to social housing regulation specifically. Wales and England both 
shared one common regulator, the Housing Corporation, and as a result, associations in 
Wales were subject to the same standards and requirements as their counterparts in 
England. Variation in social housing regulation, the primary focus of this thesis, therefore 
remained minimal. Despite the best efforts of civil servants at Whitehall to secure uniformity 
between Wales and England, the growing differences between ʻday to day administrationʼ of 
housing in Wales and England, would prove to have a significant impact on the development 
of regulation over the next decade.88 It is important to note the context within which these 
day to day differences had developed. As has been discussed, despite the growth in 
devolution over this period, there were very limited differences between primary legislation in 
Wales and England. Despite this, housing associations in Wales were now receiving extra 
money than their English counterparts, and organisations such as the Housing Corporations 
were operating differently in Wales. These differences demonstrate how divergence can 
develop at a number of different levels. The Housing Corporation was not obliged by statute 
to develop a distinctive approach when operating in Wales. These differences emerged a 
result of the decision of the staff at the Corporation. Much of the divergence that had 
developed during this era therefore did not develop at the primary legislative level but rather 
as the result of the decisions of those who were tasked with implementing the legislation.    
The growth in day to day differences between Wales and England over this period was to 
have a long-term effect. The fact that housing in Wales was being administered and 
discussed in ways that were so different to England, would lead to calls for further 
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devolution. By the end of the 1980s, these calls had led to the foundation of a separate 
regulator for housing associations in Wales.  
4.3 The 1980s – The Thatcher years 
Despite the continuing growth of both the Housing Corporation and Welsh devolution 
throughout the 1970s, both faced uncertain futures as they entered the 1980s. In 1979, the 
people of Wales had voted overwhelmingly against the establishment of an Assembly,89 
whilst the budget of the Housing Corporation was becoming increasingly stretched.90 The 
devolution referendum was not the only time that the people of Wales would go to the ballot 
box in 1979. On 3 May, there was a General Election, from which Margaret Thatcher and her 
Conservative Party emerged victorious. The legacy of her Government has been long 
debated. What seems beyond debate is that her Government had a significant impact on the 
country and on the housing sector.  
One of the policies most synonymous with the Thatcher administration is the ʻright to buyʼ. 
The virtues of the policy have long been debated and have resurfaced recently due to the 
expansion of the policy to cover housing associations in England.91 Whilst undoubtedly 
significant, this thesis will primarily focus on developments that were to take place in the 
second half of the 1980s; the expansion of the Housing Corporation, and the establishment 
of Tai Cymru/ Homes for Wales.  
4.3.1 The right to buy 
The notion of tenants being able to purchase their council homes was nothing new by the 
time that it became a Conservative Party manifesto pledge in 1979. Discretionary sales had 
been available since the interwar period and had increased in popularity since the 1950s.92 
The Conservative’s policy was to go further than what had gone before, however, and was 
viewed by Thatcher herself as one of the key reasons for the Conservative's victory at the 
General Election.93 The policy was put into law with the enactment of the Housing Act 1980 
and expanded further by the Housing Act 1985. The 1980 Act offered tenants substantial 
discounts to help them buy their homes,94 and provided the Secretary of State with the 
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power to intervene to assist tenants if local authorities were dragging their heels.95 Many 
housing associations were not required by law to comply with the ʻright to buyʼ, despite this 
being the initial intention of the Conservative Party.96 In spite of this, by the end of the 
1980/1981 financial year, over 4,500 housing association tenants had requested to buy their 
properties.97 
The passage of the policy from a manifesto pledge to legislation was not entirely smooth. 
Whilst criticism from the opposition may have been anticipated, its progress also faced 
difficulties due to internal wrangling in Whitehall. Amongst the departments that presented 
such difficulties was the Welsh Office. The Parliamentary Counsel had identified the 
ʻproblem of Walesʼ by January 1980.98 The ʻproblemʼ being, deciding on which powers 
should be exercised by the Secretary of State for Wales under the Bill, and determining how 
these should be set out.99 The discussions between the Welsh Office, the Department of the 
Environment and the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel on how to resolve this problem 
were frank at times. Nowhere was this more apparent than in a letter sent by the Welsh 
Office on 1 February 1980, in response to correspondence by the Parliamentary Counsel.100 
The Counsel had discussed how provisions could be placed into the Bill to ensure that the 
Secretary of State for Wales could make separate but identical regulations or orders for 
Wales.101 The Welsh Office believed that it had already been agreed that the Secretary of 
State for Wales would be permitted to carry out such functions both separately and 
differently.102 In its response the Welsh Office states: 
As you are aware, we are most anxious, and indeed our Secretary of State 
expects, to be able to exercise regulation making and order making powers 
separately and differently as respects to Wales.103 
The Welsh Office’s concerns were supported by the Department of the Environment who 
asked the Parliamentary Council to revisit the Bill unless it could assure both itself and the 
Welsh Office that the legislation would allow the formation of both separate and different 
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provisions for Wales.104 The Wales Office was, in effect arguing for a space to develop a 
distinct Welsh approach to implement a common Wales and England policy. This debate 
demonstrates the significance of one of the thesis’ key themes, that divergence can develop 
at a number of levels. The Wales Office’s request for powers to developed separate 
regulations under the Act, shows that it had appreciated it was possible to develop a 
distinctive Welsh approach when making regulations, even when it was tasked with 
implementing a common Wales and England policy that was set out in primary legislation.  
4.3.2 The role of the Housing Corporation 
As has been noted, the Housing Corporation entered the 1980s under some pressure. The 
Corporation had already faced cuts to its budget and with the election of a Conservative 
Government there were fears that the Corporation would be disbanded during a cull of the 
quangos.105 Whist the Corporation was spared, things did not carry on as before.106  
The 1980/81 financial year was a year of great change for the Corporation. Faced with a 
tightening financial belt the Corporation underwent some considerable reorganisation in an 
attempt to operate in a ʻslimmed downʼ form.107 In the 5 years leading to 1979/80 the number 
of staff employed at the Corporation had more than doubled as a result of the Corporation’s 
increased workload.108 In 1980/81, the number of posts across both Wales and England was 
cut from 689 to 545.109   
In addition to this cut in staff the Corporation underwent further restructuring. The 
Corporation announced plans to bring all responsibility and staffing for the registration, 
supervision and control of housing associations under one roof at its Headquarters.110 
Monitoring officers would be based at the regional offices, but would be answerable to 
Headquarters.111 Financial efficiency was not the only motivation behind this decision. This 
structure would permit the Corporation to separate monitoring functions from other day to 
day work.112 This would mean that the Corporation could ensure that there was a clear 
separation between its investment and supervisory functions.113 
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The operation of the Corporation was also amended because of new legislative powers and 
the adoption of new regulatory techniques. Under the Housing Act 1980 it was now 
compulsory for every housing association to transfer copies of their audited accounts to the 
Corporation within six months.114 The Housing Corporation had already had the power to 
request that housing associations transferred these accounts to them,115 but only 81% of 
associations submitted their reports within the requisite time period.116 Under their new 
powers under the 1980 Act, the Corporation began legal proceedings against eight 
associations during the 1985/86 financial year.117 Aware of the fact that it could not monitor 
every housing association; in 1978/79 the Corporation introduced spot audits.118 These were 
designed to supplement the monitoring visits that were already being undertaken by the 
Corporation.119 This was to feed into a new regulatory approach under which each housing 
association in receipt of public funds would be visited over the course of a two year cycle.120 
These visits were to focus on serious weakness both in the control of an association by its 
committee, and in its behaviour.121 An approach not dissimilar to the risk based approach to 
regulation in force today. 
4.3.3 Becoming similar but growing apart? 
All these changes to the Housing Corporation had the effect of further centralising social 
housing regulation across Britain, but by the late 1980s a decision was taken that would 
significantly increase the scope for divergence between Wales and England. In 1988, Tai 
Cymru was established as a separate Housing Corporation for Wales. This was a 
development that was to mean that whilst the social housing sector as a whole was 
becoming increasingly similar, Wales and England were continuing to drift apart with regards 
to social housing regulation.  
This divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England might never have 
happened. By the mid-1980s suggestions were being made that the Corporation’s Welsh 
Office should be scrapped, with its functions in north Wales being operated from Liverpool, 
and in south Wales from Bristol.122 With regulation across Wales and England now being 
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controlled from the Housing Corporation’s headquarters, the opportunity for regional 
variation seemed to have further decreased, with each region converging to follow one 
central approach. Any move to disband the Corporation’s Welsh office would have 
accelerated convergence between Wales and England. This idea was rejected, and it was 
only a few years later that Tai Cymru was established.  
The Housing Association Act 1985 updated the statutory basis upon which the Housing 
Corporation operated, but only three years later a separate Housing Corporation for Wales 
was established. Discussions regarding the establishment of a separate Welsh Housing 
Corporation had started back in the autumn of 1987. Concerns were raised about how 
certain provisions contained in a new Housing Bill would be implemented in Wales without 
the establishment of a separate Housing Corporation.123 In the minutes of a meeting held 
between the Welsh Office and the Department of the Environment on 3 September 1987, it 
was noted that both were agreed that it was now necessary to establish a separate Welsh 
Housing Corporation.124 
A week later the Secretary of State for Wales was on the offensive in his efforts to establish 
a separate Welsh Corporation. In a letter to the Cabinet Office, the Welsh Office sets out that 
the Secretary of State viewed the Welsh Office of the Housing Corporation as the ʻodd man 
out amongst Welsh quangosʼ that came within his responsibility for public expenditure, as it 
was a Welsh arm of a body, as opposed to being a ʻdistinct and independent Welsh 
entityʼ.125 Furthermore, it was noted that ʻthis singularityʼ was to be further emphasized when 
Scottish Homes was to come into being as a separate Housing Corporation for Scotland.126 
The proposals seemed to gain support in Whitehall during the autumn of 1987 but support 
was still not forthcoming from the Cabinet Office. In a letter to the Secretary of State for 
Wales, the Minister for the Civil Office, Richard Luce, set out his concerns with the 
proposal.127 The Minister outlined that the Government’s policy on the establishment of non-
departmental public bodies was that they were only to be established if the new body would 
ʻcarry out its functions more economically and effectively than would other optionsʼ.128 The 
Minister felt that whilst the proposal to establish a Welsh Housing Corporation would lead to 
some efficiency savings, this would be a side effect, with the primary motivation for its 
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establishment being political in nature.129 Despite these concerns, by December the 
proposal had been approved in principle by the Secretary of State for the Environment 130 
and the Prime Minister.131 Once again this important step did not develop as a result of a 
process of thinking about how housing powers should be devolved to Wales. In this 
instance, it would seem that the primary motivation for devolution was the Secretary of State 
for Wales’ desire to ensure his powers were consistent with those of the Secretary of State 
for Scotland. 
On 16 December, a meeting was held between the Secretary of State for Wales and Sir 
Hugh Cubitt, the Chairman of the Housing Corporation. At the meeting the Secretary of State 
informed Sir Hugh of his intention to establish a separate Housing Corporation for Wales.132 
The idea was supported in principle by Sir Hugh and attention turned towards some of the 
issues that would arise during the establishment of a Welsh Corporation.133 Amongst the 
issues discussed were the timescale for the establishment of the Corporation, its name, and 
the need to ensure that the Corporation’s Board was of sufficient quality.134 The following 
week the Government launched its consultation on the establishment of a separate Housing 
Corporation for Wales.135  
The proposal received widespread support from those involved in Welsh housing.136 The 
sector’s enthusiasm for the idea is highlighted by the fact that by early January 1988 the 
Welsh Office had already received a letter from a Colwyn Bay Chartered Surveyor offering 
his services to any newly established body.137 Despite this positivity there were concerns 
raised by housing associations that operated on both sides of the border that housing 
associations in Wales wanted to establish a closed shop.138 In their response to the 
consultation, Hanover Housing Association set out that if a separate Housing Corporation 
was established in Wales it would have to consider reorganising its administration, though 
                                                          
129 ibid 
130 Letter from A C Elmer at the Welsh Office to Mr M Betenson at the Treasury (11 December 1987) National 
Archives File BD 107/ 66 
131 Letter David Norgrove, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, to Jon Shortridge at the Welsh Office (11 
December 1987) National Archives File BD 107/ 66 
132 Minutes of a meeting held between the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Housing Corporation and 
the Chief Executive of the Housing Corporation (16 December 1987) National Archives File BD 107/ 66 
133 Ibid. No reason was given by Sir Hugh for his support.  
134 ibid. Particular concerns were raised about the quality of the Housing Corporation’s Welsh board member, 
Lloyd Williams. 
135 Welsh Office, Consultation Paper on the Proposal to Establish a Separate Housing Corporation for Wales  
136 The proposals were welcomed by organisations ranging from local authorities, to housing associations, to 
other third sector bodies. The responses are held by the National Archives in file BD 107/66 
137 Letter from John Kelly to Peter Walker, the Secretary of State for Wales (24 December 1987) National 
Archives File BD 107/ 66 
138 Response to the Consultation Paper by Hanover Housing Association – Available in file BD 107/66 
94 
 
they did make it clear that they saw no reason to question their continued operation in 
Wales.139 Their response suggests that some housing associations were aware of the 
potential impact the establishment of a Welsh Housing Corporation would have on the social 
housing sector in Wales, and the divergence that was likely to follow between the sector in 
Wales and England.  
With ʻalmost unanimous supportʼ for the idea to establish a Welsh Housing Corporation 
attention soon turned to its establishment.140 Civil servants and politicians focused on two 
areas in particular during this process; the structure of the Welsh Corporation and its name. 
There had been some debate within Whitehall on how a separate Welsh Housing 
Corporation could be most effectively created through legislation. They eventually concluded 
that this would be through introducing amendments to the Housing Bill. By February 1988 
revised instructions had been sent to the Parliamentary Counsel for the amendments that 
needed to be made to the Housing Bill.141 What is immediately obvious from the instructions 
is that despite the fact that the formation of Scottish Homes was one of the factors that had 
made some in Westminster believe that the formation a separate Housing Corporation for 
Wales was necessary, these two bodies were to be very different.142 The Welsh Corporation 
was to be far more closely associated with its counterpart in England. The instructions state: 
the Secretary of State for Wales is not seeking a Welsh equivalent of the 
Scottish body “Scottish Homes”. He wishes to establish the Housing Corporation 
for Wales which will have exactly the same, and no more, powers than those 
exercised at present by the Housing Corporation.143  
Given that the new Welsh body was to have the same powers as the existing Corporation, 
this limited some of the structural issues that may have arisen. In many areas, the Housing 
Bill could be simply amended so that the statutory provisions that gave the Housing 
Corporation its powers also applied to the new Welsh body.144 This approach would also 
have an impact on the name that was to be chosen for the Welsh Housing Corporation. Four 
names were initially suggested in February 1988.145 These were Welsh Homes, Homes for 
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Wales/ Housing for Wales, Tai Cymru and the Welsh Housing Agency.146 The Housing 
Corporation was eager that the new Welsh Corporation adopted a different name to avoid 
confusion between the two organisations.147 It was felt, however, that Welsh Homes would 
be too similar to the new Scottish Homes in Scotland. This was felt to be undesirable given 
the different structure and functions of Scottish Homes.148 Within the month the decision was 
taken that the body should be referred to as Housing for Wales in English and as Tai Cymru 
in Welsh.149 
The decision that Tai Cymru was to operate under the same powers as the Housing 
Corporation in England certainly curtailed the extent to which regulation in Wales and 
England could diverge from each other. In addition to this, both bodies were answerable to 
ministers within the same Government and would be subjected to similar policy directives. 
This does not lessen the significance of the moment. For the first time, housing associations 
were being regulated by two different bodies across either side of Offa’s Dyke. Given the 
extent to which other administrative functions over housing had already been devolved to the 
Welsh Office, the establishment of Tai Cymru meant that there was now very little crossover 
between Wales and England with regards to housing. Even though social housing regulation 
in Wales and England remained similar, there is no doubting that the establishment of Tai 
Cymru meant that both nations continued to grow apart. This was a process that was to 
continue even more significantly only a decade later with the establishment of the National 
Assembly. 
4.4 The run up to the National Assembly 
Only a few years after its foundation, Tai Cymru found itself severely tested. In 1990, a 
Welsh housing association, Corlan, collapsed. The incident sparked significant reaction in 
Wales. In Westminster, the Secretary of State for Wales was questioned on numerous 
occasions on how the situation had arisen, and about what his and Tai Cymru’s proposals 
were for dealing with it.150 On 25 May 1990, Tai Cymru commissioned a report by the 
Housing Association Consultancy and Advisory Service (HACAS) into the affairs of 
Corlan.151 In March 1991 the Parliamentary Undersecretary to the Welsh Office laid out the 
Report’s findings to the Commons.152 The Undersecretary made it clear that he believed that 
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Tai Cymru had learned lessons from the incident and cited the fact that they now required 
associations to submit management accounts in addition to their audit financial reports.153  
4.5 Conclusion  
Tai Cymru survived the Corlan incident and in 1996 the statutory basis for social housing 
regulation was updated once more, with the Housing Act 1996 now replacing the Housing 
Act 1988. The Act was to serve as the legal basis for both the Housing Corporation and Tai 
Cymru and makes almost identical provisions for both. Only three years later, Tai Cymru 
was disbanded, following the establishment of the National Assembly, with all its functions 
being transferred to the Welsh Ministers.154 The Act was subsequently amended to reflect 
this, though the statutory basis for the powers of the Welsh Ministers remained largely 
unchanged from those of Tai Cymru. As this chapter has shown, a clear line can therefore 
be drawn from the developments in housing devolution in the 1960s and the establishment 
of the Housing Corporation, to the powers devolved to the National Assembly in 1999 in 
relation to social housing regulation. 
Through this exploration of the historic development of divergence this chapter has also 
drawn further attention to two of the thesis’s main themes. First, the chapter has 
demonstrated how a number of factors contribute to development of divergence. In this 
period, two factors appear to have had a particularly significant impact on the process, 
politics and the structural differences that exist between Wales and England. This chapter 
has also highlighted how divergence can develop at a number of level. It has shown how, 
even in the era of administrative devolution when there was limited divergence in primary 
legislation, important differences could develop between Wales and England. It has also 
highlighted how the devolution settlement in Wales continued to be shaped by ad-hoc 
decisions as opposed to a more rounded consideration as to the benefits of devolution and 
what shape any settlement should take. 
Despite the significant changes in Wales’ devolution settlement and the legislation 
introduced by the National Assembly since 1999, the Housing Act 1996 remains the 
statutory basis for social housing regulation in Wales. In England on the other hand, this is 
not the case. The Housing Act 1996 was therefore the last piece of legislation enacted that 
provided a common statutory basis for social housing regulation both sides of Offa’s Dyke. It 
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is from this point that Chapter 5 will chart the development of contemporary divergence in 
social housing regulation.  
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5. Housing Divergence: 1996 to the Present Day 
 
18 September 1997 is a landmark date in Welsh history. By a majority of just 6,721, the 
people of Wales voted in favour of establishing a National Assembly.1 The opening of the 
National Assembly in 1999 was not the final step in Wales’s devolutionary journey. Over the 
last decade and a half, the National Assembly has operated under three different 
devolutionary settlements; the Government of Wales Act 1998, Schedule 5 of the 
Government of Wales Act 2006 and Schedule 7 of the Government of Wales Act 2006. This 
chapter sets out the significance of each of these developments. It looks at both primary and 
secondary sources in order to get an understanding of how these constitutional changes 
impacted upon social housing regulation in Wales and England, and examines whether they 
promoted or restricted divergence.   
A study of modern day devolution in Wales, might be expected to start with the opening of 
the National Assembly in 1999, but this chapter begins its examination in 1996. In 1996, the 
UK Government enacted the Housing Act 1996. Even though regulation had been 
undertaken separately in Wales and England since the enactment of the Housing Act 1988,2 
the Housing Act 1996 updated the statutory basis for regulation in both nations. The Act 
operated as the statutory basis for regulation on both sides of the border until 2008, when 
the Westminster Government enacted a further piece of housing legislation, the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008. The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 became the new statutory 
basis for regulation in England only, with the Housing Act 1996 continuing as the statutory 
basis for regulation in Wales. Both the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing and Regeneration 
Act 2008 have been amended further in recent years, by legislation such as the Housing 
(Wales) Measure 2011, the Localism Act 2011 and the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
Despite this, the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 both 
continue to provide the statutory basis for social housing regulation in Wales and England 
respectively. This chapter therefore charts the extent of the differences that developed 
between regulation in Wales and England during the early years of the Assembly, and 
explores the factors that contributed to the process. In doing so, this chapter provides a link 
between the historic and contemporary aspects of this thesis.   
The chapter examines these developments in three sections. The first section charts the 
development of devolution more generally over the period between 1996 and 2011, drawing 
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on both primary and secondary materials to note how these developments may have 
constrained or enhanced divergence. The second section examines how legislative 
divergence developed over this time, noting the effect of differing policy objectives across 
Offa’s Dyke and potential external factors. Finally, the chapter examines the differences that 
developed between the regulatory frameworks in Wales and England. In adopting this 
approach this chapter is setting the scene for a more detailed analysis of the dissimilarities 
that have developed between Wales and England, and of the factors that have contributed 
to divergence process. This chapter also demonstrates how divergence can develop as a 
result of the actions of both the UK and Welsh Governments, a theme that becomes 
increasingly important throughout the remainder of the thesis.   
5.1 From the referendum to the present day 
5.1.1 The establishment of the National Assembly 
Between 1999 and 2007 the powers of the National Assembly were set out in the 
Government of Wales Act 1998. This period is often referred to as the era of executive 
devolution, as the Act, in effect, transferred the Secretary of State for Wales’s powers to the 
National Assembly.3 This period has been discussed by a number of leading academics on 
Welsh devolution, including Richard Rawlings, in his book, Delineating Wales.4 Rawlings 
notes that the Assembly had powers over policy, a number of significant administrative 
functions and secondary legislation, but crucially, no primary legislative powers.5 The 
devolution settlement therefore limited the ability of the Welsh Government to enact 
divergent housing legislation. This may go some way towards explaining the limited extent of 
divergence in social housing regulation over this period. 
Given the extensive administrative devolution that had taken place within the housing sector 
before 1999,6 it is not surprising that powers over housing were devolved to the National 
Assembly. As discussed in Chapter 4, social housing regulation had been undertaken by 
different bodies in Wales and England for a decade by this time, Tai Cymru in Wales and the 
Housing Corporation in England. The rise of quangos in Wales, including Tai Cymru as well 
as such organisations as the Welsh Development Agency has been cited as a driver towards 
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the formation of the Assembly.7 On the one hand they contributed towards the development 
of a Welsh identity and led to greater differences between administration in Wales and 
England.8 On the other, there was a perception that these quangos lacked accountability 
and operated in an unfair manner.9 This led to calls for the greater democratisation of 
devolution. In this context, it is not surprising that many quangos, including Tai Cymru, were 
disbanded upon the establishment of the National Assembly.  
The Government of Wales Act 1998 abolished Tai Cymru.10 Interestingly, Tai Cymru’s 
powers were not directly transferred to the National Assembly. Tai Cymru’s functions were 
initially transferred to the Secretary of State for Wales.11 These functions were then 
transferred from the Secretary of State, to the National Assembly under the National 
Assembly for Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999.12 Tai Cymru was, therefore, not 
disbanded by the National Assembly, but was in fact disbanded by the UK Government 
before the Assembly had even been established. One of the key developments of the early 
years of Welsh devolution in the social housing context was not a result of a newly 
established Assembly finding its feet, but was in fact a continuation of a process that had 
been ongoing for decades previously with Westminster, through the Secretary of State for 
Wales, making decisions on how Wales was run. 
This finding seems to lend support to the views noted by Rawlings and others about limited 
nature of devolution in Wales at this time.13 It should also be emphasized that, despite its 
limits, the establishment of the National Assembly did create the possibility that greater 
differences could develop between social housing regulation in Wales and England. A 
Secretary of State for Wales was unlikely to use his or her powers to introduce secondary 
legislation, or issue guidance to Tai Cymru that differed considerably from the overall 
objectives of the Westminster Government. Indeed, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, when 
powers had been devolved to Wales prior to 1999, concentrated attempts had been made to 
minimise the possibility of policy differences emerging. The purpose of administrative 
devolution was to allow the relevant devolved body to administer Westminster policy in a 
distinct manner in Wales, not to pursue its own policy agenda. The move towards executive 
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devolution was to signal a change in approach.14 The National Assembly was free to pursue 
a distinctive policy approach to housing, within certain constraints.15 A democratically elected 
Assembly would also not be tied by the same political bonds as the Secretary of State for 
Wales. This analysis seems to be supported by events that took place over the eight years 
that the National Assembly operated under this model of devolution. For example, the 
National Assembly implemented a new inspection regime and set out new regulatory 
requirements for housing associations in 2006.16 The fact that powers over primary 
legislation were not devolved did mean that if the National Assembly wanted to pursue a 
radically different approach to social housing regulation, its ability to do so remained limited.  
These developments provide further emphasis for two of the thesis’s main themes. First, 
they demonstrate how divergence can develop at a number of different levels. In 2006, there 
was very limited divergence in primary legislation between Wales and England. On a 
regulatory level, however, there were separate inspections regimes. Secondly, these 
developments provide further evidence that politics is a factor that can lead to the 
development of divergence. The impact of politics on divergence extends beyond party 
politics. During this period, the Labour Party were in power in both Cardiff Bay and 
Westminster, yet despite this, distinctive Welsh approaches were beginning to emerge. This 
is discussed in greater depth in sub-section 7.1.  
Even with the gradual emergence of distinctive Welsh policy approaches, the limitations of 
the Government of Wales Act 1998 were quickly recognised. Rawlings notes that as early as 
2000, the Labour Party had promised their coalition partners at the National Assembly, the 
Liberal Democrats, an Independent Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements 
of the Assembly.17 By 2002 the Richard Commission had been established and by 2004 its 
report was published.18 The Commission proposed numerous changes to the devolution 
settlement. Amongst these were the transfer of primary law-making powers to the Assembly 
and changes to the electoral system.19 The Commission’s Report, and the Labour Party’s 
reaction to it in particular, had a major impact on the development of Welsh devolution.  
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5.1.2 The LCO years 
The Labour Party did not wholeheartedly welcome the Richard Commission report.20 In a 
White Paper published in August 2004, the party issued a response to the Commission’s 
suggestions. Of particular interest to the thesis is the Labour Party’s response to the 
proposal that primary law making powers should be devolved. The party’s response 
highlights, once more how political expediency rather than a process of thinking drove the 
development of Wales’s devolution settlement. 
The White Paper sets out that if a Labour Government was re-elected for a third term they 
would bring forward another White Paper discussing the options for ʻfurther enhancement of 
the powers of the Assemblyʼ.21 Following these discussions they would then lay a Bill before 
Parliament to enact these changes.22 The 2004 White Paper set out two options for 
enhancing the power of the Assembly. The first option was to give the Assembly ʻenhanced 
Order-making powersʼ.23 Under this system the UK Government would give the National 
Assembly ʻmaximum discretionʼ to make secondary legislation,24 but the Parliament at 
Westminster would continue to be the only body capable of making ʻWales onlyʼ primary 
legislation.25 The second option was the devolution of primary law making powers to the 
National Assembly in those areas that were already devolved. 26 Housing would be one such 
area. 
On 5 May 2005, the Labour Party won their third term in office. A few months later they 
published the promised White Paper, Better Governance for Wales. Given their not entirely 
enthusiastic support for further devolution a few months earlier, the content of the White 
Paper has been described as ʻradicalʼ, ʻfar-reachingʼ and a ʻmajor surpriseʼ.27 The White 
Paper set out proposals for devolution of primary legislative powers to the National 
Assembly.28 These would initially be transferred on an issue-by-issue basis through an Order 
in Council.29 In the long term, it was envisaged that the National Assembly would be granted 
full legislative powers in those areas that were already devolved, following a post legislative 
referendum.30 Some analysts have argued that this compromise was a victory for the pro-
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devolution wing of the Labour Party.31 This seems a strong argument given the negative 
reaction to the Richard Commission within certain parts of the Party in 2004.32 This victory 
came at a price. When the White Paper’s proposals were put into law by the Government of 
Wales Act 2006 (GOWA 2006) it soon became apparent that the legislative process that was 
adopted was extremely cumbersome, time consuming and complicated.   
The system of legislating introduced by GOWA 2006 became known as the Legislative 
Competence Order (LCO) system, and was set out in Part 3 and Schedule 5 of the Act. Part 
3 gave the National Assembly the power to enact primary legislation, known as Assembly 
Measures.33 In order for the Assembly to be able to make a Measure it had to be within its 
legislative competence.34 What was within or outside the Assembly’s competence was set 
out in Schedule 5 of the Act.35 Upon GOWA’s enactment the Assembly’s competence did not 
extend beyond a few limited functions (known as matters) relating to the Assembly’s day-to-
day running.36 Schedule 5 contained 20 fields under which primary legislative functions could 
be transferred to the National Assembly.37 These fields included areas such as education, 
health and housing.38 Matters could be added to Schedule 5 either by an Act of the 
Westminster Parliament or as a result of an Order in Council that had been approved by the 
National Assembly and both Houses of Parliament.39  
3 May 2007 saw the people of Wales go to the polls for the third time to elect members for 
the National Assembly. Those elected would be the first Assembly Members (AMs) to be 
tasked with operating the LCO system. It was in Westminster and not Cardiff Bay that the 
failures of system became apparent, in particular, the approach adopted by the UK 
Parliament when considering whether an LCO should be approved or not. In an article for 
Parliamentary Affairs, Sue Griffiths and Paul Evans argue that when deciding on whether to 
approve a prospective LCO or not, Westminster’s main focus was on policy concerns not 
procedural matters.40 They argue that: 
In negotiation, individual Whitehall departments required certain policy areas to 
be exempt from the Assembly’s competence, not on the grounds of constitutional 
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principle, but because the Government wished to forestall any moves in Wales to 
adopt divergent policies.41 
This approach was to severely handicap the LCO system and limit the National Assembly’s 
legislative powers. The LCOs granted tended to transfer very specific matters to Schedule 5, 
ensuring that the Assembly’s legislative competence remained restricted. Examination of 
LCOs granted at the time can illustrate these restrictions. For example, one LCO granted the 
Assembly the power to legislate over the red meat industry but not the white meat industry.42 
The policy driven approach to scrutiny also meant that some LCOs took a long time to 
transfer Matters to the National Assembly, with one LCO taking over two years.43 This 
restricted approach to devolution was not what many pro-devolutionists had expected when 
GOWA 2006 had been enacted.44 It would appear than some civil servants and MPs at 
Westminster did not appreciate how the establishment of the National Assembly had 
changed the nature of Welsh devolution. The National Assembly was not a Westminster 
outpost in Wales, established to administer common UK policies in the Welsh context, but a 
separate institution that could pursue distinctive Welsh policies, if it so wished. Once more, 
political factors seemed to be affecting the development of devolution in Wales as opposed 
to long term constitutional thinking.  
The system’s limitations were to have a real impact on the development of divergence 
between Welsh and English housing legislation. In 2008 the National Assembly proposed an 
LCO, the National Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence) (No.5) Order 2008 
(Affordable Housing).45 The LCO was to give the Assembly the legislative competence to 
enact primary legislation that would permit the Welsh Ministers to suspend the right to buy in 
particular local authorities.46 Griffiths and Evans highlight how the Welsh Affairs Committee 
at Westminster had significant reservations about the LCO.47 They note that the transfer of 
the powers set out in the LCO would, in effect, allow for the abolition of the right to buy in 
Wales.48 The Committee argued that the abolition of the right to buy was not the Welsh 
Government’s policy objective and, as such, it was not appropriate for the LCO to be 
approved as it stood at the time. The Committee proposed that the LCO should be amended 
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so that the Secretary of State would also have to give his or her consent before the 
suspension of the right to buy could be approved in a particular local authority.49  
This was to prove to be a contentious suggestion, so much so that Griffiths and Evans argue 
that it was the treatment of this LCO that bought the issues with the system more broadly to 
a head.50 They note how the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments strongly criticised the 
Welsh Affairs’ Committee’s suggestions.51 The Joint Committee set out that the National 
Assembly’s competence should be defined by law, not by the Secretary of State’s decision.52 
As such, the progress of the LCO was stalled for a further year.  
It was not just the Joint Affairs Committee that criticised the Welsh Affairs Committee’s 
treatment of the housing LCO. Evans and Griffiths note how the Welsh Affairs Committee’s 
decision had drawn criticism from a broad range of sources, including the Assembly’s 
Presiding Officer and the Welsh press.53 They argue in their article that this decision 
signalled a shift in approach at Westminster with more focus being given to process when 
subsequent LCOs were scrutinised at Committee Stage.54 It was not just Westminster that 
was changing. Frustrated with the devolution settlement, the Labour, Plaid Cymru coalition 
Government in Cardiff Bay had set about establishing the All Wales Convention in order to 
ascertain whether there was sufficient support in Wales to vote in favour of the devolution of 
full legislative powers to the National Assembly, should a referendum be held.55 The 
Commission reported back to the Government in 2009, publishing a report suggesting that a 
yes vote would be attainable.56 The referendum was held on 3 March 2011, with ʻyesʼ 
receiving 63.5% of the vote.57 This was to signal the end for the LCO system. 
Whilst the limitations of the LCO system reduced the rate at which regulation in Wales 
diverged from regulation in England, it did not halt the process completely. At Westminster, 
the UK Government enacted the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The Act updated the 
statutory basis for regulation in England, increasing divergence between Wales and 
England. In 2011, the UK Government enacted a further piece of legislation, the Localism 
Act 2011, which made further amendments to the statutory basis for regulation in England, 
demonstrating how divergence can develop as a result of the actions of both the UK and 
Welsh Governments. It was not just at Westminster that primary legislation was being 
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introduced that amended the existing statutory basis for social housing regulation. By 2010, 
the 2008 LCO had been superseded. The National Assembly for Wales (Legislative 
Competence) (Housing and Local Government) Order 2010 gave the National Assembly the 
power to make primary legislation relating to social housing providers, disposals of social 
housing and homelessness.58 The significance of this Order for the housing sector was 
immediately acknowledged. Writing for the Journal of Housing Law in 2010, Simon Hoffman 
notes how there was: ʻa possibility that housing law in Wales will differ substantially from 
England.ʼ59 
In 2011, the National Assembly was to use these new powers to enact the Housing (Wales) 
Measure 2011. The Measure contained provisions that gave the Welsh Ministers the power 
to suspend the right to buy within individual local authorities.60 It also contained provisions 
that amended Part 1 of the Housing Act 1996, the statutory basis for social housing 
regulation in Wales.61 The establishment of the National Assembly, and the devolution of 
legislative powers to it in particular, increased the possibility of different policy being pursued 
in Wales and England. The fact that there was now a greater space within which policy 
divergence could develop did not mean that both Governments were bound to adopt 
differing policy approaches. As will be demonstrated in section 5.2, whilst different legislative 
and policy approaches may have been adopted in Wales and England since the 
establishment of the National Assembly, there have also been examples of both nations 
implementing similar approaches. Divergence is therefore not a linear process.    
5.1.3 The present day 
A mere two months on from the referendum the people of Wales returned to the ballot box to 
vote in the National Assembly election. Following the election, the result of the referendum 
was put into effect. The legislative competence of the National Assembly was now set out in 
Part 4 and Schedule 7 of the GOWA 2006, provisions that remain in force to this day.62 
Under these provisions the National Assembly can introduce primary legislation that relates 
to one of the 21 fields listed in Schedule 7, subject to certain exceptions.63 Given that the 
fields set out in Schedule 7 have already been filled, it is no longer necessary for the 
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Assembly to submit an LCO to Westminster in order to seek permission to introduce primary 
legislation.  
Wales’s devolution settlement is set for further change in the near future. The conferred 
powers model of devolution, in place in Wales, has been heavily criticised for lacking clarity. 
On three occasions the Supreme Court has been asked to decide whether legislation 
enacted by the National Assembly is within its legislative competence, under Schedule 7 of 
GOWA 2006.64 The UK Government has therefore recently enacted legislation that will 
change the model of devolution in place in Wales to the reserved powers model.65 Under this 
model, the Assembly will be permitted to enact primary legislation on any subject that is not 
expressly reserved to Westminster.66 Whilst the advantages of the reserved powers model of 
devolution have been well documented,67 there has been some concern that the provisions 
contained within the Wales Act 2017 will see the Assembly lose powers.68 Despite these 
concerns the Wales Act 2017 has made it onto the statute book, with the reserved powers 
model of devolution set to be put in place in the near future.69 Whilst not expressly 
discussing the significance of this constitutional change, the thesis will, in the remaining 
chapters, highlight the potential impact of policy and legislative variation on future discussion 
regarding Wales’s devolution settlement. 
5.2 Legislative divergence 
5.2.1 A unified statutory basis for regulation 
The Housing Act 1996 was the latest in a long line of housing acts enacted since the 1960s. 
Chapter 4 explored how each new enactment saw the statutory basis for regulation evolve, 
focusing in particular on the Housing Act 1988. The Housing Act 1988 established Tai 
Cymru as separate social housing regulator in Wales.70 In 1996 the decision was taken to 
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further update the statutory basis for regulation in Wales and England.71 As with the Housing 
Act 1988 the statutory powers of Tai Cymru and the Housing Corporation were extremely 
similar under the Housing Act 1996, ensuring that the ability of both regulators to adopt 
differing approaches to regulation was kept to a minimum. As discussed in 5.1, with the 
establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 and the subsequent growth in its powers, 
there is now a greater possibility of divergence developing.   
As discussed in section 5.1.1, the Government of Wales Act 1998 disbanded Tai Cymru as 
the regulator of housing associations in Wales. The constitutional significance of this 
development has been discussed above, but the decision was also to have an impact on the 
development of divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England. During 
the process of transferring regulatory powers from Tai Cymru to the Secretary of State for 
Wales, and then from the Secretary of State to the National Assembly, amendments were 
made to the Housing Act 1996. These amendments were not substantial and were mainly 
linguistic in nature.72 Nevertheless one significant dissimilarity did develop between the 
nations. Regulation was now being undertaken directly by the state in Wales, whereas in 
England, regulation was still being carried out at arm’s length by the Housing Corporation. 
To this day, the Welsh Government remains the regulator of social housing in Wales, whilst 
in England, the regulator has been changed on two occasions.73 This chapter will explore the 
development of this difference and will consider its significance.  
5.2.2 The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 – the start of real divergence?  
As discussed in section 5.1.2, the LCO system constrained the ability of the Welsh 
Government to develop and implement its own legislative programme. Not limited by such 
difficulties the UK Government carried on with business as usual. In 2008, the UK Labour 
Government enacted the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. Part 2 of the Act updated the 
statutory basis for regulation in England.74 Importantly, these provisions did not apply in 
Wales. Part 1 of the Housing Act 1996 remained the statutory basis for regulation in Wales.75 
For the first time, the statutory basis for regulation in Wales and England was to be found in 
different statues.  
The process that led to the development of this difference began a few years earlier. June 
2007 saw the publication of the Cave Report. The Report was the conclusion of a Review 
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undertaken by Professor Martin Cave into social housing regulation in England.76 Whilst the 
content of the Cave Review’s Report, and the UK Government’s reaction to it has been 
criticised by some,77 others have described the legislation enacted based upon its 
recommendations as the greatest shake up to the way that social housing regulation was 
undertaken in England for thirty years.78 Whilst there is some debate as to whether the Cave 
Review and the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 considerably changed the way that 
social housing regulation was undertaken in England, this thesis will demonstrate that the 
significance of the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 for the 
development of divergence between Wales and England is beyond question.  
One difference that developed between social housing regulation in Wales and England in 
the wake of the Cave Review can be found when examining the bodies subjected to 
regulation. Under the Housing Act 1996, the powers of Tai Cymru and the Housing 
Corporation only extended to housing associations. The Cave Review examined the role that 
regulation could play over the broader social housing sector in England including both local 
authority housing and housing associations homes. It recommended that there was a need 
to rationalise the approach to regulation.79 The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
therefore set out one regulatory regime for the entire sector.80 The Act still recognised that 
there were differences between the way that social housing regulation could be most 
efficiently undertaken with regard to housing associations and local authority housing, but 
these difference would now be recognised within a united system.81 In Wales, no such 
changes have been introduced and whilst the Welsh Government is the regulator of both 
types of bodies, this regulation is carried out separately.82 Whilst this is a very clear and 
important divergence, the primary focus of this thesis will be on the regulation of housing 
associations.   
With this in mind, a number of the Cave Report’s recommendations are of particular interest. 
The Report highlights numerous shortcomings within the regulatory regime that was in place 
at the time. Amongst these were; that regulation was inadequate in the way it dealt with 
tenant concerns, that there was insufficient separation between policy and regulation, and 
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that certain providers were being over-regulated.83 The Report made many 
recommendations on how social housing regulation could be improved. Amongst these were 
the establishment of a regulator that was, by law, independent from the Government, and 
the development of a more co-regulatory approach to regulation.84 
Following the publication of the Cave Review the UK Government set about enacting the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The Act was to change the way in which regulation 
was undertaken in England. The Housing Corporation, after being in existence for more than 
forty years was disbanded.85 In its place, two new bodies were established; the Homes and 
Communities Agency (HCA) and the Tenants Services Authority (TSA), the operating name 
of the Office for Tenants and Social Landlords.86 The HCA was established with four objects 
in mind: (1) improving the supply and quality of housing, (2) regenerating or developing land 
or infrastructure, (3) supporting the creation, regeneration or development of communities 
and (4) to contribute to sustainable development and good design.87 Meanwhile, the TSA 
was established to regulate social housing.88 This meant that the funding and the regulation 
of housing associations were carried out by two different bodies, a shift from the position in 
Wales where not only was regulation being undertaken by one body, but that body was the 
Welsh Government.89  
The significance of this difference might not be as great as it first appears. In October 2015 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reclassified private registered providers of social 
housing in England as part of the public sector.90 The reason given by the ONS for their 
decision was the degree of public sector control exercised by the UK Government over 
registered providers of social housing.91 The ONS’s reclassification originally applied from 22 
July 2008, the date of enforcement of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.92 This would 
suggest that, despite the attempts of the Westminster Government to set up an arm’s length 
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regulator of social housing in England, this was not achieved and that in reality, the 
Government still exercised very real controls over the sector. It would therefore appear that 
the regulators in Wales and England still had a great deal in common, even after the 
enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The ONS’s decision and its 
implications will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters 6 and 7.  
The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 introduced further changes to the way that 
regulation was undertaken in England. Under the Act, profit-making bodies would, for the 
first time, be permitted to register with the regulator as providers of social housing in 
England.93 In Wales, all RSLs still had to be non-profit bodies.94 The Act also created, two 
categories of regulatory standards in England. The regulator would be permitted to set 
standards concerning the provision of social housing, and standards that concerned the 
management of social housing.95 In Wales, no such division had taken place.96 These 
changes, and others, led to the development of divergence between Wales and England, but 
within three years, the extent of these differences was to change again with further 
legislation enacted in Wales and England.    
5.2.3 Divergence and convergence - legislation from both sides 
The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 saw the development of differences between social 
housing regulation in Wales and England. In 2011, the statutory basis for regulation in Wales 
and England underwent further change. This time, change was driven by the enactment of 
legislation at both the Westminster Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales. The 
effect that the enactment of this new legislation had on the development of divergence in 
social housing regulation between Wales and England is more complicated to assess than 
the impact of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.  
Following the election of the Coalition Government at Westminster in 2010, the Department 
of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) decided to undertake a review of the way 
that social housing regulation was undertaken in England. In October 2010, the DCLG 
published its report. The introduction to the Report sets out that the review was to take place 
in the context of certain published Government objectives.97 The introduction names out 
seven such objectives, the first three of these were to sound the death knell for the TSA. 
These objectives were; reducing the number of quangos, reducing administration cost, and 
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ensuring value for money and cutting unnecessary regulation.98 Interestingly ʻsupporting a 
supply of affordable housingʼ and ʻensuring that social housing tenants are adequately 
protected and empoweredʼ were the last two objectives noted in the introduction.99 
Given the Government’s stated desire to reduce the number of quangos it is no surprise that 
DCLG recommended that the TSA should be disbanded.100 What might be considered as 
surprising, is the fact the DCLG expressly cites this objective as its reason for making the 
recommendation to abolish the TSA.101 In addition to recommending the abolition of the 
TSA, the DCLG Report recommended that the TSA regulatory functions should be 
transferred to HCA.102 Such a recommendation might be expected to lead to a moment of 
convergence between regulation in Wales and England. There would no longer be any 
divide between the body that funded and regulated housing associations in England, making 
the position more similar to the position in Wales. Crucially, the DCLG’s Report 
recommended that regulation in England should now be exercised by a regulatory 
committee that was legally separated from the remainder of the HCA.103 By adopting this 
recommendation, the UK Government ensured that a degree of separation would continue 
between the regulator and the funder of social housing in England, a degree of separation 
not present in Wales. As discussed above, the decision of the ONS to reclassify registered 
providers of social housing in England does raise a question as to the significance of this 
separation in reality.  
The recommendations of the HCA Report were taken forward by the UK Government and 
put into law through the enactment of the Localism Act 2011. The Localism Act 2011 did not 
replace the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 as the statutory basis for regulation, rather 
it made significant amendments to it. Beyond the scrapping of the TSA, the most significant 
changes made by the Localism Act 2011 included the ʻrefocussingʼ of consumer 
regulation.104 This ʻrefocussingʼ would see a two-tiered approach to regulation introduced in 
England. The Localism Act 2011 introduced sections 198A and 198B to the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008.105 Under section 198B the regulator would be permitted to take 
action against a provider that had, or was at risk of breaching a standard set out under 
section 194 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, a standard relating to an economic 
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matter.106 Under section 198A, however, the regulator would only be permitted to take action 
against a provider that had, or may breach a standard set under section 193, standards 
concerning consumer matters, if this failure had or could cause a serious detriment to the 
provider’s tenants.107 It would appear that, following the enactment of the Localism Act 2011 
that the regulator in England could enforce standards relating to economic matters, more 
rigorously, than it could enforce standards relating to consumer matters. No such distinction 
was in place in Wales under the Housing Act 1996. The significance of this will be discussed 
in greater depth in Chapter 6.108   
Whilst legislation enacted at Westminster continued to push divergence between Wales and 
England, the National Assembly was about to enact a piece of legislation that would see the 
regimes in Wales and England converge to a certain extent. In October 2007, the Affordable 
Housing Task and Finish Group, was commissioned by the Deputy Minister for Housing to:  
explore the barriers and opportunities presented by the Assembly Government's 
priority to deliver significantly more affordable homes in Wales by 2011.109 
The Group reported back to the Deputy Minister in June 2008. The Group’s report, better 
known as the Essex Report, after its author Sue Essex, examined both the statutory basis 
for regulation in Wales and the regulatory framework. The Report drew attention to the 
statutory changes introduced in England through the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.110 
Interestingly Essex noted that the Welsh Government had:  
given no indication as to how it might choose to respond to these changes 
beyond saying it is content with the 1996 Act.111 
It went on to state: 
This leaves unresolved how or whether the Welsh Assembly Government might 
take a stronger role around tenants’ issues and what it might do to strengthen its 
intervention powers.112 
The Welsh Government’s response to the Essex Report came in the form of the Housing 
(Wales) Measure 2011. Much like the Localism Act 2011 amended the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 did not replace the Housing Act 
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1996 as the statutory basis for regulation in Wales, but made many amendments to it. These 
amendments both simultaneously drove divergence and convergence. On the one hand the 
Measure brought the Welsh Ministers powers to intervene in failing associations much closer 
to those of the Secretary of State in England.113 On the other hand, the Measure updated the 
regulator’s ability to set performance standards,114 powers that, as discussed, differed to 
those of the regulator in England.115 This ensured that the two-tiered approach to regulation 
adopted in England was not put in place in Wales. The Measure also left a number of the 
provisions within the Housing Act 1996 unchanged. These included provisions relating to the 
requirement for all RSLs in Wales to be non-profit bodies, ensuring that some of the 
differences already in place between Wales and England continued.116 
This examination of the legislation enacted in Wales and England between 2008 and 2011 
highlights the complicated way in which divergence develops. It demonstrates how 
divergence and convergence can develop as a result of the actions of both the UK and 
Welsh Governments, and as a result of a number of factors working with and against each 
other. The contents of these three Acts, as well as other legislation that has been enacted in 
the period since 2011 will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 6 of this thesis. The 
chapter will build upon the work set out in this chapter to provide a snapshot of the 
differences that exist between Wales and England today. Chapters 7 and 8 will then move 
on to discuss some of the factors that have contributed to the divergence process in more 
depth.   
5.3 Divergence between the regulatory frameworks  
Whilst statutory differences between Wales and England concerning social housing 
regulation have primarily developed as a result of Westminster legislation, this is not the only 
level at which divergence develops. Divergence is a process that appears at a number of 
levels; primary legislation, secondary legislation and between the regulatory frameworks. 
This latter category has also undergone great deal of change over recent years, with 
changes being made to the regulatory frameworks in Wales and England. These must also 
be placed onto the already complicated map of divergence.   
As discussed in 5.2.2, and 5.2.3, the way in which social housing regulation was undertaken 
in Wales and England was reviewed at the turn of the last decade. The Essex Review in 
Wales and the Cave and DCLG Reviews in England did not only review the statutory basis 
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for regulation in both nations, it also examined the regulatory frameworks that were in place, 
and the approaches taken to regulation. This section will provide a brief overview of the 
contents of the Reports and the changes that developed in light of them, so that they can be 
examined in more detail in subsequent chapters.  
The Cave Review was to signal a shift in the way social housing regulation was undertaken 
in England. Many of the Review’s major recommendations have been set out in 5.2.2. The 
impact of the Review extended beyond the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 
2008. Following the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the Westminster 
Government set about introducing a new regulatory framework in England.  This was put into 
force in 2010, and heralded the beginning of a new approach to regulation, ʻco regulationʼ 
with the boards of social housing providers expected to play a much greater self-regulatory 
role.117 In addition to moving towards a co-regulatory approach to regulation, the framework 
introduced several new standards that registered providers would have to comply with, in 
particular standards concerning service delivery and tenant involvement.118 
Only one month after the framework was put into force, it became apparent that it was only 
destined to regulate the activities of the providers of social housing in England in the short 
term. With the election of the coalition Government, the DCLG was tasked with reviewing the 
way that social housing regulation was undertaken in England. Within two years, the 
Localism Act 2011 had been enacted, scrapping the TSA. A new regulatory framework was 
published in March 2012.119 The Framework was to maintain the co-regulatory approach 
developed by the TSA but also reflected changes made to statutory basis for regulation. For 
the first time, consumer and economic standards were set out separately within the 
framework, with more emphasise being placed on the economic standards, an important 
change from the position two years previously.120 
Whilst all these changes were introduced in England, the regulatory framework in Wales was 
also undergoing change. In response to the Essex Report, the One Wales Coalition 
Government set about developing a new regulatory framework in Wales. This followed 
closely on the heels of the enactment of the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011. The new 
regulatory framework in Wales was published in December 2011.121 As when examining the 
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development of divergence between legislation in both nations, measuring the extent of the 
differences that developed between the regulatory frameworks in place in Wales and 
England is a difficult task. The new Welsh regulatory framework adopted some measures 
that saw regulation in Wales and England converge, in particular the focus on co-
regulation.122 On the other hand the Welsh Government, did, at times, develop a distinctly 
Welsh approach to regulation within the Framework.  
The Regulatory Framework in Wales set out the standards that RSLs in Wales had to 
comply with by using the outcomes based objectives model of regulation.123 This meant that 
Welsh RSLs had to demonstrate that they had complied with a number of regulatory 
objectives in their day to day operation. For example, an RSL in Wales had to demonstrate 
that: 
We provide an efﬁcient and effective responsive repairs service which meets the 
requirements of our tenants.124  
By contrast the English Framework required that  
Registered providers shall:  
provide a cost-effective repairs and maintenance service to homes and 
communal areas that responds to the needs of, and offers choices to, tenants, 
and has the objective of completing repairs and improvements right first time.125 
This distinction continues to be in place today, though the Welsh Government is about to 
open consultation to review the way it publishes its regulatory standards.126 The significance 
of this distinction in practice is questionable. All five housing associations interviewed in 
Wales as part of the research undertaken for this thesis stated that they viewed the 
outcomes based objectives approach, to some extent or another, as a tick boxing 
exercise.127 Even if the impact of this variation is limited in practice, it remains of academic 
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interest. Regulatory divergence up until 2011 had, on the whole, been driven by 
Westminster. In adopting the outcomes based objective approach to regulation the Welsh 
Government was attempting to develop a distinctive Welsh approach to regulation. A 
historically rare example of divergence been pushed from Cardiff Bay.  
In 2013 regulation in Wales underwent a further change. This was not a change made to the 
regulatory framework but a change in approach by the Welsh Government to regulation.128 
The new approach further emphasised the importance of co-regulation and boosted the 
importance of risk based approach to regulation.129 Further change was to come in England 
as well. As of 31 March 2015, regulation in England has operated under a new regulatory 
framework. The content of this framework will be examined in detail in the following chapters 
as the thesis examines present day divergence. In addition to exploring the variation that 
developed as a result of the changes that were made to the regulatory frameworks in Wales 
and England, the remaining chapters of this thesis will also consider the impact of new 
legislation enacted at Westminster, in the shape of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, and 
potential new legislation in Wales, on the development of regulation and divergence.  
5.4 Conclusion  
 
There is no doubting that there are now significant differences in place between the way that 
social housing regulation is undertaken in Wales and in England. This chapter has 
demonstrated that the process that has led us to our current position has taken decades. 
From the early days of the Welsh Board of Health, to the Welsh Office in 1965, to opening of 
the National Assembly in 1999, there have been many key steps along the journey. These 
chapters have demonstrated how the devolution settlement in Wales developed as a result 
of a series of ad hoc decisions, not through a processes of thinking. As shown in this 
chapter, however, it is in the last 10 years that the differences between the way that social 
housing regulation is undertaken in Wales and England has significantly increased. It is by 
keeping this history in mind, remembering what factors encouraged or constrained 
divergence, that divergence can develop at a number of levels, and that divergence can 
develop as a result of the actions of the UK and Welsh Governments, will we be able to best 
assess the extent by which regulation is likely to diverge or converge in future.   
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6. Divergence Today: What’s Different? 
 
Having explored the divergence process in its historical context in the previous three 
chapters, the focus of the thesis now turns towards its development in the present day. 
Chapters 3 to 5 highlighted a number of themes that impact upon the divergence process in 
the social housing context. These themes include the fact that divergence can develop at a 
number of different levels, that divergence can develop as a result of the actions of both the 
Welsh and UK Governments, and that a number of factors contribute towards the 
development of divergence and convergence. These themes continue to feature prominently 
in this chapter, and the two chapters that follow it. This chapter sets out to provide a 
snapshot of the variations that exists between social housing regulation in Wales and 
England in the present day. Chapters 7 and 8 will then examine the factors that have 
contributed to the development of these differences, exploring their role in process of 
divergence.  
In providing its snapshot of the differences that exists between social housing regulation in 
Wales and England today, this chapter will focus on three specific aspects of regulation. 
These are: (1) registration, (2) tenant protection, and (3) the regulatory controls cited by the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS) as their reason for reclassifying housing associations in 
Wales and England as part of the public sector. This chapter focuses on these three aspects 
of regulation so that it can examine the differences that have developed within them in detail, 
as opposed to providing a broad-brush analysis.1 In so doing, the chapter examines what the 
extent of the differences that have developed in these three areas of regulation tells us 
about the impact of divergence in practice, the impact of divergence on housing and 
devolution policy, and for the development of future divergence.  
6.1 Registration 
The chapter’s discussion on the differences that exist between Wales and England with 
regard to registration are set out in three parts. 6.1.1, considers why housing associations 
choose to register with the regulators.  6.1.2, sets out the differences that have developed 
with regards to who can register with the regulators in both nations. Whilst 6.1.3, considers 
the implications of a regulatory gap that has developed as a result of divergence.  
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6.1.1 Why register? 
Since the enactment of the Housing Act 1974 a register has been kept of housing 
associations operating in Wales and England.2 Registration has changed significantly over 
the intervening four decades. Changes have been made as to who can register, and as to 
who maintains the register. The impact of such changes on divergence will be examined 
later in the chapter.  
One aspect of registration that does not appear to have undergone such significant change 
is the incentives for housing associations to register with the regulator. This demonstrates 
that whilst divergence may develop with regard to certain aspects of social housing 
regulation, it has not diverged across the board. Registration was introduced by the Housing 
Act 1974; it limited access to public finance to registered associations only, giving them 
greater access to finance than an association which chose not to register.3 Despite changes 
over the subsequent years to social housing development funding structures, registration is 
still required for any association seeking to gain full access to public money in Wales and 
England. In Wales, the Welsh Government awards its social housing grants to RSLs,4 whilst 
in England only registered providers are eligible for funding under the Affordable Homes 
Programme.5 In recent years the significance of gaining access to public money as a reason 
for registration seems to have decreased. One participant noted during interview that: 
there was a time when grants we got from central government was a really big 
deal because it basically covered 100% of the costs of running the housing 
association. 6 
Over recent years the amount of public funding available has decreased on both sides 
of the border. One RSL in Wales revealed how social housing grants now only cover 
30% of the costs of developing some of its schemes, following a deal that it had struck 
with Welsh Government.7 As a consequence, the importance of private lending has 
increased markedly.  
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Despite the decline in public funding, regulation has continued to play an important 
role in determining access to finance for the sector. During interview, Kerry Mac Hale, 
the policy lead for the Regulation of the Social Housing sector in England at the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, revealed that lenders had 
informed the UK Government’s Ministers that they wished to see a ʻrobust regulatory 
regimeʼ in place in England.8 By being subject to such a regime, housing associations 
in Wales and England are viewed as a low risk investment opportunities for private 
lenders, meaning that they can receive preferential terms when entering into lending 
agreements.9  
Furthermore, bodies such as the Housing Finance Corporation only make loans 
available to regulated housing associations in the UK.10 It would seem that despite the 
fact that there is less public money available for housing associations in Wales and 
England, being regulated does provide housing associations with greater access to 
finance. Given that there are still incentives for housing associations to register with 
the regulators, the registration requirements of the Welsh Government and the HCA’s 
Regulatory Committee remain important.   
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the regulators of RSLs in Wales and registered 
providers in England have changed several times over the past fifty years.  The Welsh 
Government is the regulator of RSLs in Wales and is tasked with maintaining the 
register.11 In England, the Homes and Communities Agency is the regulator of 
registered providers and maintains the register.12 The register is maintained directly by 
the state in Wales and at arm's length in England - in itself, a difference between the 
nations. Reports have emerged within the housing press recently that suggest that the 
UK Government may establish a new regulatory body in England, separate from the 
HCA, so as to strengthen the division between the financing and regulation of housing 
associations.13 As discussed in 5.2.2 the significance of this difference is questionable, 
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even if a new separate regulatory body is established in England.14 In addition to this 
proposed change, the HCA has recently opened consultation on another connected 
proposal that would see the way that regulation is undertaken in Wales and England 
diverge. The HCA is seeking the opinion of registered providers on proposals to 
introduce fees for social housing regulation.15 Given that neither proposal had been put 
into effect at the date of submission for this thesis, their significance for the divergence 
process will not be considered. One aspect of regulation within which the approaches 
of both Governments have clearly parted, however, is who can register with the 
regulator. The impact of this variation is considered below.  
6.1.2 Who can register? 
In Wales, a ʻWelsh bodyʼ is eligible for registration as a RSL if it is a registered charity 
that is a housing association, or if it is a registered society or company that complies 
with the conditions set out in section 2(2) of the Housing Act 1996.16 The conditions set 
out in section 2(2) are that the body is principally concerned with Welsh housing, is 
non-profit and is established to provide, construct, improve or manage houses for 
letting, for occupation by members of the body or hostels.17 In addition to this, any 
additional purposes or objects of the body must comply with a list set out in the Act.18 
These permitted additional purposes include constructing homes for shared ownership 
and, acquiring, repairing, improving, or converting a houses or other property, so that it 
can be disposed of on sale, lease or on shared ownership terms.19  
By contrast, the requirements for registration in England appear simpler. An English 
body must satisfy only two conditions in order to be permitted to register. First, it must 
either be a provider of social housing in England or a body that intends to become a 
provider of social housing in England.20 Secondly, the body must satisfy any criteria 
set by the regulator with regard to its financial situation, its constitution and other 
arrangements for its management.21 The significance of these differing registration 
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requirements for the social housing sector in Wales and in England are discussed 
below.  
Perhaps the most significant difference between the eligibility criteria for registration in 
Wales and England is that, in Wales, a body must be non-profit, whereas no such 
requirement exists in England. The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 sets out what 
constitutes a ʻprofit-makingʼ and ʻnon-profit-makingʼ organisation. A non-profit 
organisation is a charity, or a body that satisfies three conditions: namely that (1) it 
does not trade for profit or issue capital with interest or dividend beyond a rate set out 
by the Housing Association Act 1985, (2) the purpose of the body is the provision or 
management of housing, and (3) any other purpose of the body is connected or 
incidental to the provision of housing.22 Any body that does not satisfy these conditions 
will be deemed a profit-making organisation.23   
Even before the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, profit-making 
organisations played a role in the provision of social housing in England. Since 2004, 
for-profit bodies were permitted to apply for grant money, and were permitted to 
undertake certain management functions in social housing.24 The Cave Review 
recommended that this should be taken further and that ʻfor-profitʼ organisations 
should be permitted to register with the regulator.25 It was argued that this would 
encourage competition within the sector and would provide tenants with greater 
choice.26 This recommendation was taken forward and put into practice by the Housing 
and Regeneration Act 2008.27  
This process contrasts starkly with the situation in Wales. Only two years after the 
publication of the Cave Review Report, the Essex Review reported back on the social 
housing regulatory regime in Wales.28 The word ʻprofitʼ appears in the Report on nine 
occasions, each time in the context of ʻnon-profitʼ organisations.29 It would appear that 
the possibility of allowing profit-making organisations to register as RSLs in Wales was 
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not even considered. The implications of this finding will be examined in more detail in 
Chapter 6, which considers the factors that have driven divergence.30 
It is clear that a noteworthy legal variation has developed between the way that social 
housing regulation is undertaken in Wales and England. The impact that this difference 
has had in practice appears limited, at least so far. As of 2 November 2016, only 
1.92% of registered providers in England were registered as profit-making bodies.31 By 
contrast, 11.18% of registered providers were local authorities, whilst 86.89% of 
registered providers were not-for-profit bodies.32 With not-for-profit registered providers 
continuing to dominate the sector in England, the statutory changes introduced by the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 have clearly failed to increase the choice 
available to social housing tenants in the way envisaged by the Cave Report.33  
The relative slow growth in profit-making providers registering with the regulator in 
England further supports two of the key themes of this thesis. First, that in order to 
understand the extent by which divergence develops, it is important to examine it at a 
number of different levels. On paper a significant legal variation has developed 
between Wales and England as to the role of profit making organisations. A closer 
inspection of how the sector operates however, has cast doubt over its significance in 
practice. This, supports a second theme of this thesis, namely that a number of factors 
impact upon the development of divergence and convergence between Wales and 
England. At first glance, it would appear that a difference in political view and ideology 
between the respective governments has led to the development of divergence.34 A 
more detailed exploration, however, indicates that the impact of this variation is limited 
in practice, suggesting that there are other economic, legislative and structural factors 
that have an impact on the divergence process.   
The significance of these other factors could lessen in the near future, leading to the 
development of greater variation in practice between Wales and England. The Housing 
and Planning Act 2016 decreases the regulatory powers of the regulator and the UK 
Government over the social housing sector in England.35 This may tempt some 
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previously unregistered profit-making organisations to register with the regulator, if 
they feel that the positives of registration now outweigh the negatives. The Act makes 
a further amendment to the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 that could lead to an 
increase in the number of profit-making bodies registered with the regulator in 
England. Section 115 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, as enacted, 
stipulated that if the regulator believed that a profit-making organisation had in fact 
become a non-profit organisation then the regulator was to change the register 
accordingly.36 No provision was in place that would permit the regulator to re-designate 
a non-profit organisation as a profit-making provider.37 The Housing and Planning Act 
2016 has changed this. The regulator will now have to amend the register if it feels that 
a profit-making organisation has become a non-profit organisation or vice versa, 
paving the way for non-profit providers to become profit-making providers for the first 
time.38 It remains to be seen what impact this new legislative difference will have on 
the sector. 
The fact that bodies may register as either profit-making or non-profit providers is not 
the only dissimilarity to have developed with regard to registration between Wales and 
England. In England a body must satisfy two conditions before it can register, but in 
Wales the requirements are far more prescriptive.39 An English body is eligible for 
registration as long as it provides social housing and complies with regulatory criteria 
concerning its financial, constitutional and management arrangements.40 In Wales, a 
body may only register as a RSL if it has amongst its objects or powers; the provision, 
construction, improvement or management of houses to be kept available for letting, 
houses for occupation by members of the body, or hostels.41 In addition to this, any 
additional objects of Welsh RSLs must comply with a list set out in section 2(4) of the 
Act.42 These differing provisions mean that the law in Wales and England has diverged 
with regard to the type work a housing association is permitted to undertake.  
In Wales, the Housing Act 1996 limits the work that an RSL is permitted to undertake 
to what many laypersons would understand the term ʻsocial housingʼ to mean. The 
meaning given to ʻprovider of social housingʼ in England differs slightly from this. Under 
the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 a ʻprovider of social housingʼ includes the 
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provision of ʻlow cost rental accommodationʼ but it also includes the provision of ʻlow 
cost home ownership accommodationʼ, be that through shared ownership, equity 
percentage or shared ownership trust.43 This is an important difference between the 
relevant laws of Wales and England. It would appear that a body that provides homes 
for low cost ownership through shared ownership but that does not provide homes for 
low cost rent, would be permitted to register with the regulator in England. This would 
not be the case in Wales. 
The potential impact of this difference can be illustrated by events that took place in 
the summer of 2015. Genesis Housing Association announced that it would stop 
building properties for affordable and social rent in July of that year.44 It announced 
that it would, however, continue to construct homes for shared ownership, market rent 
and outright sale.45 It seems that Genesis was permitted to do this whilst continuing to 
operate as a provider of social housing for two reasons. First, Genesis was still 
providing homes for low cost rental through the homes that it had already constructed 
or purchased as part of its portfolio. This seems analogous to what would happen if 
Genesis were a Welsh RSL, as long as the provision, improvement or management of 
such rental properties continued to be one of its objects or powers.46 Secondly and 
more interestingly, under the definition of ʻprovider of social housingʼ as set out in 
section 80 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, Genesis would still be 
constructing social housing by building homes for shared ownership. It seems that this 
second reason would not apply in Wales. The differences that have developed in the 
registration requirements in Wales and England can impact upon the work that 
housing associations can undertake in these nations.     
This finding suggests that the sectors in Wales and England could diverge further over 
the coming years. Not only are registered providers in England permitted to operate for 
a profit, they also do not need to construct or provide any properties for low market 
rent in order to be eligible for registration with regulator.47 If an increasing number of 
registered providers were to follow Genesis's example by stopping the construction 
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homes for low cost rent in order to focus on low cost home ownership properties, then 
the sectors in Wales and England could become very different indeed. Already there is 
evidence that this is taking place. Sanctuary Housing Association, the UK'S largest 
social housing provider announced its eight-year development plan in May 2016.48 It 
announced that it intended to construct 24,000 homes over the period. While stating 
that it would construct 1,000 properties for social rent in Scotland, the provider 
revealed that it would not build any in England.49 As in Wales, a housing association is 
only permitted to register with the regulator in Scotland if it has amongst its objects or 
powers; the provision, construction, improvement or management of houses to be kept 
available for letting, houses for occupation by members of the body, or hostels.50 This 
difference between the law in Scotland and England may help to explain Sanctuary’s 
different approach. If so, this development suggests that the variation of housing law 
and regulation between Wales and England potentially has practical consequences.  
Under the present devolution settlement, the National Assembly has significant 
legislative and policy powers over housing issues. One policy area where the powers 
of the National Assembly is more limited, however, is over the payment of welfare 
benefits. Powers over housing benefit, for example, have not been devolved to Wales, 
with the UK Government retaining responsibility for developing a united policy across 
both nations. Work undertaken by the Auditor General for Wales has already 
discovered that common policies can affect Wales and England differently.51 If, over 
time, variation in housing law sees the sectors in Wales and England become more 
distinct, with social rented housing becoming less prevalent in England than in Wales, 
then the probability of common welfare policies applying equally on both sides of 
Offa’s Dyke, diminishes. This issue is further discussed in section 7.1.2 and 
8.2.2. 
6.1.3 Where's the border? 
As well as the differences that have developed between Wales and England over who can 
register with the regulators in each nation, another area within which a variation has 
developed in recent years relates to where a body is permitted to register. In Wales, only 
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ʻWelsh bodiesʼ are eligible to register with the regulator,52 whilst in England, only ʻEnglish 
bodiesʼ are permitted to register.53 The fact that the Housing Act 1996 and the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 contain these different provisions is not surprising. Given that the 
regulatory regimes in place in both nations are undertaken independently from each other, 
with the Welsh Government responsible for regulating the social housing sector in Wales,54 
and that the HCA responsible for regulating the sector in England,55 it is perhaps not 
surprising that both regulators have limited the bodies eligible for registration to those that 
operate within their respective nations. But this development has produced some 
unexpected results and raises a number of questions about the impact of legislative 
divergence.  
Under section 1A of the Housing Act 1996, a Welsh body is a registered charity, registered 
society or a company, that has its registered offices in Wales.56 Furthermore, to be eligible 
for registration such a body must also be ʻprincipally concerned with Welsh housingʼ.57 As 
such, a Welsh body must own housing only in, or mainly in, Wales, or demonstrate that its 
activities are principally undertaken in Wales.58 An English body, on the other hand, is 
defined in the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 as a registered charity, a registered 
society, a registered company or a community land trust that has its registered offices in 
England.59 There is one further type of body, however, that can register with the regulator in 
England, namely any body which is neither a Welsh body nor a Welsh Local Authority that 
provides accommodation in England.60 
These provisions clearly limit the ability of bodies in Wales and England to register across 
the Welsh-English border. There is not one body that is registered in both nations at 
present.61 The legislation in both nations does not prohibit registered organisations from 
providing homes in the other country. The Housing Act 1996 is very clear in only requiring 
Welsh RSLs to be principally concerned with Welsh housing,62 whilst the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 in England places no constraints upon where a registered provider 
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can undertake their activity.63 This means that an English provider can provide social 
housing in Wales but is regulated from England, with the same being true for Welsh RSLs. 
As a result, social housing tenants that live within the same town could be renting property 
from landlords that are subject to different regulatory regimes. The rights of such tenants 
would differ, depending on which side of the border their landlord is based.  
Neither the HCA in England nor the Welsh Government holds data on how many properties 
are owned by registered providers nor RSLs on the other side of the border from where they 
are registered, or even on how many registered providers or RSLs operate in both nations.64 
This lack of data is, perhaps, surprising.  The HCA revealed, following a freedom of 
information request that, as they are the ʻSocial Housing Regulator for Englandʼ, they ʻdo not 
collect data on social housing outside of Englandʼ.65  The rationale for this decision is clear 
and understandable. It does give rise to the prospect that tenants of such housing 
associations are trapped in a kind of regulatory no man's land with their individual concerns 
falling within the purview of neither the English nor the Welsh regulator.  
If the regulators lack data on cross-border social housing activity, this information is available 
via the housing database Housingnet. The data held by Housingnet reveals that the number 
of social homes owned by Welsh RSLs in England is extremely small. As of 2 June 2016, 
only 11 properties were owned by Welsh RSLs in England.66 Six of these were owned by 
First Choice Housing Association and a further five were owned by Mid Wales Housing.67 19 
English housing associations had property in Wales,68 between them these associations 
owned 1,160 properties. The majority – 774 – were owned by Place for People Homes Ltd.69 
Whilst the number of tenants affected by this issue does appear small, it does not reduce its 
significance for 1,000 plus households impacted by the regulatory gap.  
The system seems to lack clarity and certainty for those in these households. If a tenant was 
to encounter a problem with their housing association, the support networks in place for a 
tenant of an English provider living in Wales are likely to be oriented towards making a 
complaint to the Welsh Government and not the HCA. Organisations such as the Tenants 
Participation Advisory Scheme (TPAS) and Shelter now have separate TPAS Cymru and 
Shelter Cymru branches for their work in Wales. A local Assembly Member or a local 
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Member of Parliament may also be more experienced on providing advice within a Welsh 
context.  
It is important not to overstate the gravity of this problem. The relatively small number of 
tenants affected by the regulatory gap means that it is unlikely that significant problems will 
often materialise. TPAS Cymru and Shelter Cymru are also likely to be able to contact their 
colleagues in England in order to ensure that the advice that a tenant receives is correct. 
Given that neither the Welsh Government nor the HCA holds information on how many 
housing associations operate on both sides of the border, however, neither regulator would 
seem to be in a position to be certain that this is the case. Such a lack of information could 
also limit the effectiveness of any new policy pursued by the regulators or the governments 
in both nations. If the regulators do not hold such information, how can they confidently 
develop regulatory policies that will apply consistently across their jurisdiction? 
 
This finding also re-emphasises a theme that appears consistently throughout this thesis. In 
order to fully understand the extent of the differences that have developed between Wales 
and England with regards to social housing regulation, there is a need to examine the 
divergence process at a number of levels. In this instance, the primary legislation in Wales 
and England has clearly diverged. This particular variation means that, by law, a housing 
association is not permitted to register with the regulator in both Wales and England. Yet the 
regulatory gap identified above did not develop solely as a result of this divergence. It was 
also a consequence of the regulators in both nations taking the same approach to this 
aspect of registration. Whilst the statute does not permit a body to register with both 
regulators, it does not prohibit the regulators from collecting information on whether an RSL 
or a provider holds property outside their nation. Neither regulator has done so. It is this 
common approach to registration that ensured that the statutory difference led to the 
development of a regulatory gap. The gap was not an inevitable consequence of the 
legislative difference. One or both of the regulators could have decided to collect information 
on housing associations operating within their territory but which had not registered with 
them. It is therefore through a combination of legislative divergence and procedural 
convergence that this regulatory gap developed, highlighting the complicated way in which 
regulatory divergence has developed. 
6.2 Tenant protection 
Section 6.1, primarily focused on how the divergence that has developed between Wales 
and England has impacted on housing associations, examining how the law in both nations 
is now different as to who can register. The second section of this chapter will focus on how 
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divergence has impacted upon tenants. Again, the fact that the statutory basis for regulation 
in Wales and England has been updated on more than one occasion over the last decade is 
relevant here.70 These statutory changes, combined with changes in the way the regulators 
interpret their regulatory powers, have led the law to diverge. One area where the statutory 
basis for regulation in Wales and England has most clearly diverged concerns the regulators’ 
powers to set standards. This divergence developed gradually but is now so extensive that it 
can be argued that tenants in Wales are offered greater regulatory protection than their 
counterparts in England. 
6.2.1 Gradual divergence 
As set out in Chapter 5, before the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
Wales and England shared a common statutory basis for regulation.71 It was section 34 of 
the Housing Act 1996, as originally enacted, that granted the regulators in both nations with 
the power to set standards with which housing associations had to comply with.72 Under the 
1996 Act, the Housing Corporation in England and the regulator in Wales73 were permitted, 
following consultation, to set performance standards in connection with the provision of 
housing.74 These powers were fairly broad with no examples placed in the Act of the sorts of 
standards that the regulator may have wished to set.75 The powers of the regulators to 
monitor compliance were also relatively broad. The Act gave the regulators the power to 
monitor compliance with any standards set under section 34 ʻfrom time to timeʼ, and also 
allowed them to require bodies to submit information to them in relation to the standards by a 
given date, every year.76 These performance standards were to be published in a manner 
that the regulators considered ʻappropriateʼ,77 and a body that failed to comply with any 
standard would be committing an offence.78 The only additional requirement placed on the 
regulators in both nations was that they annually published any information that they had 
gathered as a result of exercising these powers.79 Only a decade later these powers were to 
be reformed.  
                                                          
70 This can be seen from Chapters 4 and 5.  
71 Even after the establishment of the National Assembly in 1999. 
72 Housing Act 1996, s 34 as originally enacted.  
73 The regulator in Wales was to change in 1999 following the establishment of the National Assembly. When 
the Act was originally enacted in 1996 the regulator had been Tai Cymru but this was changed to the Welsh 
Ministers in 1999. More information at 4.1.1.  
74 Housing Act 1996, s 34 as originally enacted. 
75 ibid 
76 ibid, s 35 as originally enacted. 
77 ibid 
78 ibid 
79 ibid 
131 
 
The enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 created a new statutory basis on 
which the regulator in England would be permitted to set standards. Under the Housing Act 
1996 the standard-setting powers of the regulators in both Wales and England were fairly 
broad and appeared in one statutory provision. The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
divided the regulator’s powers into two categories. Section 193 of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, as enacted, gave the regulator the power to set standards that 
concerned the provision of social housing, whilst section 194, as enacted, granted the 
regulator with the power to set standards that concerned the management of a respective 
provider.80 Not only did the Act create two categories of standards, but it also contained 
more detail on the sorts of standards that the regulator would be permitted to set. With 
regard to the provision of social housing, the regulator was permitted to set standards:  
as to the nature, extent and quality of accommodation, facilities or services 
provided by them in connection with social housing.81 
Section 193 also contained a list of ten further specific standards with which registered 
providers of social housing in England might have been required to comply. These included 
standards that related to maintenance, levels of rent and methods of consulting and 
informing tenants.82 In addition to this, section 193 also set out that the regulator was ʻto 
have regard to the desirability of registered providers being free to choose how to provide 
services and conduct business.ʼ83 Compared to the broad powers of the regulator under the 
Housing Act 1996, the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 gave the Westminster 
Government greater control over the standards that the regulator could set for the sector in 
England. By providing examples of the sorts of standards that English providers might be 
expected to comply with, the 2008 legislation gave the regulator a very clear indication of the 
type of standards that it was expected to set for the sector. The Act also provided the 
Secretary of State with the power to direct the regulator to set a standard under section 193, 
a further control over the work of the regulator.84  
Interestingly, the powers of the Secretary of State over management standards were not as 
extensive.85 The Secretary of State did not have the power under the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, as originally enacted, to direct the regulator to set a management 
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standard.86 Section 194 also did not contain a list of examples of the sorts of standards that 
the regulator may have wished to set.87 There were similarities between the sections. 
Section 194 did also contain a requirement that any standard set under the section did not 
limit a provider’s ability to be free to choose how it operated.88 To this end the regulator’s 
powers to set management standards were curtailed further. Any standards that were set 
with regard to a profit-making provider, only extended to their operations as a provider of 
social housing,89 meaning that they were free to continue to manage their financial affairs as 
they wished beyond their social housing activities. 
Despite the fact that the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 created two separate 
categories of regulatory standards, it did not establish a different approach to monitoring the 
two categories. The decision to establish two such categories did pave the way, however, for 
a significant shift in approach upon the enactment of the Localism Act in 2011. This shift will 
be examined in 6.2.2.  
While these statutory changes were being made in England, the Welsh Government did not 
amend the statutory basis for regulation in Wales. The changes in England therefore 
immediately led to divergence in the undertaking of regulation in Wales and England. This 
result lends support to the argument made in Chapter 5 that the initial driver for the 
development of significant divergence from Wales was the enactment of Westminster 
legislation that applied only in England. The changes brought about by the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 essentially meant that section 34 of the Housing Act 1996 become 
part of the body of distinct Welsh law. Indeed, the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
explicitly set out that Part 1 of the Housing Act 1996 was to be restricted to Wales.90 The 
2008 Act amended the wording of section 34 of the Housing Act 1996 so that it only applied 
to ʻWelsh Ministerʼ marking a clear difference between the law in Wales and the law in 
England.91 This episode highlights the complicated way in which the ʻbody of Welsh lawʼ has 
developed and diverged from the law applicable in England. The significance of this finding 
for our understanding of “Welsh law” will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.  
6.2.2 Going in a different direction 
In 2011, the National Assembly and the UK Parliament both enacted legislation that 
amended the statutory basis for the setting of regulatory standard by the regulators in Wales 
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and England. In Wales, the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 introduced three new sections to 
the Housing Act 1996.92 It is these provisions that, to this day, provide the regulator with 
powers to set regulatory standards for RSLs. In England, some provisions of the Localism 
Act 2011, amended the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.93 These legislative changes 
were to have an important, yet at times unexpected, impact on divergence between Wales 
and England.  
Against a general trend towards divergence, on the whole, the provisions contained within 
the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 lead to convergence in the regulators’ standard-setting 
powers. Under the Housing Act 1996, the Welsh Government was permitted to set standards 
that were concerned with the ʻprovision of housingʼ.94 This was in contrast to the position in 
England where the regulator was permitted to set standards based on two grounds, one 
concerning services and housing provision, and the other concerning the management of the 
provider.95 The Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 led to the system in Wales became more in 
line with that of England. Following the amendments made by the Measure, the Welsh 
Government are now also permitted to set standards for RSLs based on two grounds. These 
grounds are similar to the ones that were in place in England under the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, as originally enacted. The Welsh Government is now permitted to 
set standards that are in connection to functions relating to the provision of housing, and in 
connection to functions that relate to the governance and financial management of their 
organisations.96 Whilst the Measure does not set out these two grounds in separate 
legislative sections, as was the case in England in 2008, this is a clear example of the law in 
Wales converging with English law. Another provision inserted into the Housing Act 1996 
makes this process even more apparent. Under section 33A the Welsh Ministers are 
required to ʻhave regard to the desirability of registered providers being free to choose how 
to provide services and conduct businessʼ when setting standards.97 This is an identical 
provision to one placed in the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 in England.  
It is these statutory provisions that, to this day, provide the Welsh Government with the 
power to set performance standards for Welsh RSLs in its capacity as the social housing 
regulator. These powers were subject to some amendments three years later by the Housing 
(Wales) Act 2014. It appears that these amendments were inserted to correct legislative 
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oversights, made when the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 was enacted, not to significantly 
amend the powers of the regulator.98 
Whilst the legislative basis for setting regulatory standards in Wales and England converged 
following the enactment of the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011, the law in both nations did 
not converge absolutely. The amended Housing Act 1996 does not contain examples of the 
sorts of standards that RSLs could be expected to face.99 The Housing Act 1996 now also 
contains an additional statutory provision that did not appear in the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008. The newly amended section 34 of the Housing Act 1996 provides 
the Welsh Government with the power to set standards of performance that are ʻin 
connection with the provision of housing in Englandʼ by a Welsh RSL.100 Given that the 
Welsh regulators are not aware of how many RSLs provide properties in England, it seems 
very unlikely that they would be in a position to set such standards.101 The fact that the 
Welsh Government has retained the ability to set standards for the provision of housing by 
RSLs in England, whilst the Westminster Government has not retained the same power for 
its regulator, remains an interesting distinction.   
Whilst the National Assembly for Wales was enacting legislation that would bring the 
statutory powers of the regulators in both nations to set performance standards closer 
together, the Westminster Parliament was simultaneously enacting legislation that would see 
these powers diverge significantly. Amendments made to the Housing and Regeneration Act 
2008, brought about by the Localism Act 2011, resulted in a shift in the standard-setting 
powers of the regulator in England and, perhaps more importantly, in their enforcement 
powers.  
The Localism Act 2011 introduced amendments to both sections 193 and 194 of the Housing 
and Regeneration Act 2008, the statutory basis by which the English regulator was allowed 
to set standards for registered providers. As a result of these changes the regulator is now 
permitted to set standards that relate to ʻconsumer mattersʼ and to ʻeconomic mattersʼ.102 In 
addition to changing the names of the categories by which the regulator is permitted to set 
standards, the Localism Act 2011 also made minor amendments to the list of standards that 
registered providers might be subject to under section 193, and introduced a list of such 
standards for the first time in section 194.103 The Act also amended section 194 to give the 
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regulator the power to set standards that require a provider to comply with rules set in 
relation to their levels of rent.104 These changes, whilst important, did not greatly increase 
divergence between Wales and England. The Localism Act 2011 also introduced two new 
sections into the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. It is these new sections that has seen 
the law in Wales and England radically diverge.  
The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 grants the English regulator a number of 
enforcement powers that it can use, if it feels that a provider has breached a standard set 
under either section 193 or section 194 of the Act.105 The Act, as originally enacted, did not 
differentiate between how those powers were to be exercised. If a provider breached a 
standard set under section 193, the process by which the regulator could enforce the 
standard were the same as if it had breached a standard set under section 194. This has 
changed following the enactment of Localism Act 2011.  
The Localism Act 2011 introduced sections 198A and 198B to the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008.106 The regulator, under section 198B is permitted to take action 
against a provider that has breached, or is at risk of breaching, a standard set under section 
194, a standard relating to an economic matter.107 Under section 198A, however, the 
regulator is only permitted to take action against a provider that has, or may, breach a 
standard set under section 193, a standard that concerns consumer matters, if this failure 
has, or could cause a serious detriment to the provider’s tenants.108 The Localism Act 2011 
has therefore effectively created a two tier system of regulatory standards in England: (1) 
economic standards, which need only be breached to lead to regulatory action; and (2) 
consumer standards, a breach of which must satisfy a two stage test before regulatory 
action is taken.  
In Wales, no such distinction exists. Whilst the Welsh Government, in its capacity as 
regulator, is permitted to set regulatory standards based on two grounds, no distinction has 
been made as to how it can exercise its regulatory powers if a RSL breaches a standard.109 
This is a highly important variation that has developed in the primary law of these nations. 
The introduction of a two-tier system of standards in England would seem to place tenants in 
England at a disadvantage compared their Welsh counterparts. Whilst tenants in England 
must demonstrate that they have suffered or could suffer serious detriment as a result of 
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their provider breaching a standard, in Wales a tenant must only demonstrate that their 
landlord has breached a standard, set in connection with the provision of housing. The 
practical consequences of these different approaches are highlighted further when 
examining the way that the regulators have decided to set their regulatory standards. This is 
done in section 5.2.3 below.   
Before examining the regulatory standards set in Wales and England in detail, it is worth 
looking back at the divergence process in this instance. Despite the establishment of the 
National Assembly in 1999, there was no substantial statutory divergence between Wales 
and England in this area until the enactment of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, a 
piece of legislation that was enacted at Westminster to change the statutory basis for 
regulation in England only. Only three years later, the National Assembly was to enact 
legislation which would see the way that the Welsh regulator was able to set regulatory 
standards converge with England. The Westminster Parliament then enacted a further piece 
of legislation, generating even greater divergence in the statutory basis for social housing 
regulation than had existed previously. This example illustrates a key theme of this thesis, 
namely that divergence develops as result of the actions of the UK and Welsh Governments.  
6.2.3 The regulatory frameworks  
To understand the significance of statutory divergence between Wales and England, it is 
important to examine how the regulators have exercised their powers to set standards. In 
both nations, the regulators have drafted regulatory frameworks with which RSLs and 
registered providers must comply. The approach taken when drafting these has been very 
different. These differing approaches has reinforced the variation that has developed 
between both nations at statutory level, leading to important differences developing between 
the rights of tenants in Wales and England.  
In England, the regulatory framework for the registered providers of social housing 
comprises three elements; regulatory requirements, codes of practice, and regulatory 
guidance.110 They have different roles. There are nine categories of regulatory requirements 
with all of which registered providers must comply.111 These include requirements relating to 
registration, information submission and of most interest for this chapter, regulatory 
standards.112 A code of practice, meanwhile, acts as amplifier to a regulatory requirement, 
supplementing its content, and assisting a provider in understanding how compliance may 
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be achieved.113 Finally, regulatory guidance is issued to provide registered providers with 
further information on the regulatory requirements and with information on how the regulator 
will carry out its role.114 Ten such documents have been published.115 
In contrast to the holistic approach taken by the HCA in England, the Welsh Government’s 
regulatory framework focuses almost exclusively on the regulatory standards with which 
RSLs must comply.116 The other factors contained within the English regulatory framework 
such as information submission requirements are set out in other documents in Wales.  
These elements do not form part of the regulatory framework itself.117 Although this is an 
interesting difference in approach, this section will not examine its impact. Instead, the 
primary focus here will be on the performance standards set out by the two nation’s 
regulators. By examining the extent of the divergence between the performance standards, 
this thesis will be able to explore whether the dissimilarities that exist in legislation regarding 
performance standards have been replicated in the regulatory frameworks.  
In England, the economic and consumer standards set by the regulator form two separate 
regulatory requirements. The economic standards imposed on registered providers form the 
first regulatory requirement of the English social housing regulatory framework. These 
standards are set out in three separate documents; the Governance and Financial Viability 
Standard, the Value for Money Standard and the Rent Standard.118 The consumer standards 
form the basis of the second regulatory requirement within the regulatory framework. These 
have been set out in four separate documents; the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment 
Standard, the Home Standard, the Tenancy Standard and the Neighbourhood and 
Community Standard.119 In Wales, every standard directed at RSLs appear in a single 
document: the Regulatory Framework for Housing Associations Registered in Wales.120 To 
demonstrate the impact of this distinction, this chapter will now turn to examine one English 
regulatory standard in particular, the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard. This 
will highlight how the difference in approach taken affords Welsh tenants greater protection 
than their English equivalents.  
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6.2.3.1 Tenant Involvement and Empowerment 
The Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard document was published in England 
in April 2012. It contains three required outcomes for registered providers. The first of these 
concerns ʻcustomer service, choice and complaintsʼ, the second concerns ʻinvolvement and 
empowermentʼ whilst the final outcome concerns ʻunderstanding and responding to the 
diverse needs of tenantsʼ.121 The regulatory document expands on what these outcomes 
entail. For example, under the second heading ʻinvolvement and empoweredʼ, registered 
providers must ensure that:  
tenants are given a wide range of opportunities to influence and be involved in …                                    
the formulation of their landlord’s housing related policies and strategic 
priorities.122 
In addition to these required outcomes, the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard 
contains ʻspecific expectationsʼ that registered providers must comply with. These are in 
keeping with the regulatory outcomes set out in the document and include:  
the provision of timely and relevant performance information to support effective 
scrutiny by tenants of their landlord’s performance in a form which registered 
providers seek to agree with their tenants.123 
These standards are broadly similar to the ones contained within the Welsh regulatory 
framework but they differ in the way they have been set out. As stated above, in Wales, all 
regulatory standards that RSLs must comply with appear on one document, the Regulatory 
Framework for Housing Associations Registered in Wales.124 Appendix 3 of the Framework 
contains ten main outcomes split between two categories, ʻgovernance and financial 
managementʼ and ʻlandlord servicesʼ.125 Each of these ten outcomes contains a number of 
sub-outcomes; these are numerous and RSLs must demonstrate compliance with all of 
these standards in addition to the main outcomes.126 The standards that appear as part of 
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the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard in England appear on more than one 
occasion in the Welsh regulatory framework, both as ʻgovernance and financial 
managementʼ outcomes and as ʻlandlord servicesʼ outcomes. For example, the first outcome 
that an RSL must comply with, within Appendix 3 is: ʻWe place the people who want to use 
our services at the heart of our work - putting the citizen first.ʼ127 This outcome contains nine 
sub outcomes, each of which are comparable to the standards that appear within the English 
Framework.128 Welsh RSLs are also required to demonstrate that they are: ʻopen about what 
we do, and publish balanced information about our activitiesʼ,129 a sub-outcome that appears 
under the ʻWe live public sector values, by conducting our affairs with honesty and integrity, 
and demonstrate good governance through our behaviourʼ outcome.130 The standards set 
out under the Tenant, Involvement and Empowerment document in England, therefore 
appear throughout the Welsh Regulatory Framework, as opposed to appearing in a separate 
document. The impact of this on tenants is potentially significant, as will be demonstrated 
below. 
The Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard is an aspect of consumer regulation in 
England. For enforcement action to be taken against a provider in breach of a consumer 
standard the regulator must be satisfied that the breach has resulted in, or creates a 
significant risk of, serious detriment to the tenant.131 The HCA sets out its role in monitoring 
such standards as follows: 
Our approach to consumer regulation is set out in legislation and is reactive only. 
We do not have a role in monitoring providers’ performance on consumer 
standards. We only use our regulatory and enforcement powers where we judge 
that there has been a breach of a consumer standard which has or could cause 
serious detriment.132  
In order to determine whether regulatory action is required, the HCA has introduced a 
serious detriment test in England which examines the ʻdegree of harmʼ caused by any 
breach.133 Under the test there are four questions that the regulator must initially consider 
before coming to a conclusion on whether a breach constitutes serious detriment. First, the 
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regulator will consider whether the concern raised appears within its remit.134 Secondly, the 
regulator will examine whether, if the issue raised were true, there would be a breach of a 
consumer standard.135 If there would be a breach, the HCA will consider whether it would 
cause harm to the tenant.136 Finally, the regulator will consider whether such harm would be 
serious.137 If the regulator has concluded that the concerns raised could potentially cause 
harm, it will then gather and examine the evidence of the specific case to determine whether 
there has, in fact, been a breach resulting in serious detriment.138 The HCA, asserts that in 
order to reach such a decision that it will need evidence of harm in relation to, but not 
exclusively in relation to: ʻhealth and safety, loss of home, unlawful discrimination, loss of 
legal rights, financial loss.ʼ139 The bar appears to have been set at a high level for the 
regulator to be able to take enforcement action against a provider that is in breach of a 
consumer standard. This analysis seems to be supported when looking at how the regulator 
has implemented the test.  
Since November 2013, the English regulator has published an Annual Consumer Regulation 
Review, looking back at how the consumer regulation standards have been enforced over 
the previous year. In 2014/15 the regulator received 589 referrals for breaches of consumer 
standards.140 Of these, 238 were deemed to have sufficient potential to lead to findings of a 
breach or serious detriment, with the regulator seeking more information in 89 of these 
cases.141 The regulator found that there had been a breach that had or could cause serious 
detriment in six of these cases.142 All six concerned breaches of the Home Standard, 
standards that concern the quality of accommodation and repairs work.143 This followed the 
example set over the previous two years.144 
The Annual Reviews contain case studies of where the regulator had considered whether 
there had been a breach of the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard.145 This 
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gives some indication of the circumstances where the regulator may be prepared to find that 
a breach is of a sufficient magnitude to lead to a finding of serious detriment. In one 
instance, the regulator has considered whether the decision of a provider to cease to 
recognise a tenant association as being the tenant’s representative body, had breached the 
regulatory standard.146 The regulator concluded that the provider had not breached the 
standard given that, in its place, it had organised a monthly tenant’s forum for all tenants.147 
If the provider had stopped carrying out any consultation with its tenants, it is possible that 
the HCA would have concluded that the provider had breached the regulatory standard and 
that this breach would have been of sufficient seriousness to constitute a serious detriment.  
The fact that a breach of a consumer standard has to be seriously detrimental in England 
when, in Wales, a mere breach is sufficient to lead to regulatory action is an important 
difference. The significance of this difference is further emphasized by the fact that the 
regulator in England takes a reactive approach to consumer regulation in contrast to the 
more proactive approach of the Welsh regulator. The regulators in both Wales and England 
take a co-regulatory approach, meaning that the onus for ensuring co-operation with the 
regulatory requirements rests with the board of a respective provider or RSL, working in 
conjunction with their respective tenants.148 In Wales, the regulator also undertakes periodic 
reviews of RSLs, assessing their compliance with each performance standard.149 Following 
the completion of such a review, the regulator then publishes a regulatory opinion on the 
RSL, scoring each RSL for their compliance with the standards. Concerns were raised by 
some interviewees that this process did limit the co-operative nature of regulation.150 Such 
an approach does mean, however, that an RSL’s compliance with the regulatory standards 
is assessed on a semi-regular basis,151 meaning that failures to comply with what would in 
England be dubbed as ʻconsumer regulationʼ does have an impact on a RSL’s regulatory 
score. 
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This is highlighted when examining one recent regulatory opinion published by the Welsh 
Government. In June 2016, the Welsh Government published its regulatory judgment for 
Pennaf Housing Group. The Welsh Government sets out that it wishes to receive greater 
regulatory assurance from the RSL that it understands ʻthe issues underpinning 
dissatisfaction with the quality of workmanship on some of the Group’s development 
schemes.ʼ152 It seems unlikely that such assurance would ever be sought by the regulator in 
England. The Welsh regulator made this recommendation to Pennaf as part of formal 
regulatory assessment, following a proactive examination of whether Pennaf complied with 
(what would be considered in England as) a consumer standard. In England, it appears likely 
that a provider that was deemed to be failing to understand tenant dissatisfaction with 
repairs, would be acting in breach of the Tenant Involvement and Empowerment Standard. 
Such a breach would then have to be bought to the attention of the regulator by the Housing 
Ombudsman.153 The regulator would then need to conclude that not only was a provider in 
breach of such a standard but that this breach also constituted a serious detriment to the 
tenants. The wording of the Welsh Government’s regulatory judgment makes it appear 
unlikely that, if Pennaf were an English provider, this would be the case. The Welsh 
Government requires Pennaf to develop more of an understanding of ʻthe issues 
underpinning dissatisfaction with the quality of workmanshipʼ.154 This would suggest that 
whilst Pennaf’s understanding of tenants’ concern are not satisfactory, the RSL does have 
some understanding of their tenant’s concerns. From the case studies published by the 
HCA, discussed above, it appears probable that an English provider that had understood 
some of their tenants’ concerns, even if this understanding was not satisfactory, would not 
be committing a breach of sufficient gravity to warrant regulatory enforcement action to be 
taken.  
The implications of this for tenant protection are immediately apparent. The proactive 
approach taken by Welsh Government means that the views of tenants can influence the 
regulatory judgments they provide to individual RSLs. Given that these judgments are 
publicly available, this provides Welsh RSLs, such as Pennaf, with a clear incentive to gain a 
better understanding of, and to address their tenants’ concerns, so as such critiques are not 
made in the next regulatory judgment they receive from the Welsh Government. Given that 
the regulator would not take action in England until a breach of sufficient gravity has taken 
place, the regulatory regime in England does not appear to provide tenants with protection 
against such ʻnon-seriousʼ breaches of consumer regulation. The fact that the regulator in 
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Wales is willing to take action in such circumstances therefore suggests that tenants in 
Wales are afforded greater protection under regulation than their English counterparts. This 
view was supported by one interview participant who had some experience of working on 
both sides of the Offa’s Dyke:  
I feel like I will be held to account by the Welsh regulator, in terms of what I’m 
doing with our involved tenants and how, I’m involved, you know? How we are 
involving tenants in our service, well in our organisation full stop. What I think 
that’s happened in England is there’s been increasing emphasis just on the 
financial stuff, the governance stuff, value for money and to be honest, really the 
regulator isn’t actually that bothered about what happens with what they call the 
tenant facing standards…155 
Whilst this was the view of one particular participant, the analysis in this section does lend 
some support to it. Tenants in Wales seem to be better protected by the regulator. The fact 
the regulator in England will only reactively examine compliance with consumer standards 
does lead to the possibility of tenants having to suffer harm before the regulator becomes 
willing to take action. The proactive approach of the Welsh Government to regulating such 
standards means that any issues encountered by tenants are tackled before matters worsen. 
The absence of the serious detriment test in Wales seems to provide Welsh tenants with 
greater protection than their English counterparts. The potential drivers for this regulatory 
difference will be examined in more detail in Chapters 7 and 8. This section, however, has 
highlighted the potential real world implications of divergence for tenants, and has shown 
that, in order to fully understand them, it is important to explore the development of 
divergence at both legislative and regulatory levels.  
6.3 The problematic powers 
On 30 October 2015, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) published a classification 
announcement that was to have a great impact on the way in which social housing 
regulation is undertaken. The ONS announced that they had decided to reclassify providers 
in England as Public Non-Financial Corporations for accounting purposes.156 The 
significance of this decision was immediately apparent. The ONS had, in effect, reclassified 
English registered providers as part of the public sector, meaning that their borrowing, 
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amounting to some £60 billion, was transferred onto the public balance sheet.157 
Unsurprisingly the Westminster Government has been eager to reverse this decision. In an 
oral statement to the Communities and Local Government Committee, the then Housing 
Minister, Brandon Lewis revealed that the Government was keen to get registered providers 
ʻoff the Government books, which is what they want, as quickly as possibleʼ.158 The Minister 
also revealed to the Committee how the Government intended to do so. He set out that the 
Government would make a number of amendments to the Housing and Planning Bill that 
was progressing through the Houses of Parliament at the time, which would deregulate the 
social housing sector, tackling some of the concerns highlighted by the ONS.159  
On 29 September 2016, the ONS published a further classification announcement. The ONS 
announced that RSLs in Wales, as well as housing associations in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland would also be reclassified as part of the public sector.160 The decision to reclassify 
Welsh RSLs would add a further £2.3 billion of debt to the public balance sheet, and would 
subject Welsh RSLs to public sector borrowing rules, set by the Treasury at Westminster.161 
The Welsh Government have indicated that, like the UK Government, they will also enact 
legislation in an attempt to reverse the ONS’s decision.162 
The remainder of this chapter will examine the extent by which the law in Wales and 
England had diverged with regard to the areas highlighted by the ONS at three points in 
time: (1) prior to the ONS’s reclassification announcement in England, (2) following the 
enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, (3) the extent of possible future 
differences, following the enactment of legislation by Welsh Government that seeks to 
reverse the ONS’s decision in Wales. Chapter 8 will then examine what these events tell us 
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about the way that divergence develops, questioning whether it is democracy or international 
accountancy standards that drives it.  
6.3.1 The ONS decision  
Before examining the actual decision of the ONS with regard to registered providers in 
England and RSLs in Wales, it is important to understand how the ONS conducts its 
reviews. All EU member states must produce their national accounts statistics in accordance 
with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010).163 As part of this process, the ONS 
must classify each institutional unit in the UK.164 As such, the ONS's review into the status of 
registered providers in England, and RSLs in Wales was a review to see whether their 
classification, as institutional units, was the correct one. The ONS decided that it was not. In 
their classification announcement in England, the ONS pinpointed five reasons for this. The 
ONS decided that the UK Government's powers in each of these instances meant that 
English housing associations should be classified as Public Non-Financial Corporations 
under the ESA 2010. These were:  
1. HM Government consent powers over, and power to set conditions on, 
disposals of social housing assets (exercised through the HCA under section 
172-178 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
2. HM Government powers to direct the use of disposal proceeds (exercised 
through the HCA under sections 177-178 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration 
Act] 2008) 
3. HM Government consent powers over disposals of housing stock following a 
registered provider’s de-registration with the HCA (exercised through the HCA 
under section 186 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
4. HM Government consent powers over the voluntary winding-up, dissolution, 
and restructuring of a registered provider (exercised through the HCA under 
section 160-166 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
5. HM Government powers over the management of a registered provider, in 
particular the power of the HCA to appoint managers and officers to the provider 
(exercised through the HCA under sections 151-157, 246-252, 261(3) and 269 of 
the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008).165 
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During an interview the ONS revealed that it was these, and no other reasons, that had led 
them to reach their decision: 
Interviewer: Ok, great, thanks for clarifying that, so, moving on to your 
announcement, you know? You list five, well you outline five reasons for your 
reclassification, can you sort of set those out, kind of, was there anything beyond 
what was written down on paper then?  
Interviewee (ONS): So, was there, of course there was analysis beyond this 
written on paper because we haven’t published all the information that we’ve 
gathered, but, you know? Firstly, it would be remise of us to have a load of other 
factors that we didn’t publish, so no there nothing beyond this that was an 
influence, and also if there was I wouldn’t be able to tell you because I’m not 
allowed to give you privileged information without then publishing that online for 
everyone basically. 
Interviewer: Ok so it’s those five reasons then are the things that 
predominantly…. 
Interviewee (ONS): Yeah, they are the reasons.166 
The deregulatory legislation enacted in England has focused very closely on these five 
powers. It appears probable that, if the UK Government reduce their controls over the sector 
in relation to these five powers, the ONS would be willing to reverse their decision to 
reclassify registered providers as part of the public sector, given that, according to the ONS 
interviewee, these were the powers that led them to reclassify English providers. Removing 
those powers would therefore remove the need to classify registered providers as part of the 
public sector. 
The reasons behind the ONS’s decision to reclassify Welsh RSLs as part of the public are 
almost identical to their reasons for reclassifying registered providers in England.167 As a 
result, this chapter will discuss each of these powers cited by the ONS in their 
reclassification announcement in England, in turn, examining how the powers of the HCA 
and the UK Government will change with the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 
2016. The chapter will then compare these powers to the ones presently in place in Wales, 
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examining the impact of these changes on divergence, and questioning what impact the 
ONS decision might have in future. 
6.3.2 Disposal consent  
The first group of statutory provisions noted by the ONS as a reason for its decision to 
reclassify registered providers in England were sections 172 to 178 of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008.168 These sections, prior to their amendment by the Housing and 
Planning Act 2016, required a provider to get the regulator's consent before they could 
dispose of social housing dwellings.169 The rationale for introducing such controls seems 
clear. Given the, at times significant, public funds invested in social housing dwellings, the 
Government wished to control how such dwellings could be used. This interpretation is 
supported by the exceptions contained within the Act to these requirements. A disposal that 
was an assured or a secure tenancy for example, did not require the regulator's consent.170 
Given that providing homes for low cost rent is one of the grounds upon which a body can 
register as a provider of social housing, it is not surprising that the consent of the regulator 
was not required to undertake such activities. Another form of disposal that did not require 
the regulator's consent was a disposal made as a result of a sale under the right to buy or 
right to acquire.171 Again this exception came as a result of an alternative Government 
policy, the promotion of home ownership, taking precedence. 
If a disposal did not fit within one of the exceptions noted within the Act, then any failure to 
get the regulator's consent would lead to the disposal being void, unless it was a disposal of 
a single dwelling and the provider reasonably believed that the buyer intended to use the 
dwelling as their principle residence.172 Such consent could be granted either generally or 
specifically (to particular providers or particular types of property, for example).173 It is also 
worth noting that a non-profit providers had to notify the regulator when a disposal of land 
other than a social housing dwelling was made.174  
The system clearly placed constraints on how registered providers could operate in England. 
These constraints were felt by the ONS to constitute such control as to necessitate a 
reclassification under ESA 2010 rules. The Westminster Government's reaction to this 
finding has been to significantly reduce the HCA’s disposals consent powers. Registered 
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providers in England will no longer be required to gain the consent of the regulator before 
they dispose of any property.175 Instead, registered providers will only be required to notify 
the regulator that a disposal has taken place.176 For-profit registered providers will only be 
required to notify the regulator if the disposal is of a social housing dwelling, whilst a non-
profit provider will be required to notify the regulator after the disposal of any land.177  
It remains to be seen whether these steps are sufficient for the Minister to succeed in 
meeting his objective of getting providers ʻoff Government booksʼ.178 Registered providers 
are now certainly subjected to far less Government control than was the case under the old 
regime. In order to understand the impact of these changes on divergence, it is necessary to 
examine the law in Wales, and how this compares to both the old, and current system in 
England.  
The powers of the Welsh Government, under the Housing Act 1996 with regard to disposals, 
are very similar to, if not slightly greater than, the ones enjoyed by the UK Government 
under the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 before it was amended. Whilst in England, 
consent was only required for the disposal of a social housing dwelling, in Wales, RSLs must 
get the consent of the regulator before disposing of any land.179 As was the case in England, 
there are exceptions to this requirement. A letting made as an assured tenancy or a secured 
tenancy, for example, does not require consent in Wales,180 and neither do disposals made 
under the right to buy or right to acquire.181 The process by which consent can be granted in 
Wales is also extremely similar to the old process in England. The consent can be granted 
generally to all RSLs, or to types of land generally.182 Furthermore, legislation in Wales is 
very similar to the old regime in England when it comes to what happens if a disposal has 
been made without consent. As was the case in England, the disposal is void unless the 
disposal was of a single house, to an individual for whom; the RSLs reasonably believed that 
the house would be their principal dwelling.183 It would seem that the law with regard to 
disposal consent in Wales and England had already diverged, all be it slightly, before the 
enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. It is therefore not surprising that one of 
the reasons behind the ONS’s decision to reclassify Welsh RSLs as part of the public sector 
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were the ʻWelsh Ministers' consent powers over the disposal of land and the disposal of 
housing assetsʼ.184 
The finding that the law in Wales and England only varied slightly prior to the enactment of 
the Housing and Planning 2016 has important implications. Given the limited dissimilarities 
that had developed prior to the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016, it was the 
deregulatory steps taken in England that significantly increased divergence between both 
nations. This raises a question about what really drives divergence. As noted, this question 
will be addressed in Chapter 8, but the fact that the Welsh Ministers retain their disposals 
consent powers, whilst their counterparts in England do not, is undoubtedly an important 
difference in the law of the two nations. It would seem that this variation does have its roots 
in the ONS's decision to reclassify PRPs in England. It remains to be seen whether the 
Welsh Government will adopt the same deregulatory measures as their Westminster 
counterparts as they react to the ONS’s decision in Wales. If, as appears likely, that the 
Welsh Government does decide to do so, then the significance of the ONS’s decision would 
be unquestionable in light of the finding set out above. The law in Wales and England would 
converge, not only removing the differences that had developed as a result of the Housing 
and Planning Act 2016 but also, potentially removing the differences that had developed 
before its enactment, raising questions about the capacity of the Assembly to develop an 
alternative approach to housing policy and to social housing regulation, in particular.       
6.3.3 Disposals Proceeds Fund 
The second set of powers that led the ONS to reach its conclusion, concerned the Disposals 
Proceeds Fund. Under the old regime, not only did registered providers have to obtain the 
regulator’s consent before disposing of social housing dwellings, but the Government also 
exerted control over the way in which they could spend the money raised from such 
disposals. Under section 177 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, the net proceeds 
of any disposal had to be shown in a separate ʻdisposals proceeds fundʼ.185 Section 177 set 
out ten forms of disposals that were to be considered ʻnet disposal proceedsʼ for the 
purposes of the fund.186 These included the net proceeds of sale made as a result of the 
right to acquire, and the net proceeds of sale of property in respect of which a grant had 
been made.187 This fund could then only be used in accordance with directions issued by the 
regulator, following approval by the Secretary of State.188 If the fund remained unused at the 
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end of a period specified by the regulator, the regulator could require the provider to pay the 
funds to the HCA or the Greater London Authority, where applicable.189 The Housing and 
Planning Act 2016 abolishes the Disposals Proceeds Fund.190  
This is another important deregulatory move by the UK Government. Under the directions 
set by the regulator, registered providers in England could, on the whole, only use the 
Disposals Proceeds Fund for the provision of dwellings at social or affordable rent.191 Such 
restrictions will not be present in future. Between 2009 and 26 January 2016, 17 registered 
providers had been ordered to repay sums to the Homes and Communities Agency from the 
Disposal Proceeds Fund.192 These repayments totalled £3,703,745.193 The HCA will not 
have access to these funds in future. These deregulatory changes introduced by the 
Government at Westminster could reduce the amount of money invested into social housing 
in England, given that registered providers will not be under a regulatory obligation to 
reinvest the proceeds of their disposals in social housing. 
The powers of the Welsh Government with regard to disposals proceeds are almost identical 
to the ones that the HCA and the Westminster Government exercised under the old regime 
in England. As was the case in England, an RSL in Wales is required to show the net 
disposals of a sale in a separate disposal proceeds fund.194 The types of disposals to be 
considered ʻnet disposal proceedsʼ in Wales, are again very similar to England195 as are the 
powers of the regulator to intervene if the funds are not used appropriately.196 It would 
therefore seem that the legislation on disposals proceeds in Wales and England had not 
diverged at all before the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. Given this 
similarity, the ONS’s decision to reclassify RSLs in Wales as part of the public sector due to 
the Welsh Government’s ʻconsent powers over the disposal of land and the disposal of 
housing assetsʼ is not surprising.197 Furthermore, it would seem, once again, that it was the 
decision of the ONS to reclassify registered providers in England, and the Westminster 
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Government's subsequent reaction to it, that led to the development of divergence. Whether 
this newly created divergence is removed by the enactment of future legislation in Wales 
remains to be seen. Whilst any such legislation would remove divergence it would also 
signify a shift in the law, with the Welsh Government losing another control over the sector in 
Wales.  
6.3.4 Disposal consent after deregistration 
The third control cited by the ONS was the powers of the Government under section 186 of 
the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. Section 186 ensured that the Government's 
consent to disposals powers continued even after deregistration.198 This meant that a 
person, who owned a social housing dwelling whilst registered, would continue to need the 
consent of the regulator before they could dispose of that dwelling, even after 
deregistration.199 Given that the Housing and Planning Act 2016 removed the requirement 
for registered providers to get the consent of the regulator before they disposed of such 
dwellings, it is no surprise that this requirement has also been removed post-
deregistration.200 Those disposing of such property will now only be required to notify the 
regulator of such a disposal, not seek their consent.201 
The system in Wales is extremely similar to the one that was in place in England before the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016 made amendments to the Housing and Regeneration Act 
2008.202 These are not the only controls that the Welsh Government exercises over social 
housing disposals post deregistration. The Housing Act 1996 also places restrictions on how 
a property can be used by a purchaser after the initial disposal. If the disposal was made, 
subject to a discount, then the Act inserts a number of covenants into the relevant 
conveyance, grant or assignment.203 One such covenant requires the purchaser to pay a 
sum to the RSL if he or she disposes of the property within 5 years of the original 
disposal.204 The liability under the covenant appears as a charge against the house,205 and 
takes priority immediately after any charge left outstanding by the purchaser or any charge 
by a lender that allowed the purchaser to secure the first disposal.206 A second such 
covenant gives an RSL the right of first refusal on a property, for ten years, under conditions 
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prescribed by the Welsh Ministers through regulations.207 In this light it is not surprising that 
the Welsh Government’s control powers over disposals led the ONS to reclassify Welsh 
RSLs as part of the public sector. If, as seems likely, the Welsh Government reacts to the 
ONS’s decision by reducing its controls over RSLs in Wales, the law in Wales and England 
will converge, eroding the dissimilarities that had developed before the enactment of the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016.  
6.3.5 Consent powers over voluntary winding-up, dissolution, and restructuring 
The fourth reason given by the ONS for its reclassification of registered providers in England 
is slightly detached from the first three. It concerned the Government's control over voluntary 
winding-up, dissolution, and restructuring of non-profit providers.208 These powers could be 
split in two. The first concerned the powers of the regulator over registered providers that 
were companies. The second, the powers of the regulator over registered providers that 
were registered societies. The powers of the regulator with regard to both types of providers 
were extremely similar. A non-profit provider that was a company needed the consent of the 
regulator before winding-up,209 converting into a society210 and restructuring, amongst other 
activities.211 A non-profit provider that was a registered society, needed the consent of the 
regulator before restructuring,212 winding up213 or its dissolution.214  
Not only did these statutory provisions mean that registered providers needed the consent of 
the regulator before making structural changes, the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 
also gave the regulator powers to petition for the winding up of a registered society or a 
company.215 The regulator could exercise these powers in three circumstances; when the 
provider failed to carry out its objectives, when the provider was unable to pay its debts, and 
when the regulator ordered the provider to transfer all its land to another person.216  
These powers provided the HCA and the Government with a significant degree of control 
over registered providers. The regulator's right to petition for the winding up of a company or 
a registered society was clearly a substantial power but the Government's consent powers 
were arguably more significant. It was these powers that meant that any registered providers 
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that were seeking to merge in England needed the consent of the Government, acting 
through the HCA, before doing so. As a result, the Government had control over how 
registered providers developed. The amendments introduced by the Housing and Planning 
Act 2016 reduce these controls and give registered providers greater freedoms to develop 
as they please.  
For example, the regulator is no longer able to petition for the winding up of a provider.217 
More importantly, the Act has also reduced the regulator's consent powers. Non-profit 
registered providers that are companies are now only required to notify the regulator if they 
convert into a society or if they restructure.218 Non-profit registered providers that are 
societies on the other hand are only required to notify the regulator before restructuring or 
their dissolution.219 Yet the Housing and Planning Act 2016 does not completely strip the 
regulator and the Government of its powers. Registered providers are still required to obtain 
the consent of the regulator before petitioning to be wound-up, whether the provider is a 
company or a registered society.220 Furthermore, whilst a provider no longer requires the 
consent of the regulator before restructuring, the statue still provides the regulator with a 
degree of control. If the changes made by a provider mean that it would no longer satisfy the 
registration requirements of the regulator, then the regulator is permitted to notify the 
provider of that fact.221 
Whilst the HCA still retains a degree of statutory control over the structure of registered 
providers in England, it would appear that in practice, their powers will be decreased further. 
The HCA are about to open consultation over the registration requirements for merged 
providers.222 The HCA is proposing to remove the requirement for registered providers to 
undergo the full registration process if they merge with another registered provider.223 The 
new regime would, according to Inside Housing, provide merged providers with ʻnear to 
automatic approval for registrationʼ224 thereby decreasing the regulator's control over the way 
that the sector develops in England further. This process further emphasises the validity of 
the thesis’s main themes. The enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 clearly 
changed and decreased the regulator's power over the social housing sector in England. If 
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the HCA were to decide, however, to apply their regulatory powers over the registration of 
housing associations in a rigours manner, the regulator would still enjoy a degree of control 
over the structural make up of social housing providers in England. As such, the significance 
of the divergence that has developed between Wales and England with regard to the 
regulator's primary legislative powers, in this instance, only becomes fully apparent after 
examining the way in which the regulator has interpreted their powers, highlighting the need 
to explore divergence at a number of levels.  
As with the other powers of the regulator discussed to date, the old regime that was in place 
in England was extremely similar to the one that is still in place in Wales. The powers of the 
regulator in Wales are set out in Schedule 1 of the Housing Act 1996. An RSL that is a 
registered society must only give notice to the regulator if it changes its name or location.225 
For all other changes, the consent of the regulator is required.226 The same is also true for 
RSLs that are registered companies,227 whilst an RSL that is a registered charity, but not a 
registered company must get the consent of the Charity Commission before changing its 
objects.228 The Charity Commission is not permitted to grant such consent without first 
consulting the regulator.229 In addition to this, a registered society must obtain the consent of 
the regulator before they can register an amalgamation, a transfer of engagements, convert 
into a company, dissolve or applying to be wound up.230 Similar provisions are also in place 
for RSLs which are companies.231 As was the case in England, the Welsh Government also 
has the power to petition for the winding-up of an RSL that is a company or a registered 
society if it is failing to properly carry out its objects or if it is in financial difficulty.232  
The similarity between the old system that was in place in England and the one still in place 
in Wales is evident and emphasizes the significance of the differences that have appeared 
between Wales and England as a result of the deregulatory changes enacted through the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016. Registered providers in England now have far greater 
freedoms to organise their corporate affairs than their counterparts in Wales. Such freedoms 
will increase further if the HCA decides to go ahead with their proposals to decrease the 
registration requirements for merged providers. This greater freedom could lead to the sector 
in England developing in ways that at present might be unexpected. For example, in 
                                                          
225 Housing Act 1996, Schedule 1, Para 9 
226 ibid 
227 ibid Schedule 1, Para 11  
228 ibid Schedule 1, Para 10 
229 ibid 
230 ibid Schedule 1, Para 12 
231 ibid Schedule 1, Para 13 
232 ibid Schedule 1, Para 14 
155 
 
December 2015 the National Housing Federation published a voluntary merger code for 
housing associations in England.233 The code has been criticised by a number of 
associations. Some associations in England have argued that the code is too burdensome 
and favours predatory takeovers.234 Others have argued that the code does not adequately 
protect the interest of tenants and have developed their own code.235 Given that the code is 
voluntary and that the deregulatory measures contained in the Housing and Planning Act 
2016 means that there are now limited Government controls over the sector in England, it is 
possible that the social housing sector in England could fragment, with registered providers 
having differing policy priorities when it comes to their corporate development. The more 
extensive Government control in Wales means that such an eventuality is less likely on the 
western side of Offa's Dyke. Whether this continues to be the case appears uncertain given 
that the ONS cites the Welsh Government’s ʻpowers over constitutional changes of an RSLʼ 
as one of the reasons that led it to reclassify Welsh RSLs as part of the public sector.236 It 
seems likely that any legislation enacted by Welsh Government to reverse the ONS’s 
decision would see its controls over the constitution of RSLs reduced.   
6.3.6 Management powers  
The final set of powers cited by the ONS concerned the UK Government's powers over the 
management of private registered providers. The ONS cited the powers of the HCA to 
appoint managers and officers in particular, as controls that led them to reclassify the status 
of registered providers. These powers are numerous but, in contrast to the other regulatory 
powers discussed above, the UK Government has been reluctant to introduce deregulatory 
moves with regard to these powers, on the ground that these are key for any regulator.237 As 
such, the Government has only been prepared to tighten, not remove, these regulatory 
powers. This suggests that whilst the Government is prepared to be influenced by the ONS, 
there are some regulatory powers that the Government believes are too important to be 
removed, and as such they are willing to challenge the ONS.  
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The first set of management powers cited by the ONS concern the HCA's powers of 
appointment in the event of insolvency. The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 gives the 
regulator the right to appoint an interim manager, which has a number of powers over the 
provider, during a moratorium.238 Under the Act the regulator is also permitted to develop 
proposals for the future of a provider during a moratorium, and to then appoint a manager to 
implement them.239 The powers of such managers are numerous and can be substantial. For 
example, a manager appointed under a moratorium to implement a proposal is permitted 
make and execute an instrument providing for the amalgamation of a registered society or 
for transferring its engagements.240 No amendments were made to these powers with the 
enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
The second set of powers cited by the ONS within this category directly concerns the 
regulators management powers.241 If the regulator is satisfied that a provider has failed to 
meet a standard, mismanaged its social housing or failed to comply with a number of 
statutory provisions, then the regulator may require the provider to tender for the 
appointment of a new manager, or the regulator may directly appoint an individual to act as 
manager of the provider.242 In addition to these powers the regulator enjoys further controls 
over the management of registered providers. The regulator may, under certain conditions 
order that the management functions of a provider should be transferred to a specified 
person.243 Again the UK Government has made no attempts to remove these controls over 
the sector through the Housing and Planning Act 2016, despite the ONS's decision.  
The ONS pinpoints two further powers of the regulator within this final category. These are 
the regulator's powers to appoint someone to carry out the functions of a suspended 
person,244 and the regulator's powers to appoint new officers to a provider.245 It is only with 
regard to this last power that the UK Government has introduced deregulatory provisions 
through the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. The 2016 Act replaced one of 
the grounds upon which the regulator could appoint new officers. Whilst the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 had permitted the regulator to appoint an additional officer if it felt 
that it was ʻnecessary for the proper management of the body's affairsʼ246 the Housing and 
Planning Act 2016 removed this ground. In its place the 2016 Act inserted a new ground. 
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The regulator will now be permitted to appoint an additional officer if it is necessary to ensure 
that a ʻregistered provider's affairs are managed in accordance with legal requirementsʼ.247 
In comparison with the significant deregulatory measures taken by the UK Government in 
response to the ONS’s reclassification announcement, the steps taken by the Government 
with regard to its powers of appointment have been minimal. It remains to be seen whether 
their reluctance to relinquish these controls will impact on any future ONS review of English 
registered providers. One consequence of the UK Government's reluctance to deregulate in 
this area has been to limit the development of divergence between the powers of 
appointment of the regulators in Wales and England. As such, there is very minimal variation 
between both nations with regard to these powers.  
As in England, the regulator in Wales has powers to appoint a manager in the event of 
insolvency and to develop provisions for the future of an RSL during a moratorium.248 The 
Welsh Government also has the power to require an RSL to tender for appointment of a new 
manager, to order the transfer of management, or to appoint a new manager, if the RSL has 
failed to meet its statutory standards, or where there has been misconduct or 
mismanagement in the affairs of the housing association.249 In addition to this, the Welsh 
Government has powers to appoint new officers to RSLs in Wales.250 These powers have 
diverged slightly from the position in England, where the powers of the regulator were 
tightened by the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. In Wales, the Welsh 
Government does retain the power to appoint a new officer if it believes that ʻit is necessary 
for the proper management of the charity/ company/ society's affairs…ʼ251 With this one 
exception the law in Wales and England has barely diverged.  
Given that Westminster’s Government's belief that these powers are crucial if regulation is to 
be effectively undertaken,252 it is interesting to note that the ONS stated that the Welsh 
Government’s ʻpowers over the management of an RSLʼ was also one of the reasons that 
led to it decision to reclassify Welsh RSLs as part of the public sector.253 During interview the 
ONS revealed that their reclassification decision had been taken on the sum of all 
evidence.254 It was made clear, however, that if there is sufficient evidence against one of 
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the indicators then this can be enough to indicate control.255 Despite the UK Government’s 
protestations, it would appear that the ONS still considers appointment powers as grounds 
for classifying housing associations as part of the public sector. What is unclear is whether 
these powers, by themselves, amount to sufficient evidence of control to necessitate the 
classification of housing associations as part of the public sector. If the ONS were to decide 
that such powers were sufficient to require this, then the Welsh and UK Governments will 
have to choose between maintaining their desired degree of regulatory control, and ensuring 
that housing associations are returned to the private sector.  
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated a number of interesting ways in which social housing 
regulation in Wales and England has diverged over recent years. The impact of this 
divergence upon the sector has been significant. These differences mean that different types 
of housing associations are permitted to register with the regulators in Wales and England. 
The work these bodies are permitted to undertake has also diverged, with English registered 
providers no longer having to construct homes for social rent to be eligible for registration, in 
contrast to their Welsh colleagues. The chapter has demonstrated that the way by which 
regulation protects tenants has also diverged. It has highlighted how tenants in Wales are 
granted greater protection by regulation than their English counterparts due to a differing 
approach to setting and monitoring performance standards, showing how divergence could 
have a real impact on the ground. Finally, the chapter examined how the decision of the 
ONS to reclassify English registered providers has led the UK Government to relinquish a 
substantial degree of control over the sector. The chapter has demonstrated how this has 
increased variation in the short term but how this could diminish in future.   
In addition to examining the extent by which divergence has developed over recent years the 
chapter has also further highlighted three key themes that have appeared in this thesis. The 
chapter has demonstrated the complicated way in which divergence develops. Divergence 
has not developed in a straightforward and linear manner; rather, it developed at a number 
of levels and as a result of legislation in both Cardiff Bay and Westminster. This theme has 
appeared throughout the chapter but perhaps in particular with regard to sections 6.1 and 
6.2, which set out how differences between the registration requirements faced by RSLs and 
registered providers, and the variation that has developed between the way that tenants are 
protected in Wales and England, have developed. This chapter has also shown how a 
number of different factors can impact upon divergence process, including politics, as 
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discussed in 6.1 and 6.2, and international accountancy standards, as discussed in 6.3. 
These three themes will continue to appear throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
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7 The Drivers of Divergence and Convergence – Constitutional 
Factors   
 
Having examined the differences that have developed between Wales and England in 
Chapter 6, the thesis now turns to examine the factors that have driven the divergence 
process. The thesis discusses these factors over two chapters, setting out how these 
compete with, and work with each other, leading to the development of both regulatory 
divergence and convergence. Chapter 7 focuses on two such factors: policy and politics, and 
the limits of devolution.   
This chapter first looks at the impact of policy and politics on the development of variation in 
social housing regulation between Wales and England. It examines policy documents and 
legislation to see whether there is evidence of any ideological and policy differences leading 
to divergence. Having undertaken this examination, the focus of the chapter turns to the 
impact of non-devolved areas on the Assembly’s ability to pursue its own direction regarding 
housing policy. The thesis has already highlighted how such limitations have constrained the 
Assembly in the past, exploring the difficulties the Assembly faced enacting the Housing 
(Wales) Measure 2011.1 Whilst the barriers that delayed the enactment of the 2011 Measure 
have been removed, other constraints remain on the Assembly. This chapter explores these 
constraints, setting out their impact on the process of divergence. 
In inspecting the impact of these two factors on the development of divergence and 
convergence the thesis refers back to Chapter 6. Chapter 6 provided a snapshot of the 
differences that have developed between Wales and England with regard to three aspects of 
the regulatory framework, labelled ʻregistrationʼ, ʻtenant protectionʼ and ʻthe problematic 
powersʼ. These three aspects of regulation are now used to illustrate how both policy and 
politics, and the limits of devolution, have driven and constrained divergence. Having 
examined the impact of constitutional factors on the divergence process in this chapter, 
Chapter 8 will move on to focus on the impact of sector specific factors on the development 
of divergence and convergence.   
7.1 Politics and policy 
In the foreword to A Voice for Wales; The Government’s Proposals for a Welsh Assembly 
the then Secretary of State for Wales, Ron Davies stated: 
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The Assembly will let the people express their own priorities – for better schools 
and health services, for bringing the quangos under control and into the open; for 
directing the £7,000 million of Welsh Office spending where it is most needed. 
The environment, housing, transport and business would all benefit from a 
strategic view based on the needs of the whole of Wales.2 
It would seem that allowing for the development of policy divergence was one of the primary 
reasons given by the backers of devolution for establishing the National Assembly in 1999. 
As has been demonstrated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, devolution is not a new phenomenon in 
Wales. Housing has been devolved to Wales to some extent or another since 1 May 1940.3 
The Welsh Board of Health and subsequently the Welsh Office had, however, been 
established to administer the UK Government’s policy in Wales, not to develop their own 
distinctive policies. The establishment of the National Assembly in 1999, therefore, 
significantly increased the possibility that distinctive Welsh policies would be implemented.4   
Politicians in Wales seem to have grasped the opportunity that devolution presented them 
early into the life of the National Assembly. On 11 December 2002 Rhodri Morgan, the then-
First Minister, delivered his landmark ʻclear red waterʼ speech.5 In the speech, Morgan sets 
out the different approach taken by his Government on health and education to the approach 
taken by Tony Blair’s New Labour Government at Westminster.6 He emphasises the 
importance of social universalism to his Government in an attempt to draw a contrast with 
the approach taken at Westminster.7 Only a few years later this ʻclear red waterʼ began to be 
seen in the context of social housing regulation.  
Between June 2007 and October 2010, three influential reports were published that were to 
lead to important changes in the way that regulation was undertaken in Wales and England. 
Each report would lead to legislative changes. Professor Robert Cave published the first of 
the reports in June 2007. Every Tenant Matters: A Review of social housing regulation 
(otherwise referred to as the Cave Review). The Report contained recommendations on how 
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social housing regulation in England should be changed. 8 Several of the recommendations 
were taken forward by the UK Government and were put into force through the enactment of 
the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.9 The second report was commissioned only four 
months later. A Task and Finish Group, led by Sue Essex was commissioned by the Welsh 
Government’s Deputy Minister for Housing, Jocelyn Davies. The group was established to 
review the way that social housing regulation was being undertaken in Wales.10 By June 
2008 the Group had published its report, Affordable Housing Task and Finish Group, Report 
to the Deputy Minister for Housing.11 The Report was to have an influence on the 
development of the regulatory framework in Wales, and would also have a legislative impact 
with the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 enacted three years after its publication.12 The last 
of the reports was published in October 2010 by the Department for Communities and Local 
Government. The Review of social housing regulation (known as the DCLG Review) made 
further recommendations on how social housing regulation in England should be changed.13 
Some of the Report’s recommendations were put into legislation the following year through 
the enactment of the Localism Act 2011.14 These three Reports and the reaction to them 
fundamentally changed how social housing regulation was undertaken in Wales and 
England, leading to divergence. This chapter will examine the three Reports in detail looking 
to see whether the incidences of divergence and convergence seen in their wake can be 
attributed to them. The chapter will also explore why these Reports developed differing or 
similar approaches, looking at the context within which these Reports were developed.  
7.1.1 The political context 
The three Reviews into social housing regulation in Wales and England were undertaken 
under unique political pressures. The impact that this pressure had on the Reports’ authors 
seem to vary, but the distinctive environment within which each of the Reports were 
developed, does seem to have influenced their approaches and recommendations.   
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7.1.1.1 The Cave Review 
The Cave Review was announced by the Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government on 14 December 2006.15 The Review contains a foreword by the Secretary of 
State, Ruth Kelly which sets out the challenges she believed needed to be confronted in 
relation to housing.16 One of these challenges identified by Kelly was the ʻneed to think about 
how social housing can continue to meet its goals in the twenty-first centuryʼ.17 To this end, 
Kelly wished to ensure that the sector could deliver both ʻsecurity and opportunityʼ to the 4 
million social housing tenants.18 Kelly set out in her foreword that she believed that the 
principles underpinning social housing remained sound, but she believed that it could 
become a more effective ʻplatform for social mobility.ʼ19 To this end Kelly believed that: 
In the twenty-first century we need a regulatory system that enables social 
housing to respond more effectively to people’s changing needs. That gives 
tenants more opportunity to have their say, and demand action on the issues that 
matter to them. And that ensures Government gets the most out of its 
investment.20 
The Cave Review was therefore undertaken within an environment where there was an 
overarching political wish to increase transparency and flexibility within the social housing 
sector, whilst also ensuring a return on Government investment. In addition to these broader 
goals, Cave’s team undertook their review subject to more specific expectations. The Report 
on the Review clearly sets out what the Review team had considered to be the purpose of 
their work, as shown by the following extract: 
The purpose of the Review is to establish a regulatory system for social housing 
which is clearer and more effective than the present set of arrangements in 
ensuring that social housing providers are regulated according to a clear set of 
objectives and accords with established principles of good regulation.21 
This was to be done whilst also finding a clear view: 
• about the scope of social housing which is subject to regulation, whether 
defined in terms of organisational type or activity 
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• of the rationale for regulating social housing 
• about the extent to which the current regulatory arrangements have been 
effective 
• of the necessary attributes of the future regulatory system that best address the 
features of social housing which require it to be regulated.22 
In other words, the Westminster Government had, in effect, requested that Cave and his 
team undertake a root and branch review of the way in which social housing regulation was 
undertaken in England, to be developed in line with its other housing policy objectives. With 
such a remit, it is perhaps not surprising that the Cave Review was to make 
recommendations that were to change the way that regulation was undertaken in England.23  
7.1.1.2 The Essex Review 
Only a few months later the Task and Finish Group was established to review social housing 
regulation in Wales. The group was set up shortly after the formation of the One Wales 
Government, a coalition between Labour and Plaid Cymru.24 Essex sets out in her Report 
how the group had been established with the objects of the One Wales Document (the 
coalition agreement that underpinned the Government) in mind.25 The One Wales Document 
contained a commitment to deliver 6,500 affordable homes over the course of the 
Assembly.26 In order to achieve this objective and others concerning the provision of 
affordable housing, the Government proposed to increase funding support for social housing 
and improve the supply of public land amongst other pledges.27 Essex sets out that her 
group had therefore adopted an approach that had a clear focus on ʻidentifying ways forward 
on affordable housingʼ within the Welsh Government’s overall objectives on ʻsustainability, 
regeneration, social justice and wellbeingʼ.28 
The initial impetus for the Essex Review had been concerns about:  
whether the current regulatory framework for Welsh housing associations (HAs) 
was appropriate for the commitment to deliver more affordable housing.29 
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The Task and Finish Group had, however, been asked to consider a number of other issues 
through its terms of reference. These were: 
•Constraints on Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) ability to deliver broader 
social products necessary for sustainable communities, including tackling 
homelessness; 
•Opportunities for attracting/releasing more investment or funding in the sector to 
meet the One Wales goals; 
•Incentivising higher environmental standards in line with the One Wales 
aspirations; 
•Opportunities for using the Making the Connections agenda to good effect in the 
housing area; 
•Looking at alternative models of operation, such as partial stock transfer; and 
•Considering potential opportunities from moving to a more flexible and 
integrated approach to tenure.30 
The focus of the Essex Review therefore differed slightly from the focus of the Cave Review. 
Whilst Cave and his team had been tasked with carrying out a review on social housing 
regulation, the focus of the Essex Review seemed broader, looking at regulation within the 
context of issues concerning social housing. There appears to be one underlying reason for 
this. The UK Government had already decided that Communities England was to be 
responsible for ensuring the expansion of supply.31 Whilst Professor Cave acknowledged the 
important role that regulation played in the process of supplying social housing,32 this was 
not the primary focus of his Report. This was in contrast to the position in Wales where the 
initial impetus for the commissioning of the Essex Review was to ensure that the regulatory 
regime was appropriate to deliver more social housing.33   
7.1.1.3 The DCLG Review 
Only two years later, and only three years after the publication of the Cave Report, Grant 
Shapps, the Minister for Housing and Local Government under the Coalition Government in 
Westminster, announced that he would commission a review into the role of the Tenants 
Service Authority (TSA), the recently established social housing regulator in England, and 
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the social housing regulatory framework more generally.34 The TSA and the regulatory 
framework had only been put into law two years previously with the enactment of the 
Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, but Shapps felt that the effectiveness of the regime 
needed to be reviewed further. The political context within which this Review was 
undertaken differed significantly from the previous two Reports.  
In the introduction to their Report the DCLG team set out the Government’s objectives in 
light of which the Report had been drafted. These are interesting not just for their content but 
also for the order in which these objectives were listed. These were:  
• reducing the number and cost of quangos 
• reducing administration costs and ensuring value for money of public 
investment 
• cutting unnecessary regulation and inspection 
• ensuring there is a robust, transparent and independent framework of economic 
regulation for social housing 
• ensuring there is a regulatory environment that ensures housing associations 
continue to command the confidence of lenders and can continue to attract 
investment at competitive rates 
• supporting a supply of affordable housing 
• ensuring social housing tenants are adequately protected and empowered.35  
Of the seven Government objectives, the first five concern economic matters. This focus on 
economic factors seemed to signal an ideological shift from the previous two Reports. The 
way in which the Review was developed was also very different. The Review was not 
undertaken by independent experts as had been the case with the previous two Reviews. It 
was the work of the DCLG, a department within the UK Government, and a department 
within which Grant Shapps was a minister. This might have limited the freedom of the 
Review team. Indeed, nowhere in the review team’s Report does the name of any of its 
authors appear. This can therefore be viewed as a report drafted by the civil service to put 
Government policy into force, an important distinction, the impact of which can be seen 
clearly from the Report’s content. Nowhere is the impact of this differing approach more 
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apparent than in the DCLG’s first finding. The first finding set out in the Report’s summary of 
findings is: 
In line with the Government’s commitment to reduce the number of quangos, the 
Tenant Services Authority (TSA) should be abolished and its economic 
regulation and backstop consumer regulation functions transferred to the Homes 
and Communities Agency (HCA), generating efficiency savings in back-office 
functions and exploiting synergies across investment and regulation.36      
It would seem that the UK Government’s political objective of minimising quangos and 
reducing costs had influenced the team undertaking the review at the DCLG. The fact that 
no other reasons beyond the ʻGovernment’s commitment to reduce the number of quangosʼ 
and the potential for ʻefficiency savingsʼ were cited by the DCLG when making this 
recommendation highlights the importance that the review team had placed on the 
Government’s objectives. Despite this recommendation, the DCLG Report also 
recommended that there was a need to ensure that the regulation of social housing 
providers and their financing remained separate.37 The TSA had been established following 
recommendations made by the Cave Review.38 It was the Cave Review that had, for the first 
time, recommended that regulation should be undertaken separately from the Government.39 
The fact that the DCLG wanted to see this separation continue, even after dissolution of the 
TSA, seems to further suggest that it was the aims of the Government to reduce the number 
of quangos that had led the DCLG Review team to their conclusions. Whether or not this 
was the case, it seems correct to conclude that the political context in which these Reports 
developed had an impact upon their content. The impact of this on divergence will be 
examined by looking at two areas of the law in particular, who can register with the regulator, 
and the differing approaches taken to consumer and economic regulation.  
7.1.2 Where’s the profit? 
As discussed in Chapter 6, one of the major differences that exists between social housing 
regulation in Wales and England is that profit-making bodies are permitted to register as 
providers in England, but not as RSLs in Wales.40 The basis upon which this dissimilarity 
developed can be found in the content of the Cave and Essex Reviews.  
At the time of the Cave Report’s publication the position of the law in Wales and England 
had not diverged with regard to the role of profit-making bodies and the provision of social 
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housing. In both Wales and England, only non-profit bodies were permitted to register with 
the regulator.41 The position of the law in both nations had begun to shift slightly with the 
enactment of the Housing Act 2004. The Act inserted a new section into the Housing Act 
1996 that permitted both the Housing Corporation in England and the Welsh Ministers in 
Wales to make grants to bodies other than registered social landlords.42 These grants could 
be given on one of six grounds including constructing homes that were to be disposed of on 
shared ownership terms and for providing, constructing or improving houses that were to be 
kept for letting.43 The number of organisations that had taken advantage of these 
opportunities were limited. At the time of the Cave Report’s writing there was not one profit-
making body that was providing social housing in England.44 One body, however, was 
managing general needs housing.45 The Cave Review was to signal a shift in the approach 
taken by the UK Government.  
One of the key themes of the Cave Review was broadening tenant choice. The word ʻchoiceʼ 
and its derivatives appeared in the Review on 120 occasions, with the word and the narrow 
context surrounding it accounting for 1.47% of the entire document.46 The word appeared 
most prominently, although not exclusively, in the context of tenant or consumer choice. The 
reason for this focus on consumer choice can be found in an extract contained within the 
Report from evidence given by the Audit Commission. The Audit Commission believed that: 
…residents who make conscious choices about where they live and whose 
services they receive are more likely to put down roots and give support to the 
future of their locality. . . Where tenants can exercise choice over their provider, 
this will encourage providers to ensure tenant satisfaction. The need for 
regulation will diminish as tenants are increasingly able to use market choice to 
spur providers to better provision.47 
Not only did the Cave’s team receive evidence emphasising the importance of tenant choice 
to the development of social housing, they also received evidence that tenants wished to be 
given more choice in how services were provided to them.48 The sort of ʻchoiceʼ that tenants 
wanted to be granted was varied, ranging from choice over where they lived, to choice over 
contractors, to choice about internal decoration.49 The Report noted that there was a lack of 
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incentives for the sector to provide tenants with such a choice and that it was necessary to 
stimulate it by ʻencouraging providers, empowering consumers and removing the institutional 
barriers to choiceʼ.50 The Report contained a number of recommendations as to how this 
could be better achieved. Amongst the Review’s recommendations were strengthening the 
role of tenants in regulation51 and providing them with greater freedom to choose how their 
properties were managed.52 Perhaps the most interesting of all the Review’s 
recommendations on boosting tenant choice for the purposes of this thesis, however, was 
the recommendation that there should be an expansion in ʻthe availability of choice of 
provider at all levels in the supply of social housingʼ.53  
The Cave Review concluded that tenants could be granted greater choice when selecting a 
provider in more than one way. The Review team’s Report argued in favour of separating the 
development, ownership and management roles in the provision of social housing.54 It was 
argued that this would stimulate competition, giving tenants greater choice.55 The Cave 
Report also suggested that tenant choice could be expanded by allowing profit-making 
providers to register with the regulator, both as independent organisations and as 
subsidiaries to non-profit providers.56 This would increase the type of bodies that tenants 
could choose to rent their property from. The Report did make it clear that it was vital that 
regulation acted as a safeguard ensuring that there was no leakage between non-profit 
providers and their profit-making subsidiaries. The Cave team also concluded that there 
were no reasons why non-profit providers should be permitted to become profit-making 
bodies.57  
The promotion of tenant choice was not the only reason that led the team undertaking the 
Cave Review to recommend that profit-making providers should be permitted to register with 
the regulator. The Cave Review was also viewed as an opportunity to rationalise the 
complicated regulatory process that was in place at the time, with local authority providers, 
profit-making providers, non-profit providers and Arms’ Length Management Organisations 
(ALMOs) all being subject to different forms and degrees of regulation.58 The Review set out 
that this ad-hoc approach meant that both non-profit providers and profit-making providers 
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felt that the playing field had been tilted unfairly in the favour of the other.59 It was felt that 
creating a unified regulatory regime would deal with many of these complications and would 
encourage profit-making bodies to develop more social housing.60 
It is in these recommendations that we see the roots of an important legal variation that has 
developed between Wales and England. By the following year, the UK Government had 
enacted the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, based on the Cave’s Review 
recommendations. The Act, for the first time, permitted profit-making providers to register 
with the regulator.61 Over the same period Sue Essex’s team were reviewing how social 
housing regulation was undertaken in Wales. Her team took a very different approach to the 
profit-making question. It is in this difference of approach that we see the impact of policy 
and political differences on regulatory divergence.  
The Essex Report contains a section entirely dedicated to regulatory developments that 
were taking place in both England and Scotland.62 Indeed the Essex Report states that: 
Discussions about the future framework for HAs in Wales have an obvious 
synergy with parallel debates in England and Scotland.63 
Her Report was therefore not developed in isolation of the work that was going on elsewhere 
in the UK. In this light, it is perhaps a little surprising that all references to the word ʻprofitʼ in 
the Essex Review appear in the context of ʻnot for profitʼ or ʻnon-profitʼ organisations.64 It 
would appear from the content of the Report that the Essex team had not even considered 
the possibility of expanding registration criteria so as to allow profit-making organisations in 
Wales to register with the regulator. As has been discussed, profit-making providers 
continue to be prohibited from registering with the regulator in Wales.65 This finding 
highlights how devolution had permitted both Wales and England to develop different policy 
approaches to similar issues.  
This finding is of further academic interest. At the time that Wales and England adopted 
divergent approaches to registration, Labour was the party of government at Westminster 
and Cardiff Bay.66 This demonstrates that when examining the factors that have contributed 
to the divergence process, it is necessary to explore ideological differences within individual 
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political parties, in addition to exploring differences between competing parties, in order to 
fully understand the impact of politics and policy on the process. It seems that the statutory 
difference that has developed between Wales and England with regard to the registration of 
profit-making providers can be directly attributed to governments of the same colour, but in 
two different nations developing distinctive policy approaches. This is not the only variation 
that has developed between the two nations because of such factors.  
7.1.3 Setting and monitoring the standards  
As noted in Chapter 6, the powers of the social housing regulators in Wales and England to 
set regulatory standards and to monitor compliance with them has diverged significantly over 
the past decade.67 The law has diverged in such a way so that it is now arguable that social 
housing tenants in Wales are better protected by regulation than their counterparts in 
England. As with the divergence that has developed with regard to the role of profit-making 
providers, its roots can be found in ideological and policy differences between both nations - 
differences that become apparent when examining the three Reviews into social housing 
regulation in both Wales and England.  
The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 created, for the first time, two categories of 
regulatory standards. The regulator would be permitted to set standards concerning the 
provision of social housing and standards that concerned the management of social 
housing.68 The reasons for this change can be found in the recommendations of the Cave 
Review. The Cave team believed that the decision to locate responsibility for supply issues 
at Communities England provided the Government with an opportunity to redesign 
regulation, so that it focused on the ʻbenefit of consumers, current and futureʼ.69 The Review 
recommended that a regulator should be founded, independently from Government, and 
have three principal duties:  
• To ensure the continuing provision of high quality social housing 
• To empower and protect tenants 
• To expand the availability of choice of provider at all levels of the provision of 
social housing.70 
The UK Government took this recommendation on board. The Housing and Regeneration 
Act 2008 established the TSA as an independent regulator of social housing.71 The Act set 
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out ten objectives that were to underpin the activities of the TSA.72 These ten objectives 
were closely linked to the Cave Report’s recommended three principal duties for an 
independent regulator, further demonstrating the Report’s influence on regulatory 
developments in England. The impact of the Review, on the regulator’s power to set 
standards is even more apparent in some of its subsequent recommendations. 
Recommendation S4 set out that the: 
Government should be entitled to issue directions to the regulator in relation to 
rents and the standards of housing provision. It should be for the regulator to 
transpose these into the regulatory framework. Therefore it is recommended that 
the regulator be given the statutory power to set rent levels across the domain.73 
It was thought that such a system would increase certainty within the sector, thus attracting 
new providers and minimising regulatory creep that could develop if there was ambiguity 
with regards to regulatory standards.74 This recommendation forms the basis of sections 193 
and 197 of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. As was discussed in Chapter 6, section 
193 gave the regulator the power to set standards in relation to the provision of social 
housing.75 Section 193 set out ten standards that registered providers might be required to 
comply with, amongst these were standards relating to maintenance and levels of rent.76 
Section 197, meanwhile, gave the Secretary of State the power issue direction in relation to 
these standards.77 The power of the regulator under section 194 of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 to set standards in relation to the management of registered 
providers also has its roots in the Cave Review. The Review recommended that: 
The regulator should monitor organisational viability (which will encompass both 
financial viability and governance) and intervene appropriately to protect the 
interests of tenants and taxpayers.78   
This provides a further clear link between the recommendations of the Cave Review and the 
legislative provisions of the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008. The powers of the 
regulator and the Secretary of State under these sections effectively mirror the regime 
envisaged by Professor Cave. Given that the statutory basis for the regulator’s power to set 
standards in Wales remained unchanged, it was the enactment of the Housing and 
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Regeneration Act 2008 that led to divergence between Wales and England. It would 
therefore seem correct to argue that the dissimilarities that developed between the statutory 
basis for regulatory standard setting in 2008, between Wales and England, developed 
directly because of England pursuing an alternative policy to Wales.  
As has already been established, the development of differences between the powers of the 
regulators to set standards in Wales and England was not linear in nature.79 In 2011, the 
Welsh Government enacted the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011, three years after the 
publication of the Essex Report. The delay between the publication of the Essex Report and 
the enactment of the Housing (Wales) Measure can be partly attributed to the legislative 
difficulties that the National Assembly faced operating under Part 3, Schedule 5 of the 
Government of Wales Act 2006.80 Another reason for this delay becomes apparent when 
examining the Essex Report. In it, the authors set out that the Welsh Government had given 
no indication as to how it intended to respond to legislative changes in England beyond 
saying that it was content with the Housing Act 1996 continuing as the statutory basis for 
regulation in Wales.81 As was highlighted by Essex Report, this left unanswered how Welsh 
Government would strengthen its regulatory powers, if it were to do so at all.82 This further 
emphasizes the role that politics and policy played in the development of divergence. By 
making the political choice in 2008 that it did not seek a new legislative framework for 
regulation in Wales, the Welsh Government in effect contributed to the development of 
divergence. Yet by 2011 the Government had changed its position. When the Measure was 
eventually enacted it led to the law in Wales and England converging in relation to the 
powers of the regulator to set regulatory standards. This will be explored next.  
The Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 introduced section 34A to the Housing Act 1996. This 
section updated the grounds upon which the Welsh Government, in its capacity as social 
housing regulator, would be able to set performance standards for RSLs, bringing the 
system in Wales more into line with the system in England.83 Perhaps due to the Welsh 
Government’s stated desire in 2008 to keep the Housing Act 1996 as the statutory basis for 
regulation in Wales, the Essex Report did not contain wide ranging recommendations on 
how the law on regulation should be amended. The Review focused in more detail on the 
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regulatory framework itself instead. Amongst the Essex Report’s recommendations, 
however, was that: 
the current regime needs upgrading to reflect new realities, ensuring that 
housing associations are well governed, financially viable, delivering high quality 
services to their residents and are striving to continuously improve.84 
The Essex Report argued that, for this aim to be achieved, there had to be a ʻdecisive move 
towards a new set of arrangementsʼ, which were also ʻmore customer facingʼ.85 In the 
Report, the Essex team set out their vision for these new arrangements. This included a 
move towards self-regulation, the continued use of inspection as part of the regulatory 
regime, and assessment of associations’ performance against key indicators.86 The impact 
of the Essex Review on the regulatory framework that is in place in Wales is clear to see. 
Many of the key features of the regulatory regime can be directly attributed to the Review’s 
recommendations. For example, the regulator in Wales continues to pro-actively assess 
compliance with all aspects of the regulatory framework in Wales.87 As was discussed in the 
Chapter 6, this is not the case in England, with consumer regulation now only being 
undertaken on a reactive basis.88 Given the clear imprint that the Essex Review has left on 
the regulatory framework in Wales, the work of Sue Essex certainly contributed to 
divergence.  This episode, emphasises once more the effect of policy differences on the 
development of divergence.  
As the Essex team made very few legislative recommendations, beyond recommending that 
the Welsh Government should increase its intervention powers,89 the impact of the Review 
on legislation in relation to regulatory standards is more questionable. The Review’s 
reference to governance, financial viability and quality of service, may partly explain why the 
Welsh Government decided to introduce section 34A into the Housing Act 1996, but this is 
not clear. The fact that the Review did not propose wholesale legislative changes in Wales, 
however, can be said to be a factor in the development of divergence. The lack of such a 
recommendation coupled with the Welsh Government’s satisfaction with the Housing Act 
1996 meant that there was no impetus in Wales to enact significant new legislation. This 
meant that legislative changes introduced in England were not replicated in Wales, to any 
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extent until 2011, increasing variation between both nations. The political choice taken in 
2008 therefore contributed to the development of divergence.   
The Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 was not the only piece of legislation enacted in 2011 
that was relevant to the development of divergence between Wales and England. It was also 
the year that saw the enactment of the Localism Act 2011 at Westminster. The enactment of 
the Localism Act 2011 was to significantly change the way in which social housing regulation 
was undertaken in England, leading to the development of further differences. The Localism 
Act 2011, for the first time, created a two-tier approach to regulation in England, with 
consumer regulation now being undertaken on a reactive basis only.90 The reasons for this 
change can be found in the Review of social housing regulation by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG).     
The DCLG Review recommended that many aspects of regulation that were in place in 
England in 2010 should continue unchanged. One such aspect was the power of the 
regulator to set standards.91 The effect of this recommendation can be seen in legislation, 
with minimal changes made to the regulator’s standard setting powers.92 The Review team 
did not feel that this was the case with regard to all the aspects of the regulatory framework. 
One area where the team felt that there was need for a change in the law was the power of 
the regulator to monitor compliance with regulatory standards. The team’s Report stated 
that: 
The Review concludes that consumer and economic issues require substantially 
different levels of regulatory activity in order to achieve the desired outcomes 
outlined above. We recommend that this distinction should be reflected in legal 
framework for regulation.93 
The Report went on to set out in more detail why it thought that this was the case and how 
this was to be achieved. The Review team concluded that the interests of tenants could be 
adequately protected through and Ombudsman, and, as a result, that ʻthere should be no 
automatic role for the regulatorʼ in dealing with consumer matters.94 The Review team 
asserted that the tools available to the regulator to assess compliance with performance 
standards were ʻbluntʼ, and that this task could be best carried out through tenant led 
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scrutiny.95 It was argued, therefore, that the role of the regulator should be limited to setting 
out clear standards, and to dealing with cases of serious failure against those standards in 
consumer matters.96 This is extremely analogous to the ʻreactiveʼ approach to regulation 
adopted by the UK Government when enacting the Localism Act 2011.97 
Having considered the approach taken towards consumer standards, the Report goes on to 
examine the approach taken with regard to economic standards. The team concluded that 
the approach of the regulator to economic regulation should continue and be subject to 
minimal legislative change.98 They felt that there was a ʻclear rationale for the continuation of 
the regulator’s proactive stanceʼ in relation to economic regulation.99 It was felt that this 
approach prevented operational failure and supported lender confidence.100 Again the 
impact of this recommendation on the Localism Act 2011 is clear, with the Act making 
minimal changes to the power of the regulator in relation to economic standards.  
This analysis would suggest that the origins of the two-tier approach to regulation in England 
can be traced back to the DCLG Review on social housing regulation. Given that no such 
approach has been adopted in Wales, it can be argued that these recommendations made 
by the DCLG have directly led to the development of a significant variation between 
regulation in Wales and England. This finding once again emphasises the role of policy and 
politics in the development of divergence. The significance of political and policy differences 
has grown in prominence as a result of deepening devolution. But policy and politics are not 
the only factors that have contributed to the development of divergence and convergence 
between Wales and England. We will now turn to explore the impact of the devolution 
settlement on divergence. 
7.2 The limits of devolution 
The history of housing devolution in Wales has been explored in detail for the first time in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The historical analysis demonstrated that the process leading to the 
present devolution settlement was long and complicated. One constant theme throughout 
this journey has been how the nature of the devolution settlement that was in place at any 
given time, has had an impact on the distinctiveness of policies developed and implemented 
in Wales. Having provided a brief recap of the impact Wales’s historic devolution settlements 
have had on the divergence process, this section will explore how Wales’s present-day 
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devolution settlement limits the ability of the Welsh Government to pursue its own distinctive 
policy, if it so wishes. It will do so by looking at two specific limitations placed on the 
Assembly’s powers; (1) the limit of the Assembly’s legislative competence, and (2) the 
impact of UK Government policy in non-devolved areas, on devolved policy.     
The transfer of housing functions to the Welsh Board of Health in May 1940 did not lead to 
significant policy divergence.101 The Welsh Board of Health had not been established to 
adopt new and distinctive health policies in Wales but to administer the Ministry of Health’s 
policy on the western side of Offa’s Dyke.102 The purpose of devolving housing functions to 
the Welsh Board of Health, as a result of Clement Davies’s Report on TB in Wales, was 
therefore, to allow UK housing policy to be administered in a distinct manner in Wales, not 
for divergent Welsh housing policy to be developed.103 The establishment of the Welsh 
Office in 1964 and the subsequent establishment of Tai Cymru in 1988 saw greater 
autonomy granted to Wales, and thus created the scope for more divergence.104 As 
discussed in 4.1, steps were taken when establishing the Welsh Office to minimise the 
development of policy divergence.105 Over time, however, the way that the social housing 
sector operated in Wales began to differ from the sector in England. The Secretary of State 
for Wales ensured that more money was available for housing associations in Wales, and 
pushed for the creation of a separate social housing regulator.106 Despite these differences, 
it should be remembered that the Secretary of State, the Welsh Office and Tai Cymru were 
either directly or indirectly answerable to Westminster. 107 They were therefore unlikely to 
wish to adopt radically different policy choices.  
The establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 and the transfer of primary law-making 
powers to it under the Government of Wales Act 2006, would see the scope for the 
development of divergence increase significantly. The National Assembly was established to 
let the people of Wales ʻexpress their own prioritiesʼ.108 Allowing for the development of a 
distinctive Welsh policy approach was, therefore, an explicit reason behind the decision to 
establish the National Assembly. Despite this, the ability of the Assembly to adopt differing 
policy has been limited. The Legislative Competence Order (LCO) system in place between 
2007 and 2011 and the approach taken to it by those at Westminster meant that, in practice, 
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the Assembly had to seek the consent of the UK Parliament before enacting legislation.109 
The impact of this on divergence and housing has been demonstrated. Members of 
Parliament, reluctant to see any significant divergence develop with regard to the ʻright to 
buyʼ, stalled the progress of an LCO that would have permitted the Assembly to enact 
legislation on housing for three years.110 The reluctance to grant this legislative consent led 
to the development of divergence in social housing regulation. As has been set out in 
Chapter 5, the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 moved the legislative basis for regulation in 
Wales closer to the legislative basis for regulation in England when it was eventually 
enacted.111 For the period between 2008 and 2011 the variation between both nations was 
greater than what it might have been had the Assembly enjoyed greater legislative 
competence.112 At any given moment in time the form of devolution dispensed to Wales has 
had peculiar, even idiosyncratic, characteristics.  These features are more the product of the 
specific historical path taken by devolution than of any rational plan or design.  In turn, they 
have had consequences for character of the legislative, regulatory and policy outputs of the 
Welsh institutions.   
Such limitations are not a thing of the past. Under the Government of Wales Act 2006 the 
National Assembly has legislative competence over housing.113 This competence is 
reasonably wide ranging, extending to: 
Housing. Housing finance except schemes supported from central or local funds 
which provide assistance for social security purposes to or in respect of 
individuals by way of benefits. Encouragement of home energy efficiency and 
conservation, otherwise than by prohibition or regulation. Regulation of rent. 
Homelessness. Residential caravans and mobile homes.114 
The Assembly is also about to be granted, for the first time, taxation powers that concern 
housing. From 2018, powers over Stamp Duty will be devolved to Wales, giving the 
Assembly control of a tax that is linked to housing.115 These broad ranging powers have 
permitted the Assembly to develop and pursue its own distinctive policies on social housing 
regulation, leading to the development of dissimilarity between Wales and England on 
matters ranging from the role of profit-making providers, to how tenants are protected under 
regulation. As noted, the Welsh Government’s ability to develop distinctive policies on social 
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housing regulation remains limited. The devolution settlement currently in place in Wales, 
impacts on the development of divergence in two different ways. First, Wales’s devolution 
settlement places limits on the ability of the National Assembly to enact legislation. The 
Assembly is only able to enact legislation if the policy area concerned is within its legislative 
competence, placing limits on the Welsh Government’s ability to develop distinctive policy.116 
Second, the UK Government is free to enact legislation and to develop policy in those areas 
that have not been devolved to Wales. The UK Government therefore retains an ability to 
change the social housing sector in Wales. Nowhere is this ability more clearly demonstrated 
than in the context of welfare spending. This chapter will examine both factors, in terms of 
what they have meant, and what they could mean for the development of differences 
between social housing regulation in Wales and England in future.  
7.2.1 Beyond the limits  
At present the National Assembly operates under the conferred powers model of devolution. 
This means that the National Assembly has got the power to enact primary legislation if the 
legal competence to do so has been expressly conferred to it. The Government of Wales Act 
2006 has done so in relation to 21 subject areas, one of which is housing.117 This is subject 
to certain restrictions. The Assembly is not permitted to enact legislation that breaches the 
European Convention of Human Rights, or the law of the European Union.118 The Assembly 
is also not permitted to amend the powers of Ministers of the Crown,119 nor is it permitted to 
enact legislation that concerns an exception to one of the 21 fields listed under Schedule 
7.120 These restrictions are important and do play a role in limiting divergence. This is 
illustrated when examining the decision of the Supreme Court in Re Recovery of Medical 
Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill.121  
The Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill was developed during 
the fourth Assembly.122 The Bill, if enacted, would have allowed the Welsh Government to 
recover certain costs for the treatment of people suffering from asbestos related diseased in 
Wales.123 Under the Government of Wales Act 2006 both the Counsel General for Wales 
and the UK Attorney General have the power to refer a Bill, or a provision within a Bill, to the 
Supreme Court, in order to question whether the Bill is within the Assembly’s legislative 
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competence.124 The Counsel General and the Attorney General have exercised this power a 
total of three times, with the Asbestos Bill being the third time that this was done.125 One of 
the grounds upon which the Bill was referred to the Supreme Court was to examine whether 
the Bill breached Article 1 Protocol 1 (A1P1) of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.126 It was held unanimously by the Supreme Court that the Bill did indeed breach 
A1P1 and as a result of this, and a finding that the Bill contained provisions that were outside 
the powers transferred to the Assembly, the Bill never received royal assent.127 The Court’s 
decision that the Bill breached the European Convention of Human Rights therefore 
contributed to minimising divergence between Wales and England in the context of health. 
Such constraints would also be apparent if the Welsh Government attempted to legislate a 
piece of housing legislation that breached Convention rights.128 This is an important 
limitation on the power of the Welsh Government to develop its own policy approach. 
The Supreme Court decision also highlights a further constraint that the conferred powers 
model of devolution places on the Welsh Government’s ability to implement divergent policy. 
Under the conferred powers model of devolution, the Welsh Government is only permitted to 
enact legislation that has been directly devolved to it. This differs from the reserved powers 
model of devolution in place in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The reserved powers model 
devolves all power to the sub-state institution except for the powers explicitly reserved to 
Westminster. It has been argued that the reserved powers model of devolution provides a 
clearer and more stable settlement that would see the number of cases referred to the 
Supreme Court reduce.129 The lack of clarity provided by the current conferred powers model 
may constrain divergence with both the Welsh Government and the National Assembly 
forced to commit resources to ensuring that legislation passed by the Assembly is within its 
legislative competence. 
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Following the enactment of the Wales Act 2017 the model of devolution in place in Wales is 
set to change with the reserved powers model replacing the conferred powers model of 
devolution.130 There are concerns, however, that, rather than clarifying the basis by which 
the Assembly is permitted to enact legislation, the model introduced by the Wales Act 2017 
could in fact increase uncertainty.131 It has also been argued that the Act may also claw back 
some of the Assembly’s powers, particularly in light of the number of reserved areas set out 
within the Act.132 It remains to be seen whether this will be the case; but as this thesis has 
demonstrated, the history of devolution suggests that, whichever system of devolution is 
adopted, there will remain constraints on the Welsh Government’s ability to develop its own 
distinctive policy approach. This could impact upon the development of future divergence 
between social housing regulation in Wales and England.  
This is not the only impact that Wales’s devolution settlement has had on the divergence 
process. Policy developed by the UK Government in areas of overlapping competence can 
also have an impact on divergence. This will be explored more closely in the next section.  
 
7.2.2 Westminster remains in charge 
The merits of the conferred and reserved powers model have been much discussed in 
Wales over recent years.133 This chapter has briefly outlined the impact that the current and 
future devolution settlements have had, and may have, on divergence. The chapter will now 
examine an element of Wales’s devolution settlement that has received less attention: the 
impact of the Westminster Government’s policy in non-devolved areas, on the development 
of divergence. Drawing on evidence gathered through interviews with Welsh RSLs, the 
chapter will demonstrate how the UK Government’s welfare policy, the ʻbedroom taxʼ in 
particular, has influenced and shaped the way that the social housing sector operates in 
Wales. The chapter will set out the significance of this finding for our understanding of the 
way that divergence develops.  
Paragraph 11 of Schedule 7 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 gives the National 
Assembly for Wales legislative competence over housing.134 The provision sets out a 
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number of different areas that are deemed to constitute ʻhousingʼ, including ʻhomelessnessʼ 
and ʻregulation of rentʼ.135 Another aspect of ʻhousingʼ under the act is ʻhousing financeʼ.136 
The devolution of housing finance to the Assembly is made subject to a specific exception, 
however:  
except schemes supported from central or local funds which provide assistance 
for social security purposes to or in respect of individuals by way of benefits.137 
This exception, in effect ensures that Westminster retains control over social security 
spending in Wales in the housing context. The fact that the UK Government retains control 
over social security is not surprising given the import role that the welfare state plays in 
maintaining the UK’s social union. However, this retention of power to Westminster has a 
very substantial impact on the ability of the National Assembly to develop the social housing 
sector in Wales as it would prefer. This argument will be demonstrated below. 
The ʻunder occupancy penaltyʼ, or the ʻbedroom taxʼ as it is commonly known, was 
introduced by the UK Coalition Government in 2012.138 The policy meant that individuals that 
were in receipt of housing benefit would see their payments reduced if it were deemed that 
their property contained a spare bedroom.139 The policy was highly controversial and was 
met with fierce opposition and legal challenge.140 The changes were to apply across Wales, 
Scotland and England and meant that thousands of people were faced with the choice of 
moving home or seeing a reduction in the housing benefit that they received.141 It would 
seem that the policy has had a significant impact on Welsh housing associations.  
During interviews, the chief executives of five Welsh Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) 
stated that they had seen a change in the type of property that was in demand within their 
social housing stock. Each RSL had seen an increase in demand for one bedroom homes. 
Each chief executive also cited the introduction of the ʻbedroom taxʼ as the reason for this. 
Their view is best summarised by the following extract:  
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Interviewer: Ok, great, sort of, looking at other factors that, you know? Might 
influence how you work, one of them obviously is housing need, what your 
tenants want. Is there a particular type of property in your social housing portfolio 
that’s more in demand than another? 
Interviewee, Chief Executive 1: Traditionally the larger properties have been in 
demand, and again if you looked at stuff that you would say are rare, would be 
things like bungalows, you know? So, older people love bungalows, yeah? They 
don’t want to live necessarily in a flat, they want bungalows. So those are the 
ones if you like, are always in demand. The one beds increasingly so at the 
moment because of the bedroom tax. That’s a political issue and if the bedroom 
tax goes the demand for one beds will go, because nobody wants a one bed 
generally. People want room for the kids to stay over, or as a study, or for the 
grandkids, or a carer, or whatever it might be. Once bedroom tax goes, if it goes, 
the demand for one beds will go.142 
This is a highly significant finding. It suggests that the ʻbedroom taxʼ, a piece of UK 
Government welfare policy, has changed the demand for social housing in Wales, a change 
that has had an impact on the very nature of the Welsh social housing sector. The impact of 
this change on the sector in Wales has been striking. One chief executive outlined the 
challenge that faced their organisation: 
when the bedroom tax first came in we had 460 tenants, 420 tenants affected by 
it, we have just about 3,000 properties, so quite a proportion, and of those I think 
200 odd wanted to, were paid to downsize. I think at the moment we’ve got, we 
managed to move on about a 100 of those by the way, so we’ve got about a 
hundred, I haven’t look most recently, we did a report to board, I think we’ve got 
about a 125 people now who are prepared to downsize, but we’ve got nothing for 
them.143 
The change has clearly placed RSLs under pressure to ensure that they find suitable 
properties for those tenants wishing to downsize. The interview participants revealed that the 
change had placed them under pressure from two angles. First, RSLs are coming under 
pressure from their tenants, and in one instance, from their local authority to develop smaller 
properties.144 This means that they are being placed under increasing pressure to develop 
property that in their view, will be in low demand if the bedroom tax policy was halted. This 
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presented the RSLs with a secondary pressure: how to develop property that would satisfy 
the short-term need for smaller houses, against the risk of developing homes that are 
unwanted in the future, if the policy was ever withdrawn. One chief executive highlighted the 
pressured that Welsh RSLs faced by recounting their previous experiences of working in 
Welsh social housing in the 1980s: 
when I worked in Swansea long time ago there’d been, and in Merthyr Tydfil, 
there’d been a lot of one bedroom flats which had become, because of the 
changing allocation policies in the 80s and early 90s had become almost 
ghettoised and the subsequently cleared and replaced with family homes, we’ve 
now got a situation where we have too few one bedroom properties and so 
there’s a greater demand because of the Government policy too, that has been 
applied…145 
In an attempt to counter this threat, one participant noted how their organisation was 
constructing its one bedroom flats with a slightly larger footprint so that they could divide a 
one bedroom flat into a two-bedroom property if this was required in future years.146 This 
demonstrates once more how the ʻbedroom taxʼ has directly changed the way that some 
within the Welsh social housing sector operate. This pressure constrains the ability of the 
Welsh Government to develop its own, fully distinctive social housing policy. The new Welsh 
Government has announced that it aims to construct 20,000 affordable homes over the 
course of the present Assembly.147 Given that the ʻbedroom taxʼ has, in effect, changed the 
nature of the demand within Wales for social housing, the Welsh Government may need to 
construct a higher number of one bedroom properties than what it might have desired. This 
would mean that, despite the fact that housing was devolved to the National Assembly, the 
Westminster Government could still steer the development of the Welsh social housing 
sector. This could have long-term consequences for the way in which social housing 
regulation develops and for the future of divergence between Wales and England. 
Work by the Welsh Audit Office in January 2015 suggested that the introduction of the 
ʻbedroom taxʼ in Wales affected a disproportionate number of Welsh social housing 
tenants.148 A House of Commons, Welsh Affairs Committee Report, published in 2013 gives, 
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some indication as to why this was the case.149 Many housing association properties in 
Wales were developed in the 1940s, during the baby boomer years, with few one bedroom 
properties being constructed at this time.150 In addition to this, housing associations 
operating in Wales’s most rural areas had very limited access to one bedroom properties. 
Moreover, homes were spread across large areas, making it hard to move people to smaller 
properties.151 These structural differences between the sectors in Wales and England meant 
that the UK Government’s welfare policy affected Wales differently to Scotland and England, 
with important implications for social housing law, policy and provision. In effect, the 
Westminster Government’s welfare policy disproportionately affected Wales because the 
nature of the Welsh social housing sector differed from that of England. The introduction of 
the ʻbedroom taxʼ could, in time, be viewed as a point of convergence, leading Welsh RSLs 
to deliver more one bedroom properties and driving the nature of sector in Wales closer to 
that of the sector in England. 
This result is significant for another reason. The differences that have developed between 
the nature of the social housing stock in Wales and England have their roots in a period 
when there was very limited devolution in Wales.152 This would suggest that differences 
between Wales and England’s social, economic and geographical make up, are, to a certain 
extent, responsible for the distinctive nature of Wales’s social housing stock. Recent 
advances in devolution mean that there is now a new pressure that could see the nature of 
Wales’s housing stock become distinct from England. With the devolution of primary law 
making powers to the National Assembly there is now a greater space for divergent policy to 
develop. This policy divergence could, in time, see the nature of Welsh and English housing 
become more distinct. Nowhere can this potential be more clearly demonstrated than with 
regard to regulation. Recent variations that have developed between Wales and England 
regarding the role of profit-making providers and the different approaches to consumer 
regulation have already, and will increasingly, lead to the social housing sectors in Wales 
and England becoming distinct.153 This raises the possibility that the Westminster 
Government’s welfare policy could have increasingly different effects on either side of Offa’s 
Dyke. This phenomenon is already presenting the Welsh Government with difficult choices.  
Whilst social security has not been devolved to the National Assembly, the Welsh 
Government could have pursued an alternative policy choice when reacting to the ʻbedroom 
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taxʼ. The Scottish Government took steps to ʻmitigateʼ the effects of the ʻbedroom taxʼ.154 
They provided local authorities in Scotland with additional discretionary housing payment, 
money that local authorities could spend on supporting tenants who needed assistance to 
pay their rent.155 The Welsh Government also faced calls to adopt such an approach.156 
Adopting it would not only have mitigated the impact of the ʻbedroom taxʼ in Wales but would 
also have reduced the immediate pressure of developing one bedroom properties, 
maintaining the difference between the housing stocks in Wales and England. The Welsh 
Government decided against this. It argued that funding the shortfall could have potentially 
been a substantial and long term cost which would not ʻplug all the gapsʼ.157 In opting for this 
approach, the Welsh Government, perhaps unintentionally, has increased the possibility that 
the nature of the social housing stock in Wales and England will converge.   
The question that remains unanswered is whether this one decision indicates how the Welsh 
Government will react to such pressures in the long term. If the Welsh Government 
continues to adopt a distinctive Welsh approach to social housing regulation, then this 
increases the possibility that the social housing sectors in Wales and England will diverge. 
With the Westminster Government continuing its programme of welfare reform through the 
introduction of universal credit and direct payments, any divergence between the sectors in 
Wales and England could mean that these policies will have a different impact in Wales 
compared to the rest of the UK.158 If this is the case, the Welsh Government could face a 
choice, between maintaining an approach to social housing regulation that has allowed the 
sector in Wales to diverge to England, and taking steps to minimise this divergence so as to 
mitigate the impact of any welfare policies that disproportionately hit Wales. Issues of this 
kind could become increasingly important in our understanding of what drives the process of 
divergence and convergence between social housing regulation in Wales and England over 
coming years, raising questions over whether there is a need to develop a mechanism for 
sharing powers within the UK.  
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7.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that legislative devolution has allowed for the development of 
divergence between Wales and England. It has provided a way for the Governments in both 
nations to pursue differing policy objectives, leading to both legislative and regulatory 
divergence. The chapter has demonstrated, however, that whilst the devolution settlement 
does allow for the development of a degree of divergence, it does place limitations as to how 
far such divergence can develop. It has also highlighted how policy developed by the UK 
Government in non-devolved areas can have an impact on social housing in Wales, leading 
to the development of convergence. These findings are crucial in shaping our understanding 
of how divergence has developed between both nations, and how this could develop in 
future. These are not the only two factors that have contributed to the development of 
divergence. The next chapter will examine three other issues that have limited or contributed 
to the development of divergence between Wales and England. These are international 
accountancy practices, private finance and the structure of the sector. By examining all 
these factors together, the complicated way in which divergence develops will become 
further apparent.  
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8. The Drivers of Divergence and Convergence – Sector 
Specific Factors   
 
The thesis has exposed the complicated way in which the divergence in social housing 
regulation between Wales and England has developed. It has revealed how powers over 
housing were devolved to Wales, increasing gradually from the powers of Welsh Board of 
Health in 1940, to the full legislative powers enjoyed by the National Assembly today. The 
thesis has also set out the extent by which social housing regulation differs between Wales 
and England in the present day, and has questioned how divergence might develop in 
future, focusing in particular on three aspects of the regulatory regimes: registration, tenant 
protection, and the problematic powers. In Chapter 7 the focus was on the constitutional 
factors that have driven and constrained divergence. Chapter 7 examined two factors, the 
impact of policy and political differences, and the impact of the limits of devolution, on 
divergence. It highlighted how these two factors work against each other, and with each 
other, to drive the law in Wales and England further apart, and closer together.  
This chapter continues the examination of this process by looking at three other factors that 
have had an impact on the development of divergence. These factors are: (1) international 
accountancy standards, (2) access to private finance and (3) the structure of the sector in 
both nations. The first of these factors relate to the impact of the ONS’s decision to reclassify 
housing association in Wales and England as part of the public sector. The chapter 
examines whether there is evidence of the ONS’s decision influencing government policy; 
evidence that would suggest that international accountancy standards do have an impact on 
the way that divergence develops. The second factor relates to the pressures exerted on the 
sector from the financial markets, in particular from money lenders. This chapter will look at 
areas of regulation where it would seem that lender concerns have had an impact on 
Government policy. Finally, the chapter looks at the structural differences that exist between 
the Wales and England. As was demonstrated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, societal, economic 
and geographic differences can impact upon the divergence process. This chapter questions 
whether the significant differences that exist between the scales of the social housing 
sectors in both nations has had any impact on the development of divergence.  
8.1 The impact of international accountancy standards 
So far, one of the key themes of this thesis has been the complicated way in which 
divergence has developed. As was demonstrated in Chapter 6, the way that regulation is 
undertaken differs on a number of levels, and these differences have their roots in changes 
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made at both Westminster and Cardiff Bay. Chapter 6 also sets out how regulation has 
converged as well as diverged during this period. This thesis has already demonstrated how 
constitutional factors have contributed to the development of divergence in social housing 
regulation in Wales and England. The establishment of the National Assembly, and the 
devolution of primary law-making powers to it, has, for the first time, created the possibility 
that two different bodies can pursue two differing legislative programmes, leading to a 
growth in divergence. As demonstrated in 7.2, however, the ability of the Welsh Government 
to develop distinctive policies and legislation is constrained by the nature of the devolution 
settlement. It is not just the nature of the devolution settlement that constrains the ability of 
the Governments in Westminster and Cardiff Bay to develop their own distinctive policies on 
social housing regulation, it is also constrained by external pressures. This section of the 
chapter will focus on one such external factor: international accountancy standards. The 
chapter will argue that the decision of the ONS to reclassify housing associations in Wales 
and England as part of the public sector, demonstrates how such standards can shape 
regulatory approaches, constraining divergence. The chapter will examine what impact this 
process has had on regulatory  
8.1.1 The ONS intervenes  
Countries across the globe are required to adopt a rigorous, internationally consistent 
system for classifying what is happening within their national economies.1 National Accounts 
developed in such a way allow for comparisons to be taken between nations globally, and 
underpins how large sums of money is divided between nations.2 Within the European Union 
(EU) the requirement for ensuring consistency in approach between nations is made more 
pressing by the fact that such classifications underpins the decision making process for 
deciding on each member state’s contribution to the EU.3 It is perhaps not surprising that the 
EU has developed a harmonised methodological approach that must be used by each 
member state when undertaking such work, the European System of Accounts Framework 
2010 (ESA 2010).4 In the UK, it is the role of the ONS to apply this methodology, ensuring 
that each body/ sector in the UK is accurately classified under this methodological 
approach.5     
Every month the ONS classification team publishes a forward workplan setting out which 
bodies will have their status reviewed in the upcoming period. On 19 September 2015, the 
                                                          
1 Office for National Statistics, National Accounts sector and transaction classification:  
A summary of the classification process (Office for National Statistics, January 2012) 3 
2 ibid 
3 ibid 
4 Eurostat, European Commission, European System of Accounts 2010 (European Union, 2013) 
5 National Accounts sector (n1) 
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ONS announced that the status of registered providers in England would come under 
review.6 This news did not come as a surprise to the sector in light of new policies 
announced by the recently elected Conservative Government.7 These included the 
expansion of the ʻright to buyʼ so that it applied to the properties of registered providers in 
England. Indeed, the ONS revealed during interview that these changes acted as a catalyst 
in their decision to review the status of English registered providers.8 
When the reclassification announcement was made on 30 October, however, the ONS made 
no reference to the new Government policy and focused instead on the provisions that were 
already in place through the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008.9 The reason for his is to 
be found in the methodological approach set out in ESA 2010: 
Interviewee ONS: … In each period, we produce those statistics for, say, each 
quarter, we have to make sure that the units, as in statistical units, including 
Government departments, charities, whatever, businesses, and the transactions 
that they engage with are classified correctly based on their characteristics in 
accordance with the rules for that quarter. So, we wouldn’t look at anything that 
was coming up because it hasn’t happened and it’s not real. 
Given that the proposed policy changes in England did not make it onto the statute book 
until May 2016, these changes were ʻnot realʼ at the time of the review. The same could not 
be said of the legislative changes made through the enactment of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008 and the Localism Act 2011, which had not been in place when the 
ONS had last undertaken a review into the status of English registered providers.10 In 
addition to this, the framework by which the ONS made its classifications decisions had been 
updated since the last review of private registered providers. As noted above, the ONS is 
required to classify each unit in the UK in accordance with ESA 2010.11 ESA 2010 was 
introduced in September 2014, replacing a previous methodological approach that had been 
                                                          
6 Office for National Statistics, ʻNational Accounts Sector Classification: Classification update and forward 
workplan, September 2015ʼ (Office for National Statistics, 29 September 2015) < 
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7 Steffan Evans ʻHow extending the right to buy in England could change the relationship between the 
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9 Office for National Statistics ʻClassification announcement: ʻPrivate registered providersʼ of social housing in 
Englandʼ (30 October 2015) 
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in place since the 1990s.12 It was therefore on these two grounds that the ONS undertook its 
review of private registered providers in England. It is difficult to separate the two grounds to 
undertake an accurate analysis on the impact of each factor in leading the ONS to reclassify 
private registered providers,13 but, Ggiven that the ONS classification announcement 
originally applied from the 22 July 2008, the date of enactment of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, it had seemed that the provisions enacted within the Act also 
contributed to the ONS’s decision.14 In September 2016, however, the ONS announced that 
the date from which English housing associations were to be reclassified as part of the 
public sector was to be extended back to the date of enforcement of the Housing Act 1996, 
suggesting that the provisions enacted within the Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 had 
been a less significant factor for the ONS than had originally been understood.15 Given this 
uncertainty the focus of this chapter is not on measuring the impact of any individual ground 
on classification, but is on examining what the ONS’s decision, and the reaction to it, tells us 
about divergence. 
As was set out in more detail in Chapter 6, the ONS highlighted five powers that had led 
them to reclassify private registered providers in England as Public Non-Financial 
Corporations. These were: 
1. HM Government consent powers over, and power to set conditions on, 
disposals of social housing assets (exercised through the HCA under section 
172-178 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
2. HM Government powers to direct the use of disposal proceeds (exercised 
through the HCA under sections 177-178 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration 
Act] 2008) 
3. HM Government consent powers over disposals of housing stock following a 
registered provider’s de-registration with the HCA (exercised through the HCA 
under section 186 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
                                                          
12 ESA (n4) 
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the new rules and we applied them.’ 
14 Classification announcement (n9).  
15 Luke Cross ʻHousing associations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland reclassified to public sectorʻ (Social 
Housing, 29 September 2016) http://www.socialhousing.co.uk/news/housing-associations-in-scotland-wales-
and-northern-ireland-reclassified-to-public-sector/7017005.article# accessed 1 March 2017 
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4. HM Government consent powers over the voluntary winding-up, dissolution, 
and restructuring of a registered provider (exercised through the HCA under 
section 160-166 of the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008) 
5. HM Government powers over the management of a registered provider, in 
particular the power of the HCA to appoint managers and officers to the provider 
(exercised through the HCA under sections 151-157, 246-252, 261(3) and 269 of 
the HRA [Housing and Regeneration Act] 2008).16 
The ONS were clear that its reclassification decision had been ʻtaken on the sum of all 
evidenceʼ.17 Yet it was revealed that ʻsufficient evidence against one, or, even only one of 
the indicators set out in the rules can be enough to indicate control…ʼ so as to necessitate 
reclassification.18 The approach taken by the ONS when assessing these controls differed to 
the approach taken by the UK Government. This is demonstrated by looking at a guide 
published on the ONS website that sets out how the classification team operates: 
Although national accounts classification decisions have wide relevance within 
government, it should be made clear that ESA does not allow for consideration of 
political or commercial significance when making classification decisions and that 
as an independent statistics office, ONS ensures that classification decisions are 
robust and fully consistent with the rules of ESA10 and additional relevant 
statistical guidance.19 
The ONS therefore makes decisions by assessing the Government’s control over a body, 
against the rules contained in ESA10 without consideration of wider political or commercial 
context.20 The UK Government took a different approach. During an interview, Kerry Mac 
Hale, the policy lead on social housing regulation at the Westminster Government, revealed 
that her team had undertaken their own internal assessment following the publication of the 
ONS’s forward workplan. Mac Hale declared: 
We obviously had our own internal assessment, we had been talking to them, we 
knew specific things they were asking us for information on, we also had looked 
at ESA 2010 against all the information we’d provided, with all of these things, 
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19 Office for National Statistics ʻUK economic statistics sector and transaction classifications: the classification 
processʼ (Office for national Statistics) 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http:/www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
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they’re independent, they’re also looking at this form a statistical perspective 
where I’d be looking at the issues from a policy perspective which is quite 
different, so I’m looking at, really my natural inclination is to look at things and 
go, why have we got those powers in the first place? And evaluate whether 
they’re, you know? Whether that’s appropriate or not, they’ll be looking at 
something slightly different, so I think we’ve always known that there were risks 
to classification for the sector…21 
It would seem that the approach of those working at the UK Government was far more 
policy-focused than the rules based stance of the ONS. On occasions these different 
approaches can be fundamentally confrontational. As set out in Chapter 6, the UK 
Government has deregulated the social housing sector in England as a response to the 
ONS’s decision, reducing or abolishing the regulator’s power in all five areas cited by the 
ONS.22 The Westminster Government was reluctant to introduce full-scale deregulatory 
changes in one area, however, the regulator’s powers over the management of a provider.23 
The reason for this reluctance was made clear by Kerry Mac Hale during interview, as can 
be seen from the following extract:  
so, the only thing we didn’t remove is the appointment, the power, the regulator’s 
power to appoint officers and managers, but we did tighten that and we have 
been quite clear why we haven’t tightened that because we think it’s a key power 
for any regulator to have, if there’s a, you know? Significant risk to the sector, 
then they need to be able to take those kinds of actions but they need to be quite 
closely guarded so that, you know? I don’t know, if the regulator decides to take 
a dislike to somebody they can’t just remove them, but what we have done is 
tighten it so that if an organisation has broken the law they can decide to use 
their powers, it’s not automatic, but they can decide to use them.24 
The UK Government’s policy driven view that such powers are crucial for regulation to be 
undertaken would not influence the ONS given that international accountancy practices 
require such decisions to be made without consideration for its political or commercial 
significance. It remains to be seen whether the UK Government’s attempt at a compromise 
is sufficient to appease the ONS. The ONS does permit Government departments to 
                                                          
21 Interview with Kerry Mac Hale, Policy lead on social housing regulation, UK Government (Telephone 
interview, 17 May 2016)  
22 See 6.3 
23 Whilst the powers of the regulator to appoint managers and members to a body were tightened, these were 
not abolished. More detail can be found in 6.3.6 
24 Interview with Kerry Mac Hale (n23) 
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approach it to seek advice on how a policy change is likely to impact on classification.25 
During interview the ONS would not reveal if such conversations had taken place with regard 
to the UK Government’s deregulatory proposals.26 Kerry Mac Hale revealed, however, that 
the Government had, had ʻinformal conversationsʼ with the ONS but that they would not ʻgive 
an opinion onʼ what the Government had done, ʻuntil they make next rulingʼ.27  
Whilst the Westminster Government has been more prepared to deregulate with regard to 
the other powers cited by the ONS, Kerry Mac Hale made a very revealing comment during 
interview: 
Interviewer: Ok, and with regard then to the changes you made to the, you 
know? Five points raised by the ONS, were any of those things that might have 
been on the cards anyway or did they become issues because of what the ONS 
did? 
Interviewee Kerry Mac Hale: Well we’re constantly renewing the regulatory 
framework. Would we have moved at that point to make those changes? 
Probably not. Would we have chosen to make some of those changes without an 
ONS ruling? Probably not. So, it was a catalyst for quite a lot of decisions.28 
Mac Hale’s answer makes it clear that the UK Government would not have enacted these 
changes were it not for the ONS’s decision to reclassify English registered providers. This is 
a very important finding, which highlights the limitations placed on a government when it 
attempts to develop its policy programme. Whilst it would be correct to note that the UK 
Government were not legally bound to take deregulatory steps following the ONS’s decision, 
the decision placed the Government in a position where it took steps that it would ʻprobably 
notʼ have done otherwise. The reasons why the UK Government felt compelled to act 
following the ONS’s decision suggests that international accountancy standards and their 
application are, in effect, regulating the Government’s work.  
Following the reclassification announcement, the Westminster Government came under 
pressure from a number of angles to reverse the ONS’s decision. First, it is likely that the 
Treasury was eager to see the £60 billion of additional borrowing that had been transferred 
onto its books, transferred back to the social housing sector as quickly as possible. 
Secondly, the leaders of housing associations across England made it clear that they wished 
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to see the sector regain its independence as quickly as possible.29 Finally there were 
concerns within Government and the sector over how the decision to reclassify registered 
providers might affected their ability to borrow money in the future from the private sector.30 
This would have a serious impact on the ability of registered providers to construct new 
housing, which would have a knock on impact on the Government’s ability to meet its own 
house building targets. These three factors contributed to shape the UK Government’s policy 
response to the decision. This response is best summarised by the following extract from 
evidence given by the then UK Government Minister for Housing and Planning, Brandon 
Lewis at the Communities and Local Government Committee in December 2015. Lewis 
stated that he wanted registered providers ʻoff the Government books, which is what they 
want, as quickly as possible.ʼ31 Statutory deregulation therefore became the most attractive 
option for the Westminster Government.  
This finding has important implications for our understanding of how legislation is developed 
in the UK. As a condition of its EU membership and in order to ensure that the British 
economy remains an attractive investment prospect, the UK Government must ensure that 
its accounts are governed in a way that is consistent with other nations. Responsibility for 
ensuring that the UK does act in compliance with such international accountancy standards 
has been placed with the ONS. Not only does the ONS have to ensure that the UK complies 
with such international standards, it must also ensure that it assesses compliance in a way 
that is methodologically consistent with the international community. This means that the 
ONS is not permitted to consider why controls have placed over bodies such as social 
housing providers, but, rather whether those controls mean that, according to international 
accountancy standards, such bodies should be classified as part of the public or private 
sector. This approach regulates the extent of control that a government can enjoy over 
certain bodies/ sectors, whilst at the same time ensuring that body remains part of the 
private sector.  
This finding, that international accountancy practices drove Westminster Government’s 
policy on social housing regulation has important implications for Wales and for our 
understanding of the divergence processes. In the short term, these practices can be said to 
have driven divergence between Wales and England, with the UK Government’s 
                                                          
29 National Housing Federation, ʻONS Reclassification of Private Registered Providersʼ (National Housing 
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deregulatory legislation moving the regulatory regime in England away from the regime that 
is in place in Wales. In the long term, however, this may lead to regulatory convergence, as 
the Welsh Government attempts to deal with the ONS decision to reclassify Welsh RSLs.32  
On 29 September 2016, the ONS announced that Welsh RSLs were also to be reclassified 
as part of the public sector.33 As discussed in 6.3, the reasons given by the ONS for 
reclassifying Welsh RSLs were extremely similar to the reasons it provided for reclassifying 
registered providers in England. The ONS focused in particular on the Welsh Government’s 
consent powers over disposals, the Government’s powers over the management of RSLs 
and the Government’s powers over constitutional changes at RSLs.34 It would seem that the 
Welsh Government would have three options open to it when deciding on how to respond to 
the reclassification decision; do nothing, follow England’s lead, develop a distinctive Welsh 
approach.  
As was the case in England, the Welsh Government is not obliged to take action to seek to 
reverse the ONS’s reclassification decision. With housing devolved to the Assembly, the 
Welsh Government, can, if it so wishes, decide to retain RSLs as part of the public sector in 
Wales. Given the political differences that exist between Wales and England, as evidenced 
in sub-section 7.1, this may prove to be an attractive option to some within the Welsh 
Government. Yet the obstacles that would have faced the UK Government had it chosen to 
adopt this approach in England are also apparent in Wales. Welsh RSLs have asserted their 
wish to remain independent of the Welsh Government, expressing concerns that remaining 
part of the public sector would have an impact on their ability to borrow money and to 
construct housing.35 The Welsh Government would also face one further complication if it 
chose to adopt such an approach. The reclassification of Welsh RSLs will add an estimated 
£2.3 billion to the national debt.36 This debt will be placed on the UK Government’s balance 
sheet, not the National Assembly’s.37 The ONS revealed the reasons for this during 
interview: 
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Interviewee ONS: so, the public sector is made up in technical terms of the 
general government sector, which includes all the government stuff, and even 
more technically, that includes stuff that is public and non-market, and in, sort of, 
very, very rough terms, non-market things are things that aren’t behaving like 
business.  
Interviewer: Yeah 
Interviewee ONS: The public sector also include things that are public controlled 
and market producers, so they are public controlled business like I said. So, the 
Welsh Government itself fits into the general government part and more 
specifically within that it sits in the central government sub-sector. There is a 
state government sub-sector as well in the European System of Accounts, but 
we, last year concluded that the state government sub-sector does not exist in 
the UK, for very good technical reasons. That’s not to say that Welsh 
Government or any of the other devolved admins don’t look a bit like states, it’s 
just to say in terms of the powers that they have, it’s just to say that in terms of 
how state government is defined in ESA, that doesn’t apply to the UK, and for 
that reason, you kind of have to make a call are the state, are the devolved 
administrations part of central government or local government? Well given the 
definitions they can’t be part of local government, they are part of central 
government, they’re effectively like having a government department but 
whereas it’s responsibility is not over a certain competence like welfare, but over 
a certain geography like Wales.38 
This passage suggests that international accountancy standards can place a further practical 
constraint on the ability of the Welsh Government to develop distinctive social housing policy 
on two grounds. First, with regard to future borrowing, the UK Government’s debt is the 
responsibility of the Treasury, and as such all public-sector borrowing is subject to rules set 
by the Treasury. This would mean that in effect, Welsh RSL would be subjected to 
Westminster control. This is an eventuality that both the Welsh Government and the social 
housing sector in Wales would seem to be eager to avoid. Secondly, the Treasury may 
attempt to put pressure on the Welsh Government to deregulate the sector in Wales to 
ensure that any reclassification is reversed so as to remove the £2.3 billion extra debt from 
the national balance sheet. If the Assembly were to decide not to take steps to ensure that 
RSLs were transferred back to the public sector, such pressure could test the already 
fractious relationship between the Governments in Cardiff Bay and Westminster. Given all 
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these pressures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Welsh Government has indicated that it 
will bring forward legislation to ensure RSLs return to the private sector.39  
Shortly after the publication of the ONS’s reclassification decision in England, a story 
appeared in the housing press, setting out that the Welsh Government were looking to take 
pre-emptive deregulatory measures in an attempt to prevent reclassification.40 With the 
Assembly election and the EU referendum dominating the political landscape in the spring 
and summer of 2016, such pre-emptive legislation did not emerge prior to the ONS’s 
reclassification announcement. Despite this, the Welsh Government has reiterated its 
commitment to enacting legislation to ensure that Welsh RSLs are returned to the private 
sector.41   
The options available to the Welsh Government to reverse the reclassification decision 
appear limited. The first option for the Welsh Government would be to follow the lead of the 
UK Government in England, and to deregulate the sector in Wales. If the Welsh Government 
were to choose to follow this route the law in Wales and England would converge, with the 
powers of the regulators in both nations being more closely aligned than what they had been 
before the ONS’s initial review. Such an approach may seem attractive to the Welsh 
Government. By enacting similar deregulatory provisions to the ones that were set out in the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016, the Welsh Government could draw upon the experience of 
the Westminster Government, meaning that legislation could be enacted quickly to minimise 
interference. On the other hand, this is not an easy option politically. As has been 
demonstrated, even a right wing Conservative Government in Westminster had difficulty in 
completely loosening the Government’s control over the social housing sector in England in 
the five areas identified by the ONS. A left wing, Labour Government in Wales, dependent 
on the support of Plaid Cymru might find this even more difficult. This might lead the Welsh 
Government to adopt a distinctive Welsh approach. 
Given that housing is devolved to the National Assembly the Welsh Government is free to 
develop its own regulatory approach in an attempt to reverse the ONS’s reclassification. The 
Welsh Government’s ability to do so is limited. As was noted by Kerry Mac Hale, the ONS 
were very clear in their classification decision in England about which powers they felt 
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necessitated reclassification, giving the Westminster Government very limited move to 
manoeuvre.42 The ability of the Welsh Government to develop a distinctive approach with 
regard to primary legislation is equally limited. The Welsh Government may have greater 
room to manoeuvre, however, with regard to the regulatory framework. This room for 
manoeuvre is particularly pronounced when looking at the power of the Welsh Government 
over the constitutional changes made by RSLs. As was discussed in Chapter 6, under the 
new statutory basis for regulation in England, a provider will no longer need the consent of 
the regulator before making such changes.43 The HCA could, however, refuse to register the 
provider in its new form, meaning that it did retain a degree of regulatory control over 
structural makeup of the sector. This control seems likely to be loosened further in England, 
with the HCA opening consultation over the prospect of granting near automatic registration 
to a new provider formed as a result of two registered providers merging.44 An option for 
Welsh Government could be the removal of the requirement for RSLs to gain its consent 
before making such structural changes, but without taking the extra steps of removing its 
registration powers. This approach may satisfy the ONS sufficiently to lead it to reverse the 
expected decision to reclassify Welsh RSLs, whilst retaining a greater degree of control over 
the sector than their counterparts in England.  
Comments made by Carol Kay and Sarah Laing Gibbens of the Welsh Government’s 
regulatory team suggest that this will be the approach pursued by Welsh Government. At 
Community Housing Cymru’s Annual Conference in December 2016, Kay and Laing set out 
proposed changes to the regulatory regime in place in Wales.45 These changes would see 
the way that the regulator publishes its regulatory judgments change, and would see 
performance standards that RSLs must comply with simplified.46 In addition to explaining 
what these proposed changes would mean for the sector, Kay and Laing set out why they 
were necessary. It was argued that these changes were necessary to ensure that the Welsh 
Government had a ʻsmooth pathʼ when brining forward legislation to change the statutory 
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basis for regulation, in the wake of the ONS decision.47 Kay and Gibbens argued that 
regulation needed to be robust, and seen to be robust to reassure lenders and politicians 
when legislation was brought forward.48 Not only do Kay and Laing’s comments emphasize, 
once more the impact international accountancy standards have on divergence, it also 
emphasizes the fact that differences in social housing regulation between Wales and 
England appear at a number of levels, one of the key themes of this thesis. If the Welsh 
Government does adopt this approach in reacting to the ONS’s decision it would mean that 
the statutory basis for regulation in Wales and England, would converge, but with a degree 
of variation continuing in practice. It will be interesting to revisit this factor, during future 
research, to examine whether regulation has converged in the way that presently looks 
likely.   
8.2 Private finance 
The thesis has examined the impact of three factors on the development of divergence 
between Wales and England to date: the impact of politics and policy,49 the limits of 
devolution,50 and the impact of international accountancy standards.51 It has demonstrated 
how each of these factors has had an impact on the way that social housing regulation is 
undertaken in both nations and has questioned what impact they may have in future. This 
chapter now turns to examine a fourth factor that has had a clear impact on the development 
of divergence between Wales and England in recent years: private finance. This section will 
consider the impact of this factor in two parts. 8.2.1, will explore how the concerns of lenders 
and the bond markets have shaped the way that regulation is undertaken in practice. Having 
completed this exploration 8.2.2 will consider whether concerns expressed by the financial 
sector have shaped legislation in England.  
As discussed in 6.1.1 and in 2.1.1 in particular, gaining access to private finance has 
become increasingly important for housing associations. Such finance is accessed in a 
number of ways. In Wales bank loans remain by far the most prominent form of private 
finance used by RSLs.52 In England, however, registered providers have increasingly turned 
to institutional investors as they seek access to more private finance at better prices.53 
Regardless of which source of finance is used, it is vital for housing associations that they 
can gain access to it if they are to be able to develop their social housing portfolios. This 
                                                          
47 ibid 
48 ibid 
49 See 7.1 
50 See 7.2 
51 See 8.1 
52 ‘The 2016 Financial Statements of Welsh Housing Associations’ (Community Housing Cymru, 2016) 
53 See 2.1.1 for a fuller discussion on this.  
201 
 
increasing reliance on private funds has had an impact on how the sector operates. The 
thesis has already highlighted that both Welsh RSLs and English registered providers are 
concerned that ONS reclassification could have an impact on the sector’s ability to get 
access to private finance, and how this is shaping the way that the Governments in both 
nations are reacting to the decision.54 This is not the only impact that the financial markets 
have had on the way that social housing regulation is undertaken in Wales and England. It 
has been argued by some that housing associations are increasingly becoming subjected to 
external forms of regulation, from lenders directly55 and from ratings agencies,56 as the 
amount of private finance that enters the sector increases and becomes more diverse. 
Whilst not directly examining how these new external regulatory practices might be 
impacting upon the way that RSLs and registered providers are operating on a day to day 
basis, this section of the chapter will highlight how such pressures have impacted upon the 
regulatory work of the Welsh Government and the HCA respectively.    
8.2.1 Market regulation  
The chief executives of five Welsh RSLs interviewed for the purposes of this thesis were in 
no doubt that the regulatory opinions that the Welsh Government published in relation to 
their organisations had an impact on their ability to borrow money. The chief executives of 
four RSLs stated that, whilst their organisations had received satisfactory financial viability 
judgments, they believed that any negative assessment would have an impact on their ability 
to borrow further funds. One chief executive noted that the lenders for their organisation 
would:  
come into meetings and they’ll quote sentences out of our financial viability 
judgment.57  
Another set out why they felt that a poor regulatory assessment could have an impact on 
their ability to borrow money. The participant felt that it would: 
make a lender more nervous and if a lender is nervous, they perceive the risk 
higher, then the price of funding goes up…58 
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The evidence given by the Chief Executive of an RSL which had received a poorer 
regulatory score suggests that the other participants were correct in this view. The Chief 
Executive explicitly stated that their poor regulatory score had, had an impact on their ability 
to borrow further funds in future. 
Interviewer: Yeah, from that then it would suggest that your regulatory score 
would have an impact then would it, on future lending?  
Interviewee, Chief Executive 2: Yeah, yep, yep and has.59 
It is not surprising that organisations with good regulatory scores find it easier to gain access 
to private finance, with research suggesting that the same is true for the sector in England.60 
Given the importance of private lending to the social housing sector the regulators in both 
nations are placed in a difficult position. Evidence gathered through interviews in Wales, and 
through the examination of evidence given by the head of the Regulation Committee at the 
Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), Julian Ashby, to the Communities and Local 
Government Committee in July 2013, suggests that pressure from the financial sector 
influences the way that the social housing regulators operate in both nations. This 
demonstrates that ʻprivate financeʼ is another factor that impacts on the development of 
divergence in social housing regulation between Wales and England. The significance of this 
finding will be discussed below. 
As set out in Chapter 6, the regulator in England has adopted a two-tier approach to 
regulation, with the regulator treating consumer regulation and economic regulation 
differently. Consumer regulation, within the social housing context, is undertaken on a 
reactive basis, and only in cases where a standard was breached to such an extent that the 
tenant suffered a serious detriment.61 Economic regulation on the other hand is undertaken 
on a proactive basis.62 There are two strands to the way that economic regulation is 
undertaken. First a provider must meet regulatory outcomes that concern their governance 
as an organisation.63 A provider must: 
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ensure effective governance arrangements that deliver their aims, objectives and 
intended outcomes for tenants and potential tenants in an effective, transparent 
and accountable manner.64 
A provider must also comply with six specific outcomes concerning their governance. These 
concern matters such as adhering to all relevant law, complying with regulatory requirements 
and having an effective risk management controls in place.65 Secondly, registered providers 
must meet regulatory outcomes that concern their financial viability. Registered providers 
must: 
manage their resources effectively to ensure their viability is maintained while 
ensuring that social housing assets are not put at undue risk.66 
Registered providers are assessed for their compliance with these two aspects of economic 
regulation separately, with the regulator publishing two separate judgements. Compliance is 
graded between one and four, with one being the highest score and four being the lowest.67 
Despite the clear overlap that exists between both requirements, it seems that the two were 
designed to play different roles as part of the regulatory framework. A provider’s governance 
score had been introduced to measure how well it was being managed, whilst a provider’s 
financial viability score had been introduced to measure its financial health.68 In practice, the 
HCA Regulatory Committee has blurred the line between the two. This fact and the reason 
for it were revealed by the Chair of the HCA Regulatory Committee, Julian Ashby in rather 
extraordinary evidence to the Communities and Local Government Committee in July 
2013.69 In his evidence, Ashby revealed that a ʻhandfulʼ of registered providers, no more 
than five, were non-compliant with financial viability standards.70 He revealed the reason for 
this: 
It would be a small number primarily because non-compliance with the viability 
standard would almost certainly trigger a potential breach in covenant. We are 
very wary of making a situation worse by doing something that would trigger a 
covenant breach.71 
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This is a rather startling statement. Ashby seems to reveal that the HCA Regulatory 
Committee consciously avoided downgrading registered providers’ financial viability rating to 
avoid triggering a reaction from lenders and the financial markets. This statement becomes 
even more surprising when read in conjunction with further information that came to light 
during Ashby’s evidence. It became apparent that, despite his view that a ʻhandfulʼ of 
registered providers were non-compliant with financial viability standards, only one, 
Cosmopolitan Housing, which was in well documented financial difficulty at the time, was 
awarded the bottom two grades.72 This provoked a reaction from the members of the 
committee.  
Q23 Chair: Why do you have a financial viability rating if you do not use it in 
those circumstances, then? 
Julian Ashby: We do use it, but the circumstances- 
Q24 Chair: It is not used for anybody here. Apart from Cosmopolitan, which is 
obviously in the bottom section, there is not a single organisation rated in V3. 
Everyone else is basically good or very good. 
Julian Ashby: I see the point you are making. 
Q25 Chair: It is quite an important point, isn’t it? 
Julian Ashby: It is. A conclusion, though, that an association is not viable is a 
very serious conclusion to come to, because it is not simply saying that there are 
issues to address. 
Q26 Chair: The wording is not "not viable". It says, "Financial viability is of 
concern". Not a single association in the country concerns you with regard to 
their financial viability. 
Julian Ashby: The issue that highlights is the difficulty of giving a grading that 
could trigger a re-pricing. 
Q27 Chair: So is it not worth the paper it is written on.73 
Again, Ashby seemed to suggest that he, as the Chair of the regulatory committee at the 
HCA, was reluctant to use his own regulatory powers. His concern was that this could 
worsen the situation by raising the costs of borrowing from the private sector. Ashby’s 
evidence suggests that he would have given a ʻhandfulʼ of registered providers a lower 
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financial viability score, were it not for these pressures.74 Ashby became even more explicit 
during the course of his evidence that the HCA Regulatory Committee consciously chose not 
to use some their regulatory powers: 
Q41 Andy Sawford: Your submission suggests your powers are not fit for 
purpose in the current economic climate, and you have repeatedly talked about 
the risk of repricing. The fear of causing providers to breach loan covenants is 
something you have raised. This clearly ties your hands, and it has come out in 
the questioning. Exactly which of your powers are not now available to you? 
Julian Ashby: All the powers are there and are available to us. The issue is 
whether it would be prudent to use them.75 
Whilst Ashby was open about the fact that the regulator was reluctant to use some of its 
regulatory powers, he also revealed that the HCA Regulatory Committee had found different 
ways of noting its concerns regarding the operation of certain registered providers:  
We do find ways of signalling our concerns and we have particularly used the 
governance rating for that purpose because that does not have the same re-
pricing trigger impact that a V3 or V4 would have. That is understood, and the 
messages that we have put out through that, if you have read some of them, are 
pretty strong.76 
Ashby revealed that this approach ensured that lenders were aware of the HCA’s concerns, 
but, at the same time, avoided the financial effects of lowering a provider’s financial viability 
score. This evidence drew damning comments from members of the Select Committee, with 
one stating that he did not believe that the HCA Regulatory Committee could be called an 
ʻindependent regulatorʼ.77 Whether or not these concerns were merited, it is apparent from 
Ashby’s evidence that the approach of the regulator in England is driven and influenced by 
the financial sector. Evidence gathered during the interviews in Wales would appear to 
suggest that similar practices are undertaken on the western side of Offa’s Dyke as well. 
One interviewee set out the financial difficulties that their organisation had recently faced. 
The participant was eager to safeguard sensitive information concerning their organisation 
but was willing to reveal some of the steps that had been taken by the regulator, their 
lenders and themselves over the proceeding months.78 The participant revealed that their 
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organisation had ʻhad higher levels of regulatory engagementʼ.79 Shortly after the 
appointment of the participant, they were invited to meet a Welsh Government Minister and 
his team.80 The Minister was said to have been: 
explicit about his requirements of the board and the people who were here at the 
time, I mean, I wasn’t due to start for another three and a half months but he 
offered his support and his officers support for what needed to be done…81 
The participant noted that they believed that their lenders had viewed this process and the 
involvement of the regulator as a positive step.82 This had not been the only involvement of 
the regulator. The participant revealed that not only had their organisation had been ʻworking 
very closelyʼ with their lenders, but that one of their lenders had met independently with the 
regulator.83 The participant stated:  
in reaching the conclusion that we have, or just about getting there with our 
lender, they have said; and this is subject to the regulator not taking any further 
action. So, the regulator and the lender have met separately, so we’ve met with 
the lender, we’ve met with the regulator and then they’ve met together and 
understood the perspectives of each other, but in order to address the situation 
that this organisation is in, they’ve all come together to help resolve the 
situation…84 
This statement is highly significant. It demonstrates the proximity of the relationship between 
the regulator and the lenders of this RSL. This proximity would seem to create a scope for 
this RSL’s lender’s concerns to influence the work of the regulator, particularly given that the 
participant stated that their agreement with their lender is ʻsubject to the regulator not taking 
any further actionʼ.85 Such an understanding provides the Welsh Government, in its capacity 
as social housing regulator, with an incentive to avoid taking further regulatory steps against 
the RSL in question. It is not possible to conclude whether this has had an impact on the 
way that the regulator has approached its dealing with this RSL or any others; however, it 
does suggest that lender concerns could also shape the way that regulation is undertaken in 
Wales, as well as England.  
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It appears that many providers of private finance are happy to continue to provide money to 
housing associations, on the basis that the regulator can provide an indication as to the 
performance of housing associations in some way. A further explanation for the continued 
willingness of private financiers to invest in, and to borrow money to the social housing 
sector may be found in the literature that has developed on the social housing sector in 
England as summarised in 2.1. With banks and institutional investors increasingly playing a 
regulatory role over the social housing sector, their awareness of the risk profile of individual 
housing association has increased greatly.86 Furthermore, a number of the larger providers 
in England who regularly seek funds from institutional investors via the bond markets are 
registered with ratings agencies, providing investors with a clear picture of their credit 
profile.87 
The finding that the regulators in both nations do not seem to use their regulatory powers as 
envisaged has clear implications for our understanding of how divergence develops. First, it 
highlights the need for further research to examine the extent by which social housing 
regulation between Wales and England has diverged in practice. My thesis has 
demonstrated how regulation has diverged between Wales and England with regard to 
legislation and the regulatory framework. However, Julian Ashby’s evidence suggests that 
the way that regulation operates in practice differs from what has been set out by respective 
governments and regulators. Second, this evidence further emphasizes that the 
development of divergence runs beyond the control of both Welsh and UK Governments. 
The concerns of the providers of private finance impact on the work of the regulators, at 
least to a certain extent. The influence of the financial sector on regulation becomes even 
clearer when looking at the development of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
8.2.2 The special administrative regime  
The Housing and Planning Act 2016 contains many provisions that concern the social 
housing sector in England. This thesis has already examined how the Act deregulates the 
sector in England, in wake of the ONS’s decision to reclassify registered providers as part of 
the public sector.88 The Act made other changes to the sector. The most high profile of these 
changes was the voluntary expansion of the right to buy to tenants of housing associations.89 
The Act also contained a series of provisions that introduced a new special administration 
regime for failing housing associations in England.90 The Act sets out the process that is to 
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be followed if an association enters into significant financial difficulty.91 The content of these 
provisions was changed during the course of the Act’s progress through the Houses of 
Parliament. This section will briefly examine the process that led to these changes being 
made. This analysis will further underscore the influence of the providers of private finance 
over elected governments. It will reinforce the finding set out earlier in this chapter that 
private finance shapes the development of divergence between Wales and England.  
The special administrative regime was developed by the UK Government following a review 
into the near insolvency of Cosmopolitan Housing in 2012.92 The policy lead on social 
housing regulation in England, Kerry Mac Hale revealed during interview that following this 
review, a subsequent review was undertaken into the powers of the regulator in light of the 
Cosmopolitan Housing experience.93 The review concluded that if a large or complex 
association became insolvent in future, the powers of the regulator at that time would have 
been insufficient to cope.94 At the time the regulator had the power to introduce a 28 day 
moratorium in the case of a provider entering insolvency.95 Mac Hale stated that these 
powers had become outdated:  
Some of these housing associations have a turnover of over a billion pounds, 
you can’t just sort through that in 28 days and get agreements from secured 
lenders, so those powers have been in place for well over ten years. In that ten 
years housing associations in England have taken on much more private finance 
and therefore are exposed to much greater risk, have more secured lenders, 
sometimes these secured lenders will be somewhat obscure bond holders so 
actually for the regulator to get in contact with them in 28 days might prove 
difficult let alone to get them to agree to some kind of rescue plan, so for the 
large developing housing associations the existing moratorium powers were 
probably not going to help…96 
Mac Hale’s statement suggests that it was the changing nature of the social housing sector 
in England, in particular the increasing prominence of private finance within the sector, which 
led the Government to introduce the new regime. These changes were introduced after the 
near collapse of Cosmopolitan Housing, so an outside catalyst seems to have prompted this 
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action, rather than any other desire within Government to develop a new regime for 
regulation. There are similarities, this analysis suggests, between the influence of private 
lenders concerns on the development of government policy and the impact of international 
accountancy standards. The UK Government was not bound to change its approach to 
dealing with near insolvent registered providers in England. A similar situation as to what the 
Government was in, with regards to the ONS’s decision to reclassify registered providers in 
England. If the UK Government had not taken any steps, however, this may have weakened 
the credibility of the regulator, leading to concerns within the financial sector that would 
ultimately impact on registered providers’ ability to borrow money. This further demonstrates 
the impact of external factors on the development of divergence between Wales and 
England.    
The introduction of the special administrative regime is significant for our understanding of 
divergence between Wales and England for a further reason. The development of the 
regime demonstrates how the concerns of private lenders have directly influenced the shape 
and content of legislation concerning social housing regulation. Indeed, this influence seems 
to have been exerted in such a way that it has had an impact on the language used by policy 
makers at Westminster. During interview, Kerry Mac Hale noted what she felt were the 
Government’s aims when they developed the special administration regime: 
we wanted to make sure that we were protecting both secured lenders and as far 
as we could tenants in an insolvency…97 
Whilst Mac Hale states that the special administrative regime was designed to protect both 
secured lenders and tenants, her comment would seem to suggest that there was a 
difference between the two, with tenants only being protected ʻas far as we couldʼ. This 
would suggest that the UK Government placed greater importance on protecting private 
lenders than they did on protecting social housing tenants during the formation of the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016. It would seem that this was not always the case.  
When the Housing and Panning Bill was first laid before Parliament on 13 October 2015, 
there was no reference in the Bill to the special administrative regime.98 Yet by the time that 
the Bill reached the Lords on 13 January 2016, the special administration regime had been 
introduced.99 The clauses contained in the Bill set out that, in the case of an insolvency, a 
person would be appointed as a ʻhousing administratorʼ.100 The administrator would be 
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appointed with two primary objectives, ensuring that the provider’s social housing remained 
a part of the regulated housing sector, and to ensure that it became unnecessary for them to 
remain in post, either due to the rescue of the provider or following the completion of 
relevant transfers of the provider’s undertakings.101 By early April 2016, reports started to 
emerge in Inside Housing that the regime was to be changed due to lender concerns.102 One 
article suggested that lenders had warned the Government that the regime’s focus on 
ensuring that social housing remained part of the regulated housing stock, would undermine 
a methodology used to value properties when lending money to social housing providers.103 
This would have reduced the value of registered providers’ properties as securities and 
would have led to lenders asking for more security from registered providers.104 A few weeks 
later the Housing and Planning Bill was changed.  
The original two objectives of the administrator appointed under the Bill were amended.105 
Under first objective, the administrator was challenged to save the provider as a going 
concern.106 If, however, the provider was to be wound up, the administrator was tasked with 
achieving a better result for the provider’s creditors as whole, than what they would have 
been likely to receive if the administrator was not in place.107 To achieve this the 
administrator would be permitted to realise property in order to make distribution to 
creditors.108 The second objective set out in the Bill was to ensure that the provider’s social 
housing remained part of the regulated housing sector.109 The Bill explicitly stated, therefore, 
that lenders would be permitted to sell social housing homes into the private sector to cover 
the loans they had made, and, that this took precedence over the protection of social 
housing stock.110 It was this version of the special administration regime that was to make it 
into the statute book.111  
The interview undertaken with Kerry Mac Hale seems to lend support to the article that 
appeared in Inside Housing that it was lender concerns that had led to changes made to the 
special administration regime. 
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…so we’ve been working really closely with the lenders on the framing of that 
legislation, so we put a load of amendments down at the report stage of the 
Housing and Planning Bill largely to address concerns they had and to tweak 
some of the ways that the administration regime would operate, we always said 
that we’d talk to the lenders in that period to make sure that it was right and they 
were comfortable and they had confidence in investing in the sector, I guess we 
worked very closely with them through that period in terms of helping them 
consider the reality of what the existing insolvency provisions did against what 
we were proposing, so the idea of being able to get your hands on the security 
after 28 days might be appealing but the reality of that is, is that you would then 
end up with X thousand properties with X families living in them with rent that you 
would have to collect and when you think about the reality of some of that, it’s 
not something necessary that some of the banks and some of the bond holders 
are really set up to deal with.112 
Mac Hale’s response fully highlights the extent of the influence that lenders exert over the 
Government. Not only does her response lend support to Inside Housing’s story that the 
special administration regime was changed following lender concerns; it also suggests that 
the Government felt the need to justify its proposed changes to lenders before enacting the 
legislation. Whilst Mac Hale viewed the amendments made to the Housing and Planning Bill 
as ʻtweaksʼ, in reality it would appear that the concessions made to the financial sector were 
more significant. The changes had, in effect, changed the entire focus of the role of the 
special administrator if the provider could not be saved as a going concern. Under the 
original proposal, the primary objective for the administrator had been to ensure that the 
provider’s social housing remained part of the regulated sector. The amendments made to 
the Bill to ʻaddressʼ lender ʻconcernsʼ meant that this objective had been relegated to 
secondary significance and would only have any influence in cases where there were 
sufficient funds to both pay off creditors and to protect social housing assets. Given that the 
regime was established to deal with insolvent registered providers, the likelihood of the 
administrator being tasked with achieving the second objective seems remote. It appears 
that private lenders had exerted sufficient influence to make a significant change to the 
content of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. 
No such regime has been put in place in Wales. The regulator in Wales continue to operate 
under a system that is analogous to the old regime in England.113 The introduction of the 
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special administration regime through the Housing and Planning Act 2016 in England can 
therefore be said to be a point of divergence between Wales and England. The way in which 
this difference developed emphasises, once more, how more than one factor contributes to 
the process. The special administration regime emerged as result of both the UK 
Government and lender concerns following the review carried out into the collapse of 
Cosmopolitan Housing. The Westminster Government’s policy response to the problems 
presented by the Cosmopolitan Housing crisis, have clearly been shaped by the influence 
exerted by private lenders. Both factors combined to shape the legislative changes made 
through the Housing and Planning Act 2016, leading to the development of divergence 
between Wales and England.  
With no indication that private sector finance will decrease in importance over the coming 
years, the impact of the financial sector on social housing regulation seems set to remain. It 
has been shown that this influence has an impact on divergence. It would seem that the 
regulators in both nations are reluctant to use their powers in practice in a way that risks 
provoking a negative reaction from lenders. This reluctance might open a difference between 
the written rules and policy practice – apparent divergence on paper might be more limited 
or constrained in practice. Further research is necessary before we are able to draw definite 
conclusions here. What seems beyond doubt, however, is that private lenders have directly 
shaped the way that social housing regulation is undertaken in England, and as a result also 
on patterns of divergence between Wales and England. This is a finding that further supports 
three of the key themes of this thesis; first that divergence develops as a result of the actions 
of both the Westminster and Welsh Governments, second, that divergence can develop at a 
number of different levels, and third, that it appears as a result of a number of factors 
working against and with each other.  
8.3 The Structure of the Sector  
Turning to the structure of the sector, when examining the social housing sectors in Wales 
and England a clear difference is that in scale. As set out in Chapter 2, in Wales, 93 housing 
associations are registered with the Welsh Government,114 by comparison 1,769 are 
registered with the HCA in England.115 It is not just in the sheer number of registered bodies 
that we see this difference. In Wales, as of 31 March 2015 the total social rented stock 
provided by RSLs amounted to 139,104, with a further 10,000 properties being provided by 
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RSLs at non-social rates.116 By contrast, the G15, a group of London’s largest 15 registered 
providers, manage 410,000 homes.117 In total, registered providers in England provided 
2,708,611 social and non-social homes in 2015.118 This difference in scale reflects the 
relative population of Wales – (3 million) and England (53 million) and has significant 
implications for this analysis. The difference of scale presents the regulators in Wales and 
England with very different challenges, potentially leading to divergence in regulation. This 
section will briefly examine the impact of this structural difference, suggesting avenues for 
future research.  
8.3.1 Structuring the regulatory approach? 
In December 2013, the Welsh Government made a decision to change the way that they 
approached social housing regulation. The Welsh Government announced that it intended to 
move to a risk based approach to social housing regulation.119 This was not a decision to 
change the content of the regulatory framework but rather a decision to change the way that 
the framework was being implemented.120 Indeed, the Welsh Government argued that such 
a change would mean that the regulatory process would be ʻmore closely aligned with the 
original principles of the Regulatory Frameworkʼ.121 
The Welsh Government’s decision to change their approach to regulation followed an interim 
evaluation of regulatory practice.122 This evaluation had concluded that while its 
underpinning principles were correct, in practice, the regulatory regime was not being 
consistently delivered.123 RSLs believed that there had been a move away from the co-
regulatory regime with focus returning to an inspection based approach to regulation.124 
RSLs also believed that the regulatory regime needed to better reflect the risks that the 
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sector faced and for greater emphasis to be placed on learning from regulation.125 The 
Report concluded that the limited resources available to the Welsh Government’s regulatory 
team had contributed to these failures.126 It was felt that these resources could be better 
targeted at the RSLs most in need of regulation by moving to a risk based approach.127 
These recommendations were accepted and implemented by the Welsh Government.128  
The change to the method of implementation of this regulatory framework is of interest as it 
seems to be attributable, at least in part, to the structure of the sector in Wales. With limited 
resources, the Welsh Government were struggling to effectively regulate all of Wales’s 
RSLs, whilst at the same time maintaining a co-regulatory approach to regulation. Moving to 
a risk based approach to regulation would allow the Welsh Government to target their 
resources more effectively, reflecting the different risk profile of different parts of the sector.    
The decision of the Welsh Government to adopt a risk based approach to regulation can be 
viewed as a point of convergence between regulation in Wales and England. Despite the 
gulf in size and scale between the social housing sectors, the HCA Regulatory Committee 
had also identified the risk based approach to regulation as the most effective approach.129 
This finding highlights the importance of the structure of the social housing sector on the 
work of the regulators. Tasked with implementing their respective regulatory regimes, and 
with only limited resources, the regulators in both nations have had to devise a regulatory 
approach that ensures that regulation is undertaken in a way that minimises the risk of 
failure within the social housing sector. Both have decided that this is best achieved by 
targeting its resources at the part of the sector that they view as highest risk, leading to the 
approaches to regulation in both nations to converge.  
The way that the social housing sector is structured may have also contributed to the 
development of divergence. The thesis discussed at length in Chapter 6 how the regulator in 
England adopted a two-tier approach to regulation – economic regulation and consumer 
regulation - with consumer regulation only being undertaken on a reactive basis. This was in 
contrast to the position in Wales where there was no differentiation between the two. 
Chapter 7 highlighted how this divergence developed as a result of the UK Government 
adopting differing policy to the Welsh Government, in particular following the publication of 
the Department for Communities and Local Government’s (DCLG) Review into social 
                                                          
125 ibid 
126 ibid 19 
127 ibid 
128 Improving implementation (n124)  
129 Homes and Communities Agency, ʻA guide to regulation of registered providersʼ (Gov.uk, 14 May 2015) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/a-guide-to-regulation-of-registered-providers/a-guide-to-
regulation-of-registered-providers accessed 10 August 2016 
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housing regulation. However, whilst this divergence does seem to have been primarily driven 
by a difference in political ideology between the Coalition Government in Westminster and 
the Labour Government in Wales, structural differences may have also contributed to that 
process.  
Not only are there far more English registered providers than Welsh RSLs but many English 
registered providers are also larger than their Welsh counterparts. With a number of high 
profile mergers taking place within the social housing sector in England over the past 
decade, the nature of the sector has changed greatly.130 Mergers have not only led to larger 
registered providers, but they have also led to the development of increasingly complicated 
group structures.131 Given the concerns that have been raised in some quarters that such 
structures can expose registered providers to greater risk,132 such activities are likely to have 
attracted a great deal of the HCA’s resources.133 Given that ʻreducing administrative costsʼ134 
was one of the objectives of the DCLG Review, and that making ʻsignificant financial savings 
across governmentʼ135 was named as one of the drivers for change in social housing 
regulation, the UK Government’s decision to adopt a two tier approach to regulation may 
have been a partly pragmatic response to such pressure, with the Government deciding that 
it wanted to channel its limited resources to the aspects of social housing it viewed as 
providing the greatest risk. 
Differences in the structure of the social housing sector between Wales and England 
influences, drives and constrains divergence. These pressures are not new. As discussed in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, geographical, economic and societal differences have had an impact 
upon the way that the housing sector has developed for decades.136 The influence of this 
factor is unlikely to wane in future. As was noted in Chapter 6, the divergence that has 
developed between Wales and England with regard to profit-making providers, and with 
regard to what constitutes ʻsocial housingʼ means that there is scope for the two sectors to 
develop quite distinctively. If the sectors do develop in such a way, it would mean that the 
regulators in Wales and England will face increasingly different challenges. This could, in 
                                                          
130 For example; David Mullins, ‘Competing Institutional Logics? Local Accountability and Scale and Efficiency in 
an Expanding Non-Profit Housing Sector’ (2006) Public Policy and Administration 6 
131 ibid and Jacob Veenstra, Hendrik M. Koolma, Maarten A. Allers, ‘Scale, mergers and efficiency: the case of 
Dutch housing corporations’ (2017) Journal of Housing and the Built Environment 313 
132 Tony Manzi and Nicola Morrison, ‘Risk, commercialism and social purpose: Repositioning the English 
housing association sector’ (2017) Urban Studies 1 
133 Kerry Mac Hale noted the increasing difficulties that the regulator faced when dealing with larger registered 
providers as one of the reasons that the special administrative regime was introduced. Mac Hale (n100) 
134 Department for Communities and Local Government, Review of Social Housing Regulation, (October 2010) 
page 3 
135 ibid, 5 
136 See discussion in section 3.1 for example on the higher rates of home ownership in the south Wales valleys.  
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time, lead to the development of further regulatory divergence as the regulators in both 
nations attempt to combat challenges that are unique to its social housing sector.      
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined three factors that have contributed to way that divergence has 
developed between Wales and England since the advent of devolution. These three factors 
combined with the two noted in Chapter 7 (policy and politics, and the limits of devolution) 
have unquestionably shaped the way that social housing regulation is undertaken in both 
nations. The two chapters have highlighted the complicated way that these factors work with 
and against each other as part of this process. The importance of looking beyond 
government policy documents is evident if a full understanding of divergence between Wales 
and England in practice is to be developed. The chapters have also highlighted the 
importance of looking at the work going on in both legislatures, if the process is to be fully 
understood. The final chapter, Chapter 9 will reflect on this work and will consider its 
implications for our broader understanding of the divergence processes and devolution.     
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9. Conclusion 
 
This thesis opened by reflecting on Michael Keating’s words in his introduction to ʻDevolution 
in Practice: Public Policy Differences within the UKʼ.1 Keating argued that relatively 'little 
systematic attention has been given to…' divergence or to its implications.2 Chapter 1 drew 
attention to other academic work that supported Keating’s view that the development of 
legislative and policy divergence is an aspect of devolution that has been overlooked by 
academia.3 The thesis therefore set out to address this under-explored aspect of devolution.  
In order to explore the divergence process in depth, the thesis has concentrated on its 
development in one particular policy area, social housing regulation.4 In exploring the 
process, my thesis has considered how divergence and devolution have developed over 
time. Through this exploration, a number of key themes have consistently reappeared. 
These include the fact that divergence can develop at a number of different levels, that it can 
develop as a result of the actions of both the Welsh and UK Government, and that it can be 
influenced by a number of different factors. 
It is not just the literature on divergence to which this thesis has made a contribution. By 
exploring the development of social housing regulation in Wales and England, the thesis has 
also made a contribution to the literature on housing law and policy, and to the literature on 
devolution, developing our understanding of how devolution works in practice, in particular.  
Through this work, the thesis has considered what is the relationship between devolution 
and divergence. This conclusion will reflect on the findings of this examination and will argue 
that whilst divergence was not, the aim of devolution, as argued by Keating, the 
development of a degree of policy and legislative variation is an inevitable consequence of it. 
Having made this argument, the Conclusion will look back at some of my findings as to how 
divergence has developed within the social housing context. The section will note how the 
housing sector is currently in a state of flux. It will argue further changes to social housing 
regulation are inevitable. The chapter will close by considering what the findings of the thesis 
mean for our understanding of the divergence process more generally and will question what 
impact this may have on Wales’s devolution settlement in future.  
                                                          
1 Michael Keating ʻDevolution and public policy in the United Kingdom: divergence or convergence?ʼ in John 
Adams and Peter Robinson (eds) Devolution in Practice: Public Policy Differences within the UK (ippr 2002) 3 
2 ibid 
3 Including Pete Alcock, ʻNew Policy Spaces: The Impact of Devolution on Third Sector Policy in the UKʼ [2012] 
46 (2) Soc Policy Admin 219, 220    
4 The reasons for adopting this approach are set out in full in section 1.4 
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9.1 Devolution and divergence, inevitably linked? 
Ron Davies, the then Secretary of State for Wales, wrote in 1997, that the establishment of 
the Assembly 'will let the people express their own priorities' over policy in Wales.5 It is clear 
that Davies, one of leading architects of the devolution settlement in 1999, intended the 
National Assembly to be a body that would be free to develop its own distinctive policy. This 
decision meant that when the Assembly was subsequently established, a space had been 
created within which divergence could develop between Wales and the remainder of the UK. 
The fact that the establishment of the National Assembly for Wales, the reconvening of the 
Scottish Parliament, and the reopening of the Northern Irish Assembly created the space 
within which policy variation could develop, does not mean that development of such 
divergence was the purpose of devolution. As noted by Davies, the establishment of the 
National Assembly allowed the people of Wales to express their own policy priorities. Whilst 
these priorities may have differed from the priorities of the people of England in certain 
areas, in others, they remained the same.   
Empirical research undertaken since 1999 suggests that the popular perception of public 
attitudes in Wales and Scotland being to the left of those in England is not, in fact, accurate. 
The work of leading analysists such as Charlie Jeffrey,6  Guy Lodge,7 Katie Schmuecker,8 
and John Curtice,9 suggests that the citizens of the four nations of the UK broadly share the 
same opinion on a number of key issues. Not only does their work suggest that UK citizens 
broadly share the same opinion on policy matters, it also suggests that the people of the UK 
wish to see a degree of policy uniformity across all four nations.10 This phenomenon has 
been labelled as the 'devolution paradox', with the people of Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland eager to see more powers devolved to the devolved legislatures on the one hand, 
but wishing to see a degree of uniformity continuing, on the other.11 The impact of this 
paradox on policy development can be seen clearly when examining health policy in Wales 
in the mid-2000s, with the Welsh Government adopting a policy that was more line with 
                                                          
5 Welsh Office, A Voice for Wales; The Governments Proposals for a Welsh Assembly, (White Paper, Cm 3718, 
1997) p5 
6 Charlie Jeffery ʻDevolution and divergence: public attitudes and instructional logics in John Adam and Katie 
Schmueker Devolution in Practice 2006, Public policy differences within the UK (ippr 2005); and Charlie Jeffrey, 
Guy Lodge and Katie Schmuecker, ʻThe devolution paradoxʼ in Guy Lodge and Katie Schmuecker (eds) 
Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010) 
7 Jeffrey, Lodge and Schmuecker, (n6) 
8 ibid 
9 John Curtice, ʻPolicy divergence: recognising difference or generating resentmentʻ in Guy Lodge and Katie 
Schmuecker (eds) Devolution in Practice 2010 (ippr 2010).  
10 ibid; Jefferey, Lodge and Schmuecker (n6); and Jeffrey (n6).  
11 Jeffrey (n6) 
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England with regard to NHS waiting times following public pressure.12 It seems clear that the 
establishment of the National Assembly did not lead to a significant public desire for the 
development of divergent policy in all areas. Indeed, Charlie Jeffrey argues that: 
it will be a sign of maturity of devolved politics when divergence is not regarded 
as a necessarily good thing in itself...13  
Not only is there evidence from public attitudes research of support for policy uniformity 
across the UK, the devolution settlements in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland ensures 
that the UK’s four nations remain interdependent. Whilst the National Assembly for Wales is 
permitted to peruse distinctive policy and to enact distinctive legislation in the policy areas 
devolved to Wales,14 in other areas such as defence and foreign policy, the UK Government 
retains responsibility for developing policy and legislation. In a system of shared legislative 
and policy competence, the decisions of one government can have a direct impact on the 
policy of another. The thesis has demonstrated that this interdependency can have an 
impact on the development of divergence. It has shown how the UK Government’s social 
security policy shapes the social housing sector in Wales. Chapter 7 drew attention to 
findings made during interview with the Chief Executives of five Welsh Registered Social 
Landlords (RSLs).15 Each Chief Executive revealed how, following the implementation of the 
ʻbedroom taxʼ, each had seen an increase in demand for smaller homes.16 The interview 
participants indicated that they had either developed plans, or were coming under pressure 
to develop plans to construct one bedroom properties.17 This policy spill-over therefore limits 
the ability of the National Assembly to shape the nature of the social housing sector in Wales 
in a divergent manner.  
It is clear that, whilst the advent of political devolution created the scope within which policy 
and legislative divergence could develop, neither the Welsh nor UK Governments are 
compelled to develop distinctive policy. The unique, cultural, geographic and demographic 
                                                          
12 Jeffrey (n6) 47; Stephen Peckham, Nicholas Mays, David Hughes, Marie Sanderson, Pauline Allen, Lindsay 
Prior, Vikki Entwistle, Andrew Thompson and Huw Davies ʻDevolution and Patient Choice: Policy Rhetoric 
versus Experience in Practiceʼ 46(2) [2012] Soc Policy Admin 199; and Katherine Smith and Mark Hellowell, 
ʻBeyond Rhetorical Differences: A Cohesive Account of Post-devolution Developments in UK Health Policyʼ 
46(2) Soc Policy Admin 178 
13 Jeffrey (n6) 48,49 
14 The Assembly has got legislative competence to enact legislation in 21 devolved areas. These are set out in 
the Government of Wales Act 2006, Part 5, Schedule 7.  
15 See 7.2.2 in particular  
16 Interview with Chief Executive of Welsh RSL 1, (Cardiff, 19 January, 2015); Interview with Chief Executive of 
Welsh RSL 2, (West Wales, 25 March, 2015); Interview with Chief Executive of Welsh RSL 3, (Cardiff, 1 May, 
2015); Interview with Chief Executive of Welsh RSL 4, (West Wales, 14 May, 2015); and Interview with Chief 
Executive of Welsh RSL 5, (South Wales, 21, October, 2015) 
17 ibid 
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features of the UK’s four nations, however, places different pressures on each government. 
Such pressures make it seemingly inevitable that a degree of divergence will develop 
between them. Some of these pressures are not new. My thesis has demonstrated how, 
even during the era of administrative devolution, special provisions were made for Wales by 
the UK Government. The purpose of administrative devolution was to allow devolved bodies 
to administer Westminster policy, in Wales, in a distinct manner.18 These bodies were not 
permitted to develop their own distinctive policies, with explicit attempts made to ensure that 
divergence was kept to a minimum. The following extract comes from instructions given to 
the Parliamentary Counsel in preparation for the transfer of powers to the Welsh Office in 
1965: 
Certain operations, however, such as the making of general regulations and the 
giving of general directions are to be reserved to the Minister with the object of 
securing uniformity of enactments.19 
Despite this, archival research undertaken for the purposes of this thesis has uncovered a 
number of instances where a distinctive Welsh approach was taken during the era of 
administrative devolution. For example, when seeking a replacement for Megan Lloyd 
George on the Central Housing Administrative Committee in 1956, the UK Government 
explicitly sought a Welsh replacement.20 No such provision was made for a region of 
England, suggesting that Wales’s sense of national identity was a factor that influenced the 
operation of the UK Government.21 In the late 1970s, the Secretary of State for Wales 
safeguarded and ensured extra funding for the work of the Housing Corporation in Wales, a 
period when the Corporation’s budget was being cut in England.22 The distinctive needs, and 
the unique political environment in Wales contributed to the development of a degree of 
policy variation even in an era of very limited administrative devolution. 
Given that the cultural, geographic and demographic differences between Wales and 
England led to the development of a degree of divergence in an era when explicit attempts 
were made to control its development, it is not surprising that the establishment of the 
Assembly has seen these factors contribute to the development of further differences. As 
                                                          
18 See Chapter 3 and 4 for a more detailed exploration of the administrative devolution era.  
19 Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Transfer of Functions to Secretary of State for Wales - 
Instructions to Parliamentary Counsel to prepare an Order in Council under the Ministries of the Crown 
(Transfer of Functions) Act 1946) – National Archives File HLG 124/171 
20 More detail on this in 3.4.2  
21 This interpretation is further supported when considering the concerns that were expressed in Whitehall 
about the potential negative reaction in Wales about appointing Blaise Gillie, a Scot, to the post of 
Undersecretary of the Welsh Office of the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. This is also discussed 
further in 3.4.2 
22 More detail on this in 4.2.2  
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was discussed in Section 8.3, for example, the differences in size and scale between the 
social housing sectors in Wales and England present the Welsh and UK Governments with 
very different challenges when devising regulatory approaches. Political devolution has 
allowed such distinctions in culture, geography and society to be manifested in policy. 
Section 9.2, below, will further emphasize this by looking back at the findings of the thesis as 
to some of the factors that have directly led to the development of divergence in the social 
housing regulatory context. 
As the development of a degree of divergence seems to be an almost inevitable result of 
political devolution, Keating’s observation that there has been limited academic study of the 
process would appear to be a weakness within the literature on devolution. Whilst it is 
important to acknowledge that devolution had not been established with the primary aim of 
generating ʻsubstantive differences in public policy across the component parts of the United 
Kingdomʼ,23 it is clear that political devolution has led to the development of substantive 
policy and legislative differences between the UK’s nations. It would therefore appear 
imperative that further research is undertaken into the area, to ensure that our understanding 
of divergence and devolution is improved. 
An example of how our understanding of both divergence and devolution can be improved 
through research can be seen when reflecting on one of the findings of this thesis. This 
thesis has demonstrated that differences between the law in Wales and England do not only 
emanate from the enactment of distinct Welsh legislation, it can also develop as a result of 
the UK Government enacting legislation that only applies in England. Evidence for this can 
be found when examining the statutory basis for regulation in Wales and England. The 
Housing Act 1996 provided the statutory basis for social housing regulation in both nations 
upon its enactment and continued to do so even after the establishment of the National 
Assembly in 1999.24 In 2008, however, following the enactment of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, the Housing Act 1996 ceased to be the statutory basis for regulation 
in England and became the legal basis for regulation in Wales only.25 It was the UK 
Government’s decision to enact a new statutory basis for regulation in England that, in 
effect, created a distinct English, and a distinct Welsh, statutory basis for regulation, driving 
                                                          
23 Keating (n1) 
24 The Housing Act 1996 was amended on two occasions over this period. First by the Government of Wales 
Act 1998, s 140, s 141, s 142, s 143, which abolished Tai Cymru; and secondly by The National Assembly for 
Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999 No. 672 Schedule 1, which devolved responsibility for social housing 
regulation to the Welsh Ministers.  
25 The Housing and Regeneration Act 2008 became the statutory basis for social housing regulation in England.  
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divergence. The significance of this finding for our understanding of Wales’s devolution 
settlement will be set out in section 9.3 below.  
9.2 Divergence and housing 
The findings of this thesis suggest that at least five different factors have contributed to the 
development of both differences and similarities in social housing regulation between Wales 
and England. These were discussed at length in Chapters 7 and 8. The five factors noted 
were: (1) politics and policy, (2) the limits of devolution, (3) international accountancy 
standards, (4) private finance and (5) the structure of the sector. This section will revisit each 
of these five factors, providing a brief recap of how each has had an impact on the 
divergence process. This section will then move on to consider some of the changes that the 
sector will be facing in the near future, noting how the housing sector is currently in a state of 
legislative, regulatory and policy flux.  
9.2.1 The factors driving divergence and convergence 
In exploring the impact of politics and policy on the development of divergence, Chapter 7 
focused in particular on the process that led to the enactment of the Housing and 
Regeneration Act 2008, the Housing (Wales) Measure 2011 and the Localism Act 2011.26 
These three pieces of legislation, enacted since the establishment of the Assembly, have 
seen the way that social housing regulation is undertaken in Wales and England develop in 
different ways, with variations developing between the way that tenants are protected 
through regulation,27 and in the role that profit-making organisations play in the provision of 
social housing.28 All three Acts were enacted following the completion of separate reviews 
into social housing regulation. The Cave Review,29 the Essex Review,30 and the DCLG 
Review31 developed within their unique political context. Section 7.1 argued that the different 
pressures that each review team faced when undertaking their respective reviews influenced 
the nature of their recommendations. Given that a direct line can be drawn from some of 
these recommendations to the legislation enacted in their wake, it would appear that 
                                                          
26 See section 7.1 in particular 
27 Section 6.2 discussed the two-tiered approach to regulation adopted in England. This approach means that 
the regulator takes a reactive approach to consumer regulation, meaning that a provider has had to have 
breached, or is at risk of breaching a consumer standard before the HCA takes action. The analysis set out in 
section 6.2 suggested that tenants in England are at a greater risk of suffering harm than their counterparts in 
Wales, who are protected by the more proactive approach of the Welsh Government. 
28 As discussed in detail in Section 5.1, profit-making bodies are now permitted to register with the HCA in 
England as providers of social housing. This is not the case in Wales.   
29 The Cave Review of Social Housing Regulation, Every Tenant Matters: A Review of Social Housing Regulation 
(June 2007) 
30 Affordable Housing Task and Finish Group, Report to the Deputy Minister for Housing (June 2008) 
31 Department for Communities and Local Government, Review of Social Housing Regulation, (October 2010) 
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differences between the political and policy environments in Wales and England contribute 
towards the development of legislative and policy variation.  
The second factor identified in the thesis as having an impact on the divergence process 
was the limits of devolution. As discussed briefly in 9.1 above, and in more detail in Chapter 
7,32 this thesis has demonstrated that Wales’s devolution settlement has an impact on the 
divergence process. The thesis highlights how the nature of Wales’s devolution settlement 
ensures that a degree of interdependency remains between the work of the Welsh and UK 
Governments. Chapter 7 focused in particular on how the UK Government’s welfare policy 
can have a direct impact on the social housing sector in Wales.33 As discussed above, 
evidence gathered through interview with the Chief Executives of five Welsh RSLs, highlight 
the impact that the ʻbedroom taxʼ, has had on Wales.34 In light of this finding, the chapter 
questioned the degree by which the Welsh Government has the ability to develop a 
distinctive social housing policy in Wales, given the impact of policy overspill on 
divergence.35 This further emphasises the complicated way in which divergence develops, 
and the role that both the Welsh and UK Governments play in the process.  
The third factor discussed in the thesis for its role in the divergence process was 
international accountancy standards. Section 8.1 focused in particular on the Office for 
National Statistics’s (ONS) decision to reclassify housing associations as part of the public 
sector.36 The ONS reached their decision based on the degree of control exercised by both 
the Welsh and UK Governments over the social housing sectors in their respective nations, 
through regulation. Drawing on evidence gathered through interview with Kerry Mac Hale, 
the policy lead on social housing regulation at the UK Government, the thesis reveals that 
the UK Government would ʻprobably notʼ have introduced the legislative changes made to 
social housing regulation in England under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, were it not 
for the ONS’s decision.37 Given that these legislative changes, have, in the short term led to 
the development of regulatory differences between Wales and England, this thesis has 
demonstrated that international accountancy standards are another factor that can drive 
divergence. In the long term, however, the ONS’s decision may drive convergence. The 
                                                          
32 Specifically, 7.2 
33 ibid 
34 See Auditor General for Wales, Managing the Impact of Welfare Reform Changes on Social Housing Tenants 
in Wales (Wales Audit Office, 8 January 2015). This is discussed in more detail in section 7.2.2. 
35 See 7.2.2  
36 Office for National Statistics, Classification announcement: “Private registered providers” of social housing in 
England, (30 October 2015) and Office for National Statistics ʻStatistical classification of registered providers of 
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37 Interview with Kerry Mac Hale, Policy lead on social housing regulation, UK Government (Telephone 
interview, 17 May 2016) 
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Welsh Government has indicated that it will take any necessary steps to reverse the ONS’s 
decision.38 Such steps are likely to include the enactment of legislation that would amend the 
statutory basis for regulation in Wales to become more in line with the system now in place 
in England. This could see the statutory basis for regulation in Wales and England becoming 
more alike than had been the case prior to the ONS’s decisions.39 International accountancy 
standards is therefore a factor that has a complicated impact on the development of 
divergence. Future research, following the completion of the Welsh and UK Government’s 
legislative and regulatory reaction to the ONS decision, may develop and deepen our 
understanding of its impact.  
A fourth factor identified as impacting on the development of policy variation is private 
finance.  Information gathered through interview, and from secondary materials, in particular, 
information revealed by Julian Ashby, the head of the Homes and Communities Agency 
(HCA) Regulatory Committee, before the Communities and Local Government Committee at 
Westminster, suggests that the requirement for housing associations to gain access to 
private finance influences the way that divergence develops in two key ways. First, it would 
appear to impact upon the way that regulation is undertaken in practice. Ashby revealed 
before the Communities and Local Government in 2013 that the way that the HCA 
undertakes its regulation in practice, differs from the regime set out on paper.40 He revealed 
that the regulator had, in a ʻhandfulʼ of cases, decided against downgrading a provider’s 
financial viability judgment so as to avoid triggering a reaction from lenders and the financial 
markets.41 This suggests that private finance has a direct impact on regulation in practice. 
Secondly, an interview with Kerry Mac Hale42 revealed that the UK Government changed 
certain provisions within the Housing and Planning Act 2016 in response to the concerns of 
lenders and bond holders.43 It would appear that private finance is a factor that influences 
both policy development and policy implementation, impacting upon the development of 
divergence between Wales and England.  
The final factor discussed within the thesis as having an impact on the development of 
divergence is the structural differences between the social housing sector in Wales and 
England. There are significantly fewer Welsh RSLs than their English counterparts. Welsh 
                                                          
38 Heather Spurr ʻ Governments pledge to reverse ONS reclassificationʼ (Inside Housing, 30 September 2016) < 
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accessed 2 November 2011. 
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RSLs are also, on the whole, smaller than English registered providers.44 This may explain 
why the Welsh Government have adopted a more hands-on approach to regulation than the 
UK Government. The smaller number of RSLs provide the Welsh Government with a greater 
opportunity to develop both informal and formal regulatory contact than their English 
counterparts, where a hands-on approach may be more resource intensive. The thesis also 
notes that the approach taken by Welsh Government to regulation has been amended over 
recent years, becoming more risk based in nature, more in line with the English approach. A 
possible reason for this change in approach is the difficulties that the Welsh Government 
encountered when undertaking regulation without such a focus.45 Chapters 3, 4 and 5 also 
highlighted how such structural differences led to the development of divergence, even in an 
era prior to political devolution. Indeed, Chapter 3 highlighted how societal, economic and 
geographical factors had an impact on the nature of Welsh housing, even in an era prior to 
administrative devolution, with higher rates of owner occupation in the south Wales coalfield 
than in the rest of the nation, in the early 20th century. Whilst further research is required to 
draw definite conclusions on the impact of this final factor on the development of divergence, 
it seems certain that the structural differences between both nations, is a factor that has an 
impact on the divergence process.  
9.2.2 Social housing, a sector in flux 
This thesis has demonstrated that divergence is a complex process. Legislative and policy 
differences develop as a result of the actions of both the Welsh and UK Governments. 
These variations appear at a number of different levels including in primary and secondary 
legislation, and in the regulatory frameworks published in both nations. These differences 
have developed as a result of a number of factors, working together to both push and to 
constrain divergence. This thesis has provided a snapshot of some of the differences that 
have appeared between social housing regulation as a result of this process.46 The extent of 
the variation that has developed between Wales and England, as set out within this thesis, is 
correct as of 31 December 2016. With the social housing sector in Wales and England 
facing a number of challenges, however, it seems certain that the extent of this variation will 
change further.    
Perhaps the most pressing challenge facing the social housing sectors in Wales and 
England is the ONS’s decision to reclassify housing associations as part of the public sector. 
                                                          
44 See discussion in section 8.3  
45 These difficulties were revealed during interview with the five Chief Executives of Welsh RSLs. During this 
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old approach to regulation. This is discussed in detail at 8.3 
46 These are discussed in Chapter 6 in particular.  
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As was discussed in sections 6.3 and 8.1 both the Welsh and Westminster Government are 
eager to reverse the ONS’s decision and to return housing associations to the private 
sector.47 There are three reasons for this. First the ONS’s decision moves the debt of 
housing associations onto the public balance sheet.48 Second, it subjects housing 
associations to public sector borrowing rules, reducing their ability to borrow from the private 
sector.49 This in turn has an impact on the ability of housing associations to construct new 
homes, making it unlikely that either government would meet their housebuilding targets. 
Third, housing associations themselves are eager to see their organisations returned to the 
private sector.50 These pressures are also apparent in Scotland and Northern Ireland.51 A 
further, consideration is likely to be driving the Welsh Government’s response to the ONS’s 
decision. Community Housing Cymru have expressed concerns that the ONS’s 
reclassification could result in the UK Treasury placing limits on the amount of money that 
Welsh RSLs could borrow.52 This would limit the ability of the Welsh Government’s to 
develop distinctive housing policy, further demonstrating the impact of Wales’s devolution 
settlement on the divergence process.      
The ONS’s decision was discussed in detail in Chapter 6 which set out the UK Government’s 
legislative reaction and looked at the options available for Welsh Government following their 
                                                          
47 In evidence to the Communities and Local Government Committee, Brandon Lewis, the former Minister of 
State for Housing and Planning stated that he wanted registered providers ʻoff the Government books, which is 
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public commitment to ensuring that RSLs are returned to the private sector.53 As was 
discussed in Chapter 8, it is not yet possible to fully measure the impact of the ONS’s 
decision on divergence and social housing regulation. At Westminster, the UK Government 
is yet to enact all the secondary legislation that it intends to have in place.54 In Wales on the 
other hand, the Welsh Government had not taken the required legislative steps to reverse 
the ONS’s decision, at time of submission for this thesis, despite making it clear that it was 
their intention to do so.55  
In the period between the submission of this thesis and the viva voce examination the Welsh 
Government has tabled legislation before the National Assembly that seeks to reverse the 
ONS’s reclassification decision.56 As was anticipated by the analysis set out in sections 6.3 
and 8.1 of this thesis, the legislative provisions, set out in the Regulation of Registered 
Social Landlords (Wales) Bill are extremely similar to the ones put in place in England 
through the enactment of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. The Bill, if enacted, will mean 
that RSLs in Wales will no longer require the consent of the Welsh Government before 
disposing of land,57 or changing their constitution.58 The power of the Welsh Government 
over the management of RSLs will also been reduced along the lines taken in England.59 All 
these changes will see the statutory basis for regulation in Wales converge with the regime 
in place in England.  
The Bill has now started on its legislative journey through the National Assembly. In 
evidence given to the National Assembly’s External Affairs and Additional Legislation 
Committee, the then Cabinet Secretary for Communities and Children, Carl Sargent, made it 
clear that the Welsh Government had held conversations with the ONS whilst developing its 
legislative response.60 In his evidence, Sargent cautioned the committee against making 
significant amendments to the Bill, stating that the ONS would not be willing to ‘give a 
running commentary on the Bill’ any that amendments could jeopardise what he argued was 
a purely ‘technical process’.61 This approach drew criticism from one committee member 
who argued that the ONS should respect the ‘sovereign rights’ of the Assembly as a 
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legislature to make amendments to the Bill.62 These concerns suggest that the impact of 
international accountancy standards could extend beyond influencing how governments 
develop policy to influencing how democratic institutions operate and scrutinise legislation.    
Despite the concerns of some committee members, the broad support that has been given 
to the Bill in consultation responses,63 and the political desire in Wales to build more 
affordable homes does make it appear likely that the Bill will become part of Welsh law in 
2018. Given that the Welsh Government were in contact with the ONS whilst drafting the Bill, 
it appears likely that its enactment will be sufficient to return Welsh RSLs into the private 
sector. 
Whilst the ability of the Welsh Government to develop a distinctive approach when enacting 
primary legislation in response to the ONS’s decision was limited, the same was not true 
with regards to the regulatory framework. In December 2016 the Welsh Government 
announced plans to ʻreviseʼ and ʻimproveʼ the delivery of social housing regulation in 
Wales.64 From 1 January 2017 the Welsh Government will no longer publish regulatory 
opinions on housing associations in Wales.65 In its place the Welsh Government will provide 
each RSL with a ʻco-regulation statusʼ.66 Each RSL with be given two such statuses, one in 
relation to its performance against ʻgovernance and service deliveryʼ standards, the other in 
relation to its performance against ʻfinancial viabilityʼ standards.67 There are four categories 
of status that a RSLs could receive, ranging from ʻstandardʼ, the status afforded to those 
RSLs that the regulator is satisfied with their performance, to ʻstatutory actionʼ.68 In addition 
to this the Welsh Government are also intending to revise the current delivery outcomes set 
out in the Welsh regulatory framework, with the Government indicating that they wish to see 
the outcomes baring a closer alignment to the way that RSLs operate in practice in Wales.69  
Speaking at Community Housing Cymru’s Annual Conference, Carol Kay and Sarah Laing 
Gibbens of the Welsh Government’s social housing regulation team were clear that one of 
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the drivers behind these regulatory changes was the ONS’s decision to reclassify Welsh 
housing associations.70 It was argued that these proposed changes to regulation would allow 
the Welsh Government to maintain a robust regulatory regime as the Government lost some 
control over the sector through subsequent legislation.71 Kay and Gibbens’s comments 
further emphasize the significance of the ONS’s decision for social housing regulation. It 
would appear that both the Welsh and UK Governments have been compelled to take 
measures that they would not otherwise have taken.  
At first glance the introduction of the ʻco-regulation statusʼ would seem to move the 
regulatory regime in Wales in line with England. Housing associations in both nations will 
now be categorised according to their compliance with ʻgovernanceʼ72 and ʻfinancial viabilityʼ 
standards.73 The Welsh Government have made it clear, however, that tenants will ʻremain 
at the heart of regulationʼ in Wales. This would seem to indicate that the two tiered approach 
to regulation, in place in England, will not be implemented in Wales.74 Under the two tiered 
approach to regulation in England, the regulator only reactively assess compliance with 
ʻconsumer standardsʼ.75 As discussed in 6.2 this means that the regulator only assess 
compliance with standards relating to matters such as ʻtenant involvement and 
empowermentʼ if there has been a breach, or if the regulator suspects that there could be a 
breach of such a standard, that has or could cause serious detriment to a tenant.76 This 
differs from the approach taken in Wales where compliance with such standards is assessed 
on a proactive basis. It would appear that the Welsh Government will continue to pursue a 
proactive approach when assessing compliance with the standards set out in the regulatory 
framework. This demonstrates that whilst the ONS’s decision may lead to certain elements 
of the regulatory regimes in Wales and England converging, other elements will remain 
different. As the full legislative and regulatory responses of the UK and Welsh Governments 
become clear over the next two to three years, this would appear to be a fertile area for 
research, providing opportunity to gain a greater understanding of the way that international 
accountancy standards impact upon the divergence process.   
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Both the Welsh and UK Governments must respond to the ONS’s decision at a difficult time 
for the UK’s housing sector. Housing is a policy area that has significantly increased in 
political salience over recent years. In May 2010, when David Cameron became Prime 
Minister, housing was viewed as an important issue by just 5% of the UK’s population.77 
Over the following six years, housing has increased sharply as an area of concern for the 
UK’s population, peaking at 22% in August 2016, housing’s highest score since October 
1974.78 Whilst the importance of housing has dropped slightly in recent months, housing 
remained an important issue for 18% of the UK population in November 2016, higher than 
education, unemployment, defence, and law and order.79 The increased importance of 
housing as a policy area is demonstrated further by the fact that the Economic and Social 
Research Council have identified housing as one of their priority research areas from 2016 
to 2020.80 In this light it is not surprising that both the Welsh and UK Governments have 
taken steps to address the ʻhousing crisisʼ.   
The Governments at Cardiff Bay and Westminster have announced plans to increase house 
building. The Welsh Government has pledged to construct 20,000 affordable homes during 
the course of the current Assembly, a two-fold increase on the target that was in place 
between 2011 and 2016.81 The UK Government on the other hand, has set a target of 1 
million homes to be built, in England, between 2015 and 2020, across all tenures.82 It is not 
just with regard to house building that the ʻhousing crisisʼ is having an impact on Government 
policy. In Wales, the Welsh Government is set to introduce legislation to abolish the ʻright to 
buyʼ.83 The UK Government, by contrast, has recently enacted legislation to expand the 
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policy to housing association properties in England.84 This divergent response to a common 
issue, a lack of affordable housing, highlights, once more how devolution has created a 
scope for policy variation to develop between Wales and England. Not for the first time, 
ideological differences between the more left wing administration in Cardiff Bay, and the right 
wing administration at Westminster, have seen directly conflicting policies developed, almost 
simultaneously.85  
In addition to addressing problems with the social housing sector, the Welsh Government 
has enacted two pieces of legislation that have made significant changes to the private 
rental sector in Wales. The first piece of legislation enacted was the Housing (Wales) Act 
2014. The Act introduced a number of changes for the housing sector in Wales, but perhaps 
the most interesting of these was the introduction of landlord registration and landlord 
licencing.86 Under the Act, all landlords in Wales must have registered with Rent Smart 
Wales, the designated licencing authority, by 23 November 2016.87 In addition to this, 
landlords are only permitted to undertake lettings and management tasks if they have 
received a licence from Rent Smart Wales to do so.88 Early indications suggest that a high 
number of landlords are not complying with these new requirements, raising a question as to 
the effectiveness of the Welsh Governments attempts to improve the private rental sector.89 
The second piece of housing legislation enacted by the Welsh Government was the Renting 
Homes (Wales) Act 2016.90 The Act significantly changes landlord and tenant law in Wales. 
Perhaps the most important change introduced by the Act is the replacement of all current 
tenancies and licences with two types of occupation contract.91 Given that these changes will 
only apply in Wales, and with no indication that the UK Government is minded to introduce a 
similar regime in England, landlord and tenant law in Wales and England has diverged 
significantly. The importance of this change extends beyond housing law, with the Lord Chief 
Justice suggesting that the joint jurisdiction of England and Wales could come under 
pressure in 2017, as the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 comes into force.92 Thomas LCJ 
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was particularly concerned about whether there was sufficient awareness in England that 
landlord and tenant law in Wales will be different to the law in England.93 He stated: 
we are slightly worried about whether people in a court in one of the English 
cities will realise that, if you have a dispute about a rented property in Wales, the 
law will not be what is English law—it will be Welsh law.94 
Thomas LCJ revealed that the judiciary was yet to find a solution to this problem.95 Whilst 
this thesis has focused on the development of divergence in social housing regulation, there 
is a pressing need for research to examine its impact in the private rental sector. This 
research would appear necessary not only to explore the extent of the differences that have 
developed between landlord and tenant law in Wales and England, and why they have 
developed, but also to examine whether these differences are placing a strain on the joint 
jurisdiction of England and Wales.  
The impact of the challenges presented by the ʻhousing crisisʼ have extended beyond 
housing policy. Nowhere has the effects of the ʻcrisisʼ been more clearly felt than with regard 
to welfare policy. The UK’s housing benefit bill had increased from just under £23 billion in 
2009/10 to over £26 billion by 2014/15.96 With reducing the deficit having been one of 
George Osborne’s primary objectives during his spell as Chancellor, it is not surprising that 
the UK Government has taken steps to try and reduce housing benefit. One way in which the 
UK Government has sought to do this has already been discussed in this thesis, in particular 
in Chapter 7.97 In 2012, the UK Coalition Government introduced the ʻunder occupancy 
penaltyʼ, or the ʻbedroom taxʼ as it is commonly known.98 Under the policy, individuals that 
were in receipt of housing benefit would see their payments reduced if it were deemed that 
their property contained a spare bedroom.99 Whilst the policy was introduced by the UK 
Government, it became clear through interviews with the Chief Executives of five Welsh 
RSLs that the policy had, had an impact on the social housing sector in Wales. All five 
participants revealed that they had seen a change in the sorts of property that were in 
demand within their portfolios, with a greater demand for smaller homes as a result of the 
policy.  
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This finding is perhaps not surprising given the suggestion in a Wales Audit Office 
publication in January 2015 that the introduction of the ʻbedroom taxʼ in Wales would affect a 
disproportionate number of Welsh social housing tenants.100 An indication as to why this is 
the case can be found in a Welsh Affairs Committee Report, published in 2013.101 The 
Committee found that the housing stock of Welsh housing associations was older and more 
rural in nature than the stock in England.102 This meant that there were proportionality fewer 
small homes in Wales, and that these were more isolated, making it harder to move people if 
they wished to downsize as a result of the reform.103 With further welfare reform in the 
pipeline, in particular the introduction of the Universal Credit and the cap on Local Housing 
Allowance payments, the impact of UK Government welfare policy seems set to 
considerably impact upon the social housing sector in Wales and England. It would therefore 
appear that there is a pressing need for further academic research to examine the 
relationship between the UK Government’s welfare policy and the Welsh Government’s 
housing policy. In time, this research may lead to a debate as to how devolution should 
operate in policy areas where powers overlap, leading to questions about whether greater 
powers should be devolved to Wales, or whether there is a need to develop a mechanism for 
sharing powers.  
Housing is a policy area that is clearly in a state of flux in the UK. The combination of the 
ʻhousing crisisʼ, the UK Government’s austerity programme, and the ONS’s decision to 
reclassify housing associations as part of the public sector, has seen both legislation and 
policy in Wales and England change in ways that would have been unexpected only a few 
years ago. Historical cultural and geographical differences have seen these changes affect 
Wales and England differently. On the one hand, the UK Government’s changes to housing 
benefit have disproportionately affected Wales, as a result of the nation’s older, more rural 
housing stock. This has placed Welsh housing associations under pressure to develop 
smaller homes. This pressure could reduce some of the historical differences that exist 
between both nations. On the other, devolution has afforded both the Welsh and UK 
Governments the opportunity to develop distinctive responses to common problems. A clear 
example of this can be found when looking at the opposing approaches of both governments 
to the ʻright to buyʼ. It therefore seems inevitable that the extent of the differences that exist 
between social housing regulation in Wales and England will change further in future. The 
legislative and regulatory variation set out in this thesis should consequently be viewed as 
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correct as of 31st of December 2016. The findings of this thesis as to the factors that 
combine to drive legislative and policy differentiation do have important, longer term 
implications for our understanding of the divergence process. The thesis’s final section will 
reflect on these lessons and will consider how they should shape our understanding of 
Welsh devolution.  
9.3 Divergence, a complicated process 
There has been a tendency within the UK to consider divergence to be a process that is 
primarily driven by the devolved nations.104 Indeed, it would appear that the UK Government, 
maintains this view. The Wales Act 2017, which recently received royal assent, amends the 
Government of Wales Act 2006, and in doing so, changes the devolution settlement in 
Wales. Amongst the Act’s provisions that has attracted the greatest public reaction have 
been those that moves the devolution model in place in Wales from the conferred to the 
reserved powers form of devolution,105 and those provisions that devolve certain powers 
over income tax to the National Assembly.106 The Wales Act 2017 also contains a provision 
that provides ‘recognition of Welsh law.’107The Act states: 
There is a body of Welsh law made by the Assembly and the Welsh Ministers.108 
No reference is made in the Act, however, to the fact a body of Welsh law also exists having 
been made by the UK Parliament and by UK Ministers. This thesis has demonstrated that 
such a body of Welsh law does exist. An example of Welsh law of this kind can be found in 
Part 1 of the Housing Act 1996, the statutory basis for social housing regulation in Wales. 
Whilst the Housing Act 1996, is a UK Parliament piece of legislation, Part 1 of the Act only 
applies in Wales.109 In only recognising law made by the Assembly as Welsh law, the UK 
Government is not only inaccurate, it also reinforces the misconception that divergence is a 
process driven by changes made in Wales.  
It appears that the Welsh Government is aware of the importance of this misconception. On 
13 December 2016, the Welsh Government announced a new programme to ‘make Welsh 
Law easier to find and understand’.110 It proposes to do this by codifying the law in Wales. 
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Under the proposals, existing laws in areas devolved to Wales, will be consolidated and 
placed into a Welsh legal code.111 The Welsh Government will apply this approach to both 
the legislation of the Assembly and the legislation of the UK Parliament, even if the 
provisions that apply to Wales also apply to other parts of the UK.112 The findings of my 
thesis as to the way that the statutory basis for social housing regulation has evolved in 
Wales suggests that the Welsh Government is correct in taking this approach to its 
codification programme. Whilst a number of UK Parliament’s statutes in devolved policy 
areas may apply in Wales and other parts of the UK, their provisions are still part of Welsh 
law. In reaching the decision to codify all legislation enacted at Westminster that apply in the 
devolved areas, in Wales, the Welsh Government demonstrates that it recognises that 
divergence can develop as a result of legislation enacted at Westminster. If the Welsh 
Government did not codify all such legislation at the outset, there would be a need to 
consistently review legislation enacted at Westminster, to see whether more Wales only law 
had been formed.   
In recognising the fact that divergence develops as a result of legislation enacted in Cardiff 
Bay and at Westminster, the Welsh Government is likely to face a number of challenges 
when attempting to codify the law. Identifying all the component parts of Welsh law and then 
enacting legislation that codifies it is a mammoth task. Whilst the Welsh Government may be 
able to draw on the Law Commission for some assistance during this process,113 it seems 
certain that it will take the Welsh Government a number of years to get legislation in place to 
fully codify the law. Identifying what constitutes Welsh law may be difficult for a further 
reason. Not only will the Welsh Government have to identify the legislation that applies in 
Wales, it will also have to decide whether it constitutes a devolved area. Given the number 
of high profile issues the Welsh Government has had in identifying what is devolved to 
Wales, this may prove a further stumbling block for the programme.114        
My thesis has identified further complexities that impact on the divergence process. The 
thesis has highlighted how, in order to fully understand the process, there is a need to look 
beyond primary legislation at secondary legislation and documents such as regulatory 
framework. In Chapter 6,115 the thesis demonstrated how neither the Welsh nor English 
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regulators were aware of the number of housing associations that were registered with them, 
but that held property on the other side of the border. This regulatory oversight had 
developed, not as a result of statutory divergence but as a result of decisions taken by both 
regulators as to whether they wished to collect such data. Whilst the number of tenants 
affected by this regulatory oversight would appear small in this instance,116 further research 
in other devolved areas may discover that this is a common problem. If this were to be the 
case, this would raise questions as to how the Welsh and UK Governments could work 
together to minimise the problem. 
The analysis has highlighted the fact that the divergence process is influenced by a number 
of factors. These factors include external pressures such as the ONS’s decision, the need 
for private finance and the cultural, geographic, demographic pressures that have shaped 
the sectors in Wales and England. This thesis has demonstrated with regard to the ONS’s 
decision in particular, how an external force, beyond the control of government, can 
fundamentally change government policy. My thesis has demonstrated how these pressures 
can lead to the development of both divergence and convergence. The thesis has also 
demonstrated, however, that the divergence process can be influenced by the political 
environment in Wales and England, and policy choices made by both governments. It is 
clear then, that the establishment of the National Assembly in 1999 did create the space 
within which policy and legislative variation could, and has developed.  
Despite the fact that the establishment of the National Assembly created the scope within 
which divergence could develop, the findings of this thesis have highlighted some of the 
potential difficulties that divergence may present the current devolution settlement in Wales. 
If the law in Wales and England becomes increasingly distinct, this is likely to place greater 
pressures on the united England and Wales legal jurisdiction. As noted in 9.2.2, the Lord 
Chief Justice has indicated that the he believes that 2017 could be a challenging year for the 
jurisdiction as the Renting Homes (Wales) Act 2016 comes into force.117 Perhaps the area 
where the development of policy variation could become most difficult to deal with, however, 
is welfare policy. As demonstrated in Chapter 7,118 the UK Government’s welfare policy has 
a direct impact on the housing sector in Wales. If the regulatory differences that now exist 
between Wales and England lead to the social housing sectors in Wales and England 
becoming more distinct, this is likely to make it increasingly difficult for the UK Government 
to develop its welfare policy in a way that impacts on Wales and England consistently. It 
would appear imperative that further research is undertaken on this issue, to ensure that 
                                                          
116 According to data provided by housingnet.co.uk. 1,171 homes were affected.  
117 Lord Chief Justice (n84) 
118 Specifically, 7.2.2 
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neither Welsh RSLs and tenants are at a disadvantage compared to their counterparts in 
England.   
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